Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/5–2152

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret
u.s. eyes only
noforn

Washington, May 21, 1952.

Subject:

• Notes for Informal Discussion with General Ridgway, May 22, 1952.²

A. Political Content of Position:

General Ridgway is, of course, fully aware of the fact that the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has a high political content. Nevertheless, it may be useful to emphasize this fact, and to point out three unusual characteristics of the position, as follows:

1. The Supreme Commander, perhaps more than any other single individual, is popularly regarded as the personal embodiment of NATO itself. In popular eyes, SACEUR is the key international servant of NATO. The tone set by him in submerging the national outlook in favor of the international point of view will set the pace throughout the whole organization. Moreover, the very nature of his position gives him certain politico-military responsibilities, such as helping to build public support for the NATO defense program, helping to improve European morale, helping stimulate national leaders to take desired actions, soothing national differences arising within the NATO command structure, etc. As a natural consequence of his position, everything he says and does carries great weight.

2. While the Supreme Commander, in his official capacity, is only 1/14 American (as General Eisenhower put it), he is much more than that to the peoples of Europe. He is inevitably regarded as a leading U.S. spokesman, and to some extent as a roving U.S. Ambassador. This tendency is aptly illustrated by the delegation of Egyptian officials who called on General Eisenhower to seek his assistance in connection with their difficulties with the UK. General Eisenhower, of course, politely declined to enter into discussions, but the mere fact that such a request was made indicates the delicacy of the Supreme Commander’s political situation. Even the most trivial statement by SACEUR may be seized upon by unfriendly elements as a basis for a propaganda barrage against the U.S. Every word of SACEUR is marked by all who hear it.

3. The force commanded by SACEUR is similar to the UN force in Korea only in that it contains elements from various nations. The main differences of course, are that most of the NATO troops are not American, that the proportion of Americans will gradually diminish, and, most important, that this is a peacetime coalition, operating under peacetime political conditions and more limited peacetime powers and processes. This inevitably results in a higher interest by other governments in basic SHAPE decisions, and requires more attention to such considerations as national capabilities as well as prestige.

B. Current Political Situation in Europe:

Outlined below are some of the major political considerations which it may be useful for General Ridgway to be familiar with in performing his duties:

1. EDC ratification—One of the major objectives of U.S. policy in Europe during coming months. Many obstacles faced, especially in French and German parliaments. (Saar controversy as illustration.)³

2. Economic difficulties affecting defense program—Perennial problem of economic limitations on European defense capabilities. (Illustrate by reference to current situations in France and UK.) Congressional cuts in U.S. aid requests may intensify problem. New annual review of requirements versus capabilities scheduled for autumn of 1952.

3. Communist situation—Communists have been largely eliminated from military and governmental posts in NATO countries, and overall influence greatly reduced since 1946. Voting strength, however, remains high in France and Italy. Current Communist tactics aimed primarily at capitalizing on European fears of war and on economic hardships arising from rearmament program. Campaigns are having some effect; opinion polls show European doubts of U.S. pacific intentions have increased measurably during past year. Commies now plan huge protest demonstration to greet General Ridgway’s arrival in Europe.

4. Sensitivity to U.S. influence—While U.S. leadership in NATO has been accepted as a necessary fact of life, there is considerable sensitivity in European political circles to outward signs of American influence and pressure. The Europeans expect Americans to be in a hurry, to be slightly inexperienced and to be insensitive to European political reactions. Several governments have suffered opposition attacks for having been allegedly too susceptible to U.S. influence, and these attacks do not come exclusively from Communists and fellow-travelers. In consequence, it is in our interest to arrange as often as possible for Europeans to take the lead in important NATO developments.

C. Civilian Relationships:

1. As an international military commander, line of contact with political agencies of NATO and with national political representatives will normally run through NATO military channels. However, there will inevitably be some informal contacts on the political side, both with the NATO international staff under Secretary General Ismay and with national political representatives.

2. U.S. political representatives in Europe may be able frequently to provide useful advice and assistance on an informal basis. This includes both U.S. Ambassadors in particular countries and Ambassador Draper’s regional staff in Paris. Douglas MacArthur II, who served as U.S. political advisor to General Eisenhower and who remains available to General Ridgway, is the best channel for all such contacts. He worked with NATO matters from the very beginning of NATO, has good relations with civilian organizations in Paris and with U.S. missions throughout Europe, and is kept currently informed of State Department thinking on wide range of subjects. Believe Doug can prove extremely useful.

D. Specific Politico-military Problems:

1. There is a continuing problem between the “big three” countries, members of the Standing Group, and the smaller powers represented through the Military Representatives Committee. Although it is doubtless imperative that the Standing Group concept be maintained, full consideration needs to be paid to the point of view of the smaller countries, and in cases which do not in fact substantially prejudice the integrity of the Standing Group operation, that sensitivity should be deferred to.

2. Basing their position on their membership in the Standing Group, the French have traditionally sought to extend their role in NATO to a key role in global planning. With full deference to French ambitions and sensitivities and to their efforts to keep the French union before us, we disagree with the French as to the extent of their global responsibility and interest.

3. There is growing in Europe a feeling that our force goals established at Lisbon are overly optimistic in light of capabilities.⁴ A concomitant to this is the tendency to place too great reliance upon the development of new weapons. Full consideration must be given to this ground-swell of opinion and although capabilities—our own as well as theirs—may be a limiting factor, a let-down based on false premises should be combatted.…

4. Operation “Mothball” contains serious political implications.⁵ The British have expressed to us their concern at the political implications of SACEUR’s alert plan. This is a most delicate problem, and will have to be pursued with great care. We shall have to be careful not to over-commit to actions which would result in prejudicial political reactions.

5. The military role of NATO is, by force of circumstance, of highest priority. The political and social goals of NATO, evidenced by Article II of the Treaty, remain the long-term goals of NATO and are of very high importance in the European mind. It is important that the Europeans not be led to believe that we consider NATO only in its military role, but view it as a means to accomplish these other goals and will strive to work with them to that end.

1. The source text, which was drafted by Joseph J. Wolf and William T. Nunley of the Office of European Regional Affairs, bears the handwritten notation “Original taken directly to Sec[retary].”
2. According to a memorandum of conversation dated May 23, Acting Secretary Bruce, Matthews, Bonbright, and Parsons briefed General Ridgway along the lines of the source text and gave the General a copy for his use. Presumably, the briefing took place on May 22. A copy of the memorandum of conversation, drafted by Parsons, is in 740.5/5–2352.
3. For documentation on the signing of the European Defense Community agreements, attempts to secure their ratification, and their relationship to the Saar, see pp. 571 ff.
4. For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, see pp. 107 ff.; regarding the force goals established at Lisbon, see pp. 203 ff.
5. The code name Mothball was the term used for alerts in NATO. The political aspects of the problem concerned who within NATO was authorized to call particular types of alerts from the simple alert to complete mobilization. The British believed that anything beyond a simple alert necessitated unanimous approval from the Council or from the Standing Group and the governments concerned, while the United States favored giving SACEUR more discretion to act as it saw fit. A memorandum of conversation, Mar. 31, 1953, presents both sides of the question. (740.5/3–3153)