Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103
Financial Contribution to Defense
Mr. Acheson reported that a message had been received from Mr. McCloy that Dr. Adenauer accepted the documents which had been [Page 172] agreed on by the Foreign Ministers the previous evening with two minor amendments.2 First, in the letter from the Chancellor to the three Foreign Ministers to delete the sentence reading: “These payments will cover its contribution to the EDC and the support of Allied forces in the Federal Republic”, and substitute the following: “These payments will include the support of Allied forces in the Federal Republic.” Second, in the letter of reply to the Chancellor by the Three Foreign Ministers, delete the phrase “and will be used exclusively for the Federal Republic’s contribution to the EDC and the support of Allied Forces in the Federal Republic” and substitute the following: “and will include the support of Allied Forces in the Federal Republic.”
Mr. Acheson explained that these changes were proposed to safeguard the position of the Federal Government which it had formulated as follows:
“The Federal Republic proceeds on the assumption that in the sense of the EDC Treaty the payments for the support of the Allied forces in the Federal Republic are reckoned as part of the Federal Republic’s contribution to EDC.”
In the event that the Foreign Ministers were unable to accept the two amendments proposed by the Chancellor, he would be willing to agree to the documents as they were drafted with a footnote safeguarding the position of the Federal Republic in the exact words quoted above.
Mr. Acheson said that unless the High Commission received contrary advices from the Foreign Ministers, it was proposed to publish the communiqué at Bonn at 6:00 p.m., G.M.T. (Lisbon time).3
Mr. Schuman indicated he was unwilling to modify the texts which had been submitted by the Chancellor, and it was agreed to maintain them. It was understood that this meant that the footnote would be included. Mr. Schuman remarked that he accepted the existence of the footnote, but not its content. The Federal Government would make the assumption and the Allies would take note of it.
It was agreed to issue the communiqué at Lisbon at 6:00 p.m. It was also agreed to send a message to the three High Commissioners congratulating them on their handling of the negotiations with the Germans on this subject.4[Page 173]
Mr. Acheson proposed that the civil aircraft problem be dealt with by omitting civil aircraft from the list in the EDC treaty of articles not to be produced in strategic areas and that Dr. Adenauer be asked to include in a communication to the three Governments an assurance in the following terms:
“In respect of civil aircraft, none are being produced in the Federal Republic at the present time, nor are there any facilities available for such production. The Government of the Federal Republic intends to purchase from other countries such civil aircraft as may be required in Germany. If in the future, the condition should change, the Federal Republic will seek agreement on this matter with the Governments of the US, UK and France in the light of the situation then prevailing.”5
After reading the US draft Mr. Schuman said he could recommend this to his Government. If they got a real community in Europe a sense of community would arise and there would be comprehension on both sides.
Mr. Acheson recalled that the Chancellor was going to make a general statement to the three Governments on security controls. Either in that communication or in one appended to it and having the same effect he would say what was in the US draft on civil aviation. Mr. Acheson thought this would be more acceptable to Adenauer than some arrangement prohibiting production for 50 years. Summarizing the position reached, he said the Ministers proposed to remove cannon from the list, to put a proposal on gun powder along the lines suggested in the morning session (that is to let the EDC work it out) and then they would ask Adenauer to say this on civil aviation.
conclusion of contractual arrangements
During the course of the general exchange of remarks on the conclusion of the contractual arrangements and the EDC Treaty, Mr. Acheson said he hoped to be able to come to Europe for the signature of the General Agreement.
Mr. Eden said he wished to raise another issue briefly, that of Trieste.6 He said he was worried about this. The Yugoslavs were raising difficulties. They want to go back to the older arrangement. We ought to look at this problem to try to find a common approach to it.
Mr. Acheson agreed that we should study it together. He said he had been told by De Gasperi that the UP was having an interview with Tito today. According to De Gasperi the Italians and the Yugoslavs [Page 174] were further apart now than a year ago. The Secretary said the United States had felt that the Yugoslavs were not negotiating in good faith. They were now encouraging the idea of a free state.
Mr. Schuman observed that we were giving aid to Yugoslavia and we should impose conditions. Mr. Perkins informed the Ministers that the United States was having talks with the French and British now in Washington on the question of aid to Yugoslavia.7 Mr. Eden thought that we ought to toughen up a bit.
It was agreed to include this subject in the Washington discussions.
- The source text indicates that Laukhuff was the drafter of these minutes on Mar. 17 and Reinstein on Apr. 1. Copies of these minutes were circulated in the Department of State as document Ger–London MIN 9, Apr. 16, 1952.↩
- Telegram 20, Feb. 26, from Bonn to Lisbon, p. 262.↩
- The agreed press statement referred to here is quoted in telegram 23, Feb. 26, from Lisbon, p. 261.↩
The message of congratulation under reference here, as transmitted in telegram 28, Feb. 27, from Lisbon to Bonn, repeated to Washington as Secto 98, reads as follows:
“Three Foreign Mins, before leaving Lisbon, wish to congratulate Allied HICOM most warmly on securing Fed Govt’s agreement so promptly to the total figure for Ger’s financial contribution to defense for the first year, and on their handling of these whole contractual negots.” (740.5/2–2752)
- The paragraph quoted here was quoted again in the telegraphic report on this meeting, Secto 100, supra and in telegram 262400Z from Nash to Lovett, p. 167.↩
- For documentation on U.S. efforts to assist in the conclusion of the dispute over Trieste, see volume viii .↩
- Documentation on U.S. economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia is included in volume viii .↩