740.5/3–752: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Oakley) to the Embassy in France 1

secret

215. In long conv with Ramsey at Porter dinner party last night and in presence Nor deleg (Frihagen), Andre Philip, French Socialist and head Fr del to ECE, said EDF treaty “in present form” would be defeated in Fr Assembly by 60 votes, that as result last Sunday’s caucus of Socialists it was clear Socialist Party would reject present concept of EDF and that Socialists could support present EDF treaty only if UK adhered or if legislation providing for polit integration EDC presented to Assembly simultaneously with treaty.

We pass his views on because he spoke with such frankness, passion and tone of authority. His principal points were these:

1.
Of conditions imposed by Socialists in EDF debate in Assembly, none more important than that polit integration of EDC must parallel milit integration. To create EDF before there is an EDC Supranatl fon policy was “natl suicide” and “putting cart before horse”. Latter could be attained only through greater measure polit integration than present EDF treaty contemplates. Danger of proceeding to rearm FedRep with EDF, in absence Supranatl EDC, could be illustrated by two examples. Until FedRep pools its sovereignty within EDC, Sovs could always disrupt EDF by dangling prize of reunification of Ger on terms no Ger Govt could turn down. If Yugo were attacked for example, and EDF should go to defense, could not Soviets neutralize Ger by offering bait of restitution of East Ger or part of Oder-Neisse territories? Hence, an EDC policy on Ger unity must be thought out and pooled before EDF activated. His own view was that EDC could not deny goal of Ger unity but that West Gers must now, and before rearming, agree by pooling sovereignty and fon policy that unity should be attained only after buildup of defensive strength within politically united EDC made negots possible with USSR toward end peaceful reunification of Ger.
2.
Socialist EDF conditions had been “minimum”. Party had not wanted to underline prestige of Eisenhower or encourage isolationism in US by “Fr failures”. However, even these minimal conditions had [Page 624]failed to keep 15 Socialist deputies in line and last Sunday’s caucus revealed that party sentiment was such that these deputies cld not be disciplined. This was indicative of sober “second-thoughts” on part of party.
3.
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance party places on UK adherence to EDF. It “approximated a mistique” and was recognized as easier solution to Socialist fears than requirement of Supranatl EDC. But one or the other was a sine qua non.
4.
Fr Socialists realized that “Gers must have enough with which to live and also enough with which to dream” supranatl EDC should provide both if Gers could be persuaded that integration could lead to unity.
5.
He had visited mid-Feb Socialist congress in Frankfort and had then traveled and lectured extensively in Hesse and Lower Saxony. His impressions were that rearmament was unpopular with youth but that former Wehrmacht members would happily re-enlist and accept traditional militaristic concept and disciplines which had made Ger so dangerous in past. Prospects of FedRep contingents of former Wehrmacht soldiers in EDF “made his blood congeal.”
6.
He did not trust Kurt Schumacher and thought, if either he or his party should succeed to power, SPD would be more militaristic than Adenauer.
7.
For Fr to deny Ger aspiration of natl unity would be to deny possibility of formulation of supranatl EDC fon policy. Fr had been divided during war and every Frenchman who went through experience should appreciate lack of realism in denying aspiration of natl unity to Ger, notwithstanding difficulties such could cause Fr. But Fr would be better off to develop common policy with Gers now and associate themselves with the inevitable.

Oakley
  1. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Washington.