740.5/11–254
Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense ( Wilson ) to the President 1
Subject:
- Recommended U.S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy.
In December the Military Committee will render a report to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with previous directions, on [Page 530] “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years”. The Standing Group has prepared a draft of this report based upon special capabilities studies prepared by the major NATO commands which take into account the availability of nuclear weapons. This proposed report will state that Soviet aggression against NATO nations can be deterred or defeated if, and only if, NATO forces have the capability both to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack and to deliver an immediate effective nuclear counter-attack. The report will also assert that, in the possibility of a full-scale Soviet attack without employing nuclear weapons, NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe without immediate employment by NATO of nuclear weapons, both strategically and tactically.
The positions to be taken on this matter by U.S. Representatives in the various NATO military and civilian agencies involve important aspects of foreign policy and strategic plans, and should, therefore, reflect your authorization and possible Congressional consultation. The Departments of State and Defense have reviewed the proposed report prepared by the Standing Group in the light of both the current international situation and the policies indicated by NSC action regarding arrangements for the use of nuclear weapons. This review established the following significant points which are consonant with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Gruenther.
- 1.
- U.S. objectives regarding a nuclear strategy for NATO, under present conditions, should
be:
a. To develop in the NATO Alliance a nuclear capability as an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet aggression.
. . . . . . .
- 4.
- While it is believed undesirable to attempt any concerted NATO program for the specific development of public opinion, it is considered desirable to direct the attention of the NATO Ministers to the common political problem facing each of them, i.e., that each must soberly and carefully seek to develop public opinion in their own country to tacitly accept the new situation.
- 5.
- In order to obtain acceptance by the North Atlantic Council in December of the nuclear concept embodied in the Military Committee [Page 531] Report, the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government must be prepared to give assurance that nuclear weapons in the hands of U.S. forces in NATO will be in sufficient quantity and available to support agreed NATO plans. Otherwise the other members of NATO would be depending on this strategy without any assurance of NATO’s ability to accomplish it. Any such assurances should be clearly limited to the form of a declaration of intention of the President, in order to conform with constitutional limitations, as explained by the Secretary of State at the London Nine-Power Conference.
- 6.
- It is not clear at this time what adjustments in forces and equipment, both of the U.S. and of our Allies, will be required for this new NATO concept. There is little hope, however, that the new system of weapons will cost less than the system it replaces, and it might well cost more. The development of U.S. forces is continually taking into account plans for nuclear weapons, including NATO plans. However, it is possible that these developments in NATO could involve considerable changes in our Military Assistance Program both in types of equipment and expenditures, such as would be involved in an expanded European air defense and early warning system. We should be prepared, if required, to give assurance to NATO that the Executive Branch will use its best efforts with the Legislative Branch in support of military assistance programs required to accomplish the new concept.
Based upon the foregoing, the two Departments suggest, for your approval, the following guidelines for U.S. actions on this subject leading into the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:
. . . . . . .
- 4.
- U.S. actions will be designed to limit, insofar as possible, the political problems inherent in a NATO nuclear concept. However, in the event discussion of these political issues is required at the December Council Meeting we should be prepared to inform our Allies that it is U.S. policy that (a) we will not wage a preventive war, (b) we will be prepared to explore reasonable bona fide disarmament proposals, and (c) that under existing circumstances a nuclear capability is an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet armed aggression, with or without nuclear weapons, or Soviet intimidation of NATO by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.
- 5.
- In addition to the foregoing action the U.S. will as soon as possible propose to the Permanent Council a formal agreement concerning the release of certain atomic information to NATO, as provided for in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Necessary procedural steps with the Legislative Branch required by the Atomic Energy Act will take place during January and February 1955, the earliest time that Congress will be in session long enough to satisfy these procedural requirements. It is not considered advisable to attempt to utilize that agreement as a quid pro quo for rights to use nuclear weapons from foreign soil.
It is recommended (a) that you approve the foregoing course of action and guidelines, and (b) that, in view of the important domestic and international political aspects, you take the necessary steps to consult [Page 532] as appropriate with Congressional leaders on the assurances set forth in Paragraph 3 of the proposed guidelines.
Secretary of State
_______________
Secretary of Defense
-
The source text (Tab A to the memorandum by Merchant, supra), is signed by Secretary Dulles but not by Secretary Wilson. The memorandum is presumably the same one, signed by both Secretaries, presented to President Eisenhower on Nov. 3 (see Merchant’s memorandum of conversation, infra). A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “The date of this document is assumed to be Nov. 2 or 3. Per Walt Trulock [of the Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat] 11/8/54.”
This memorandum was jointly drafted by Wolf (EUR/RA) and by J. S. Billups of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). It was concurred in by Murphy (G), MacArthur (C), Nolting (S/MSA), Phleger (L), Bowie (S/P), Brown (H), Jernegan (NEA), and Arneson (S/AE), representing the Department of State and by Admiral Radford (JCS), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Wilfred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative and Public Affairs) Frederick A. Seaton, Gen. J. Lawton Collins (NATO), and Maj. Gen. (ret.) Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy).
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