Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/6–2053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret
niact

Washington, June 23, 1953—1:13 p.m.

Topol 1476. Limit distribution. Reference Poltos 2413, 2423, 2438.²

We agree completely that military recommendation in Sergent paper would cause serious difficulty and would merely result in acrimonious discussion in Military Committee with no constructive results. Military representatives 14 different countries cannot effectively discuss such matters as changing disposition of forces to concentrate them in particular areas. Furthermore do not believe that raising question of possible overemphasis on “quality” is fruitful at this time. Some of these issues may come up during course of 1953 Annual Review and should be dealt with in orderly fashion in that process. Agree Hughes or Anderson should raise this matter discreetly with Ismay along above lines and attempt to prevent Ismay paper from containing recommendations on this point such as those included in Sergent paper.

We interpret political recommendation in Sergent paper to be merely plea for more effective political consultation in NAC. We see no objection to such recommendation being included in Ismay paper providing it is kept in general terms and is not inconsistent with U.S. position on this subject as set forth in relevant telegrams (reference Polto 2358, June 9³ and Topol 180, September 19, 1952⁴). As indicated in Topol 1441⁵ we feel that effective political consultation in NATO is particularly helpful at this time in counteracting mood of disappointment in NATO to which Ismay referred during NAC meeting June 18. Statement on Bermuda authorized in Topol 1441 should be helpful this connection.

We believe it would be very unfortunate for any paper on these subjects to come before Council without referring to urgent need for EDC and German contribution. We note that Sergent paper omitted reference to this point.

FYI. We believe it possible French will raise problem of gap between NATO requirements and capabilities at Bermuda Conference. Position to be taken on this subject at that time now under study here. Would appreciate prompt reporting Council discussions Ismay paper and your recommendations.

Dulles

1. This telegram was drafted by Moore and cleared with the Department of Defense and WE.
2. Poltos 2413 and 2423, June 18, pp. 408 and 410; Polto 2438, June 20, supra.
3. Not printed; in it Anderson reported inter alia his feeling that the United States should seize every opportunity to pursue with vigor and determination the development of the procedure of consultation. (740.5/6–953)
4. Ante, p. 323.
5. Not printed; in it Anderson was instructed to make a statement in a restricted NAC session concerning the forthcoming Bermuda Conference, assuming that there were no objections from the British and French. The statement would indicate (1) that there would be prior consultation with the NATO partners through the Council, (2) that a wide range of topics was to be discussed without a fixed agenda, (3) that the main topic would be the relationship between the free world and the Soviet Union, (4) that the United States would take into consideration the full exchange of views on the Soviet Union which had been expressed at the Council meeting at Paris in April, (5) that no decisions would be taken affecting a NATO country without consultations, and (6) that a post conference report would be made to the Council. (740.5/6–1653)