740.5/3–452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn 1


1941. For McCloy. Ref: Bonn 1824,2 rptd Paris 585, London 489, [Page 625]Mar 4; Bonn 1839,3 rptd London 493, Paris 589, Mar 5; Bonn 18404 rptd London 493, Paris 589, Mar 5.

We have impression that Fr and possibly Brit have had some second thoughts on agreements reached re security controls at London and Lisbon, and are now attempting stretch definitions to include areas of control beyond those agreed by Fon Mins. This departure from agreed principles in effect constitutes a renunciation of an agreement presumably made in good faith with the Chancellor, will increase his difficulties with the Bundestag, and because of nature of restrictions which Fr intend to add (e. g. productive capacity), if accepted, may lead in post-occupation period to unnecessarily strict interpretations of treaty provisions by Fr and consequent attempts to interfere in Ger internal affairs.
Four actions need to be taken in field of security controls as result of decisions reached London and Lisbon. To recapitulate, they are:
Art 4a of EDC treaty wld be amended to give EDC Commissariat discretion not to place orders for production items on annexed list II in strategically exposed areas (e.g. Fed Rep).
Adenauer wld send letter to US, Brit and Fr indicating that action of EDC under Art 4a wld not be regarded by Fed Rep as discriminatory.
Adenauer wld address letter to US and UK govts assuring them that EDC treaty (including provision concerning limitation of arms production) will become Ger law, and prohibitions will also have effect re UK and US.
Adenauer wld address letter to US, UK, and Fr govts assuring them with respect Civil aircraft (1) that none are being produced in Fed Rep at present and no facilities were available for such production, (2) that the Fed Rep intends purchase from other countries such Civil aircraft as may be required in Ger and (3) that if conditions changed in future Fed Rep wld seek agreement on this matter with the US, UK and Fr in light of conditions then prevailing. We wld prefer that this be included in ltr noted para 2b above, tho it was not so agreed with Adenauer.
Our views follow on specific points introduced by Brit and Fr, and reported in reftels:
Re Bonn 1839 para 1 as indicated Deptel 1937 Mar. 7,5 we do not [Page 626]approve inclusion influence mines in definition long range and guided missiles as this weapon never discussed at London. However you may agree to this if Brit and Fr insist.
Definition mil aircraft Bonn 1839 definitely not acceptable to us. It represents considerable retrogression from TGG London recommendation in that it probably wld not permit production most component and spare parts. We believe component parts listed Paras 1 b and c London Report (TGG 20 final Oct 256) shld be absolute maximum components covered in this definition. We wld prefer definitions covering only complete mil aircraft and complete air frames and engines for mil aircraft.
We wld reluctantly accept proposal para 3 urtel 1839 for inclusion of mfg capacity in definition of weapons.
Agree formula re propellants plans urtel 1840.
Agree definition naval vessels para 4 urtel 1839, with exception of Fr amendment to para 2 re vessels for reception and launching of aircraft or guided missiles. From our point of view Fr amendment is unnecessary in view of restrictions on vessel tonnage and guided and long range missiles, but you may accept it for proposal to Gers if you feel some “give” is necessary.
It was sense of Lisbon agreement that Adenauer wld send ltr or communication on civil aircraft to three govts, not make “declaration”. We believe this distinction shld be noted. It was understood at Lisbon that this ltr, as well as those noted under 2 b and c above, must be laid before Bundestag and that they wld be part of overall package deal. The word “approval” was used. It was not rpt not made clear specifically what this meant, but it is clear that it wld at least require that Bundestag not raise objection to ltrs. We therefore believe you shld go along with Fr proposal on this point (urtel 1840) at least until Ger reaction is ascertained.
While we recognize HICOM shld discuss its proposals with Adenauer and recognize that Fr may insist that his agreement, at least in principle, be obtained before discussion and drafting begins in EDC conference, we believe no effort shld be spared to prevent development of Allied-Ger split on this issue and further delay in reaching final agreement on terms of necessary articles of EDC treaty. We also believe other members of EDC are likely to argue that more objectionable aspects of Fr inspired limitations shld be modified. In any case they cannot be asked to accept without discussion and possible modification provisions applicable to their own activities. We of course hope that proposed definitions will be passed to EDC for final action as quickly as possible.
In conclusion, as indicated para 1 above, we believe some of Fr and Brit proposals go beyond mins decisions and agreement with Adenauer and hence are likely to provoke justifiable resentment on Adenauer’s part. We therefore think you shld, in agreeing to present them to him, point out to Fr that they were not mentioned to him at [Page 627]London and that your Govt believes his refusal to accept them, if he does refuse, must result in reconsideration of Allied position, at least so far as commitments or coverage of definitions additional to those discussed with Adenauer at London are concerned.
  1. Drafted by Laukhuff, Hay, William K. Miller, and Jacobs of GER, cleared in substance with Byroade of GER, Barnard of RA, and Fahey of Defense. Repeated to London and Paris.
  2. Not printed; it contained a brief summary report of an informal meeting of High Commissioners held on Mar. 4 at which the French High Commissioner stated that the French agreement at the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February relating to security controls over German production of propellants and gun barrels as well as civil aviation “was only given as part of an overall settlement.” Unless the United States and United Kingdom would agree that the EDC should have a monopoly on the construction of plants producing propellants and that such plants would be in strategically appropriate locations, and unless France also received satisfaction on a German civil aviation declaration, the French Government would have to ask that the entire problem of German armament production be reconsidered (740.5/3–452).
  3. Not printed; it reported on a meeting at the technical level in an effort to reach further agreement on clarification of German armament production limitations and requested permission for agreement by U.S. officials if the French remained adamant (740.5/3–552).
  4. Not printed; it contained a draft formula concerning production by the proposed EDC of propellants which, as explained by the French High Commissioner, did not “exclude possibility of some manufacture of propellants in Germany if under Article A 7 of EDC treaty this should be decided by majority vote.” However, it was reported that “French are at present opposed to authorizing such manufacture in Germany and argue that existing capacities elsewhere should first be developed.” McCloy stated that “Although French formula does not entirely correspond to our understanding of Lisbon agreements, it nevertheless does not give French absolute veto in EDC and probably represents the furthest to which French Govt is prepared to go” (740.5/3–552).
  5. Not printed.
  6. Not printed; a copy of TGG(SC)P.20 Final, Oct. 10, 1951 and Appendix E, thereto, the paragraphs under reference here, is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 205.