740.5/11–154

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State 1

top secret

Subject:

  • Presidential Approval and Congressional Consultation on U.S. Position on NATO “New Approach” Studies.

In December the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council [Page 528] will consider the Military Committee Report on the “New Approach” studies. A draft Report (Tab B)2 is now under consideration in the Military Representatives Committee, and, after its action on November 15, will come before the Military Committee for final action on November 22.

This Report will state the military position that a NATO capability for immediate nuclear counter-attack in the event of Soviet armed attack (whether or not the Soviet first uses nuclear weapons) is an indispensable measure if the Soviet is to be deterred or defeated.

In view of the importance of the issues involved, Presidential approval of the U.S. position is considered to be required, and should be obtained as soon as possible so as to (a) provide guidance for the U.S. position in the Military Representatives Committee on November 15 and for the December Council meeting, and (b) permit early consultation by the President with key Congressional leaders, a number of whom plan to leave the country on extended trips: Congressmen Vorys and Richards on November 5, Senators Russell and Wiley about November 10, and many members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee on November 10.

A proposed joint Memorandum to the President from the Secretary of Defense and yourself has been prepared in conjunction with the Department of Defense and is attached as Tab A.3 It is believed that Secretary Wilson and yourself, together with Admiral Radford and General Collins, should meet with the President on this subject. The Admiral departs Washington Sunday, November 7.

Certain aspects of this matter are of particular importance, and it is believed that you may wish to draw the President’s attention to them in discussing the matter with him:

. . . . . . .

2) U.S. Assurances That May Be Required.

In order to obtain the acceptance of the new concept, the U.S. must be prepared to assure our allies of our preparedness to support the concept with nuclear weapons and military assistance programs (Tab A, paragraphs 5 and 6).

Neither the U.S. nor the NATO military studies have yet reached the point that would make it possible to indicate at this time even the order of magnitude of additional dollar cost that may be involved. This presents a serious problem from the point of view of Congressional consultation, and leads us to suggest that the President should personally consult with Congressional leaders on the assurances involved.

[Page 529]

3) Major Contingent Issues.

a)
Despite our efforts to avoid discussion of nuclear use rights at the December Council meeting, the issue may be brought up. We must be prepared to deal with this contingency in a way that will avoid evidencing any disunity or lack of firm purpose.
b)
While the European allies had originally hoped that a NATO nuclear strategy would reduce both cost and risk, the Report will make it clear that, not only will it not cost less and may cost more, but that growing Soviet nuclear strength creates a dangerous capability. To a certain extent, fear may replace hope.

Council approval of the Report will dedicate NATO nations to develop forces for nuclear, not non-nuclear, warfare. As some nations may be concerned at having to respond to non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons, it is possible that further NATO studies to explore the military, budgetary and manpower aspects of “a dual-purpose force capable of winning either a nuclear or non-nuclear war may be suggested at the December meeting. We should be prepared to consider this possible development, but not at the expense of delay in approving the new concept that will permit the development of NATO nuclear strength as an essential element of the deterrent.

Recommendations:

1)
That you sign the attached Memorandum to the President (Tab A).
2)
That you arrange to meet as soon as possible with the President, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford and General Collins to discuss the issues and obtain the President’s approval.
3)
That you advise the President at that time of the matters set forth in numbered paragraphs 1–3 above.
4)
That you arrange for early consultation, preferably by the President, with appropriate Congressional leaders. A suggested list is at Tab F.4
  1. This memorandum was drafted by Wolf (EUR/RA) and was concurred in by Murphy (G), MacArthur (C), Bowie (S/P), Arneson (S/AE), Nolting (S/MSA), Phleger (L), Brown (H), and Jernegan (NEA). A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.
  2. The reference here is to document SG 241/3, a copy of which was not available to the editors.
  3. Printed as a separate document, infra.
  4. Not found attached to the source text and not further identifiable in the Department of State files.