740.5/6–2053: Telegram
The United States Deputy Special Representative in Europe (Anderson) to the Department of State
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Paris, June 20,
1953—8 p.m.
Polto 2438. Noforn. Limit distribution. For Merchant and Martin.
- 1.
- It is clear that IS paper reported in Polto 24131 was basis for Ismay’s statement at NAC informal session June 18 reported in Polto 2423.2 Alphand called on Ismay late afternoon June 17. Friend in IS tells us this call precipitated Ismay’s decision raise issue with Council immediately.
- 2.
- Although we do not know at this stage what will be the substance [Page 413] of the paper Ismay plans to present Council next week, if it should follow the general line taken in the original paper by Sergent and, more particularly, if Ismay should come up with similar recommendations as to action to be taken in the military field and in the political field, it seems to us that we might be in for really trouble-some times in the Council.
- 3.
- If the Council, for example, were to accept the recommendation that the military committee consider the shortfall, below stated requirements, of the military resources being made available, it seems to us that one possible and glaring result of this would be a resurgence of claims for greater United States military assistance.
- 4.
- The philosophy underlying the Sergent paper seems to take issue with basic NATO military strategy. Moreover, although the paper is directed at the gap between requirements and availabilities, it is silent on the matter of German rearmament. A premature reexamination by NATO military and political authorities of the fundamental type recommended in paper as it now stands could disrupt the preparations that must be carefully made if the next NAC ministers meeting is to contribute to the firm establishment of a long-term NATO defense policy based on politico-economic realities. It might, in fact, seriously postpone the achievement of this result. At the same time, such a re-examination could also be used, at least for a while, to divert attention from the lack of progress, if not retrogression in efforts to ratify the EDC.
- 5.
- We cannot now dissuade Ismay from presenting a paper on this to the Council. It may be possible, however, to influence the nature of the paper that he presents. We would not think he would want to attach his prestige to a series of recommendations which he knew in advance could not be accepted by some or perhaps by any of the member governments. Unless you see objections, Anderson will discreetly and privately discuss this consideration with Ismay. We believe that this is perhaps the best if not the only chance to forestall the Council’s being faced with a paper which might present us with a very long list of difficulties.
Anderson