740.5/2–2852: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State 1
secret
priority

1748. Pass Defense. AgSec from Slater. Fol is brief summary report portion HICOMers informal mtg Feb 282 on security safeguards.

1.
Verbatim text definitions (other than atomic weapons and aircraft reported in immed fol cable3) as fols:

“Biological weapons.

Biological weapons are defined as any weapons, equip or apparatus expressly designed to use harmful insects or other harmful living or dead organisms, pathogenic organisms, or their toxic products of such nature and in amounts making them capable of being used for milit purposes, including such organisms and their toxic products quantities not exceeding peaceful civilian requirements of the above insects, organisms or their toxic products will not be considered as biological weapons. Note: The above definition of biological weapons does not cover facilities capable of producing such weapons, subject of one of the most important of the integrated prohibitions included in Appendix C of the final report of the TGG.4 It is understood that such facilities are included in provisions of the convention of the EDC. If this is not so, it is recommended that above definition be supplemented by a provision with respect to these facilities.

Chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons are defined as any weapon, equip or apparatus expressly designed to use the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant growth regulating, antilubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance for milit purposes, including the chemicals capable of use in such weapons. Quantities of the above chemicals not exceeding peaceful civilian requirements will not be considered as chemical weapons. Note: Above definition of chemical weapons does not cover facilities capable of producing such weapons, subj of one of the most important of the integrated prohibitions included in Appendix C of the final report of the TGG. It is understood that such facilities are included in provisions of the convention of the EDC. If this is not so, it is recommended that above definition be supplemented by provision with respect to these facilities.

Long range and guided missiles.

Long range or guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the velocity or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launch by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile (combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the velocity) included in this definition are the V-type weapons, developed in the recent war, and subsequent modifications thereof. Also included are any [Page 267] parts, devices or assemblies especially designed for use in or with such a weapon.

Naval vessels.

By naval vessels other than minor defensive craft is meant all warships over—displacement tons, all submarines and other types of warships with propulsion equip utilizing nuclear or special high efficiency fuels (e.g., the Walther system).”

2.
Fr consider control productive capacity not adequately provided by EDC treaty and used atomic weapon approach to reopen whole capacity issue. I explained since atomic energy field a special case, special handling justified and stated that based on my talks with him I believed Chancellor wld probably accept without objection. Kirkpatrick equally opposed to considering capacity controls within framework instructions from Fon Mins which he held were limited to defining weapons. Furthermore, he stressed it was impossible to define precisely what constitutes capacity. Fr extremely persistent this point and because of it no agreement on any point was possible.
3.
Instructions from Admiralty UK suggested substitution “a long range or guided missile is a weapon whose velocity, direction of motion or time of burst can be influenced after the instant of its launch by any device (other than time or contact fuses) inside or outside the weapon” for the first sentence of missiles definition. I pointed out such a definition wld include not only all influence mines but also proximity fused projectiles. Fr accepted at once as it covered one of their naval vessels reservations. I rejected on grounds this a subterfuge to broaden list Fon Mins agreed to with Chancellor. Kirkpatrick did not press and promised seek recision this instruction.
I agreed limit vessels to 1500 displacement tons. Fr pressed for prohibition ASDIC to which both Kirkpatrick and I objected. Poncet seeking further instruction from govt.
4.
Berard stated Schuman agreed drop question gun barrels only if they get satisfaction within EDC re propellants which according to UK cable indicated new capacity to be constructed only Sardinia or North Africa.
5.
Agreement was reached on draft letter from Adenauer to govts and definition atomic weapons. (See immed following cable.5)
6.
Am concerned over Fr tactics on security safeguards and believe unless we restrict our efforts to simple definitions of weapons on special list we run risk of reopening entire case with FedRep which wld jeopardize progress made to date.
7.
After HICOMers adjourned, working group met briefly at which time Fr indicated they were primarily concerned over erecting complete [Page 268] plants designed for production of weapons these categories except for naval vessels.
8.
In WG talks Brit proposed revised wording re propulsion equip reading “all naval vessels powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines or jets”. Bequest Dept instructions soonest. At same time Fr expressed desire to include “all vessels and craft fitted for the reception or launching of aircraft or guided missiles”. UK lukewarm this proposal, US objected. Fr agreed to recommend to their govt this proposal be dropped.
Mccloy
  1. This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and London.
  2. For a report on another portion of this meeting, see telegram 1747, Feb. 28, from Bonn, supra.
  3. See footnote 5, below.
  4. Documentation on the activities of the Tripartite Group on Germany during 1951 is included in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 2, pp. 1647 ff.
  5. Telegram 1749, Feb. 28, from Bonn, not printed. (740.5/2–2852) The draft text was further revised in subsequent negotiations and exchanges. For further documentation on the definition of and limitations on atomic weapons, see volume ii .