Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103: Telegram

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ( Nash ) to the Secretary of Defense ( Lovett )¹

top secret
operational
immediate

Lisbon , February 26, 1952—midnight.

262400Z. Further distribution this msg made only at discretion of Secretary.

[Here follow Parts 1 and 2 reporting upon the Acheson–Eden–Schuman–Stikker–Van Zeeland meeting of February 26, 10 a.m. (see the Reinstein minutes, page 161) and the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting of February 26, 11 a.m. (see the Laukhuff–Reinstein minutes, page 163).]

Part 3. Afternoon mtg commenced on encouraging word just received from Bonn of Ger agreement to def contribution recmd by TCC. Acheson then proposed folg add to Adenauer declaration to Bundestag re Federal Republic intentions concerning civil acft production.

[Here follows the paragraph on civil aircraft quoted in Secto 100, infra.]

Schuman and Eden both indicated agreement, thus concluding final remaining question concerning security controls. In view of agreement on two remaining questions on Ger contractual agreement of Ger def contribution and security controls, Acheson asked Schuman when he anticipated EDC treaty would be ready for signing. Schuman said that it would be approx six weeks. Acheson asked whether this could be expedited. Schuman stated that they would do their best but said that negotiations had been on for a year est was still six weeks. Acheson said would like personally to attend signing of EDC treaty and contractual agreement. Some discussion of place for such signing took place. Schuman recmd Paris as the site for signing of EDC treaty. French and UK indicated preference of Bonn for signing of contractual agreement, US reserving its position with suggestion of Strasbourg as alternative. It was further agreed mtg of three foreign ministers might well take place at time of foregoing action.

Part 4. Folg conclusion of foregoing, Eden inquired whether he might raise several non-scheduled items stated he had just concluded mtg with De Gasperi on Trieste² wherein De Gasperi indicated situation had worsened with Yugoslavs making further difficulties. Schuman commented Austrian question with Russia would be greatly ameliorated if Trieste question was solved. Acheson referred to press interview by Tito stating Italians and Yugoslavs further apart on Trieste than year ago and similar unhelpful statements. Schuman emphasized US, UK and France presently giving economic and mil asst to Yugoslavia pointing out only three weeks ago French parliament voted 5½ billion aid to Yugoslavia. He suggested we must use our aid as lever for correcting Yugoslavia recalcitrant on Trieste situation. Acheson noted French, US and UK currently discussing future asst to Yugoslavia in Wash. Agreed to req such consultations to take foregoing suggestion into consideration in such discussion. Eden then referred to fact he had recently seen results of discussions of US, UK and French mil reps on future courses of action in Southeast Asia.³ Eden stated we must do something about it although he was not proposing attempt to meet question in Lisbon. Acheson replies US having a thorough going over the entire question of Southeast Asia, including Indo-China stating we are hoping to come up with something in way of proposal. Schuman evidenced great interest in latter possibility and asked when results of US study might be ready. Acheson replied optimistic est would be approx in month. Schuman emphasized great importance of US position toward Indo-China to political situation in France and reqd earliest advise of US decision. Acheson agreed to furn info concerning US position when finally determined. Schuman inquired concerning possibility of discussing Indo-China at proposed tripartite foreign ministers mtg est to take place six weeks hence in connection with signing of EDC treaty and Ger contractual agreement. Acheson refrained from any commitment. Eden then inquired whether Acheson had any further info on the Korean situation. Acheson stated he had only fragmentary info of most recent developments in Korea. He further stated his understanding remaining questions related to period of rotation of troops stationed in Korea: Question of exchange of POW, inspection by neutrals, and mil recmd of matters to be discussed in political conf folg armistice. On POW question, he indicated there was greater difficulty of finding way to avoid return of POW likely to be killed upon return, but at same time not to force Communists to accept theory of voluntary repatriation. Indicated some optimism solution to problem could be reached but stated it would take time. Re question of inspection of ports of entry neutrals Acheson pointed out our willingness to stretch our conscience to permit participation with Swiss and Swedes by such satellites as Poles and Czechs but complete inability to cut Soviet Union in on deal. Agreement indicated by French and UK on latter point on question of matters for discussion at conf folg armistice Acheson stated Ridgway position as UN mil comdr that his recmds could not go beyond matters relating to Korea. Schuman indicated agreement with this point of view. British view point not indicated. Schuman stated he thought it would be of interest to other foreign ministers to know that proposed Communist labor strike set for Feb 12 had proved complete flop with only 10% of workers showing up. He commented Commies have had successes on question relating to such matters as wage but on any political question were proving complete failure. He further commented Soviet propaganda in France had taken turn away from concentration on peace proposals to questions particularly those relating to East–West trade. He referred to international trade conf set for Moscow in April which Commies were making every effort to build up. He stated French were advising against any French participation in such conf but emphasized Soviet propaganda efforts to impress French industrialists on advantages in developing East–West trade.⁴ Mtg ended on general note of felicitation on success fairly enthusiastic on results. Folg conclusion of mtg Schuman and Acheson proceeded to execute memorandum of understanding⁵ and minutes of conversation⁶ with ref to $200,000,000 off shore procurement asst designed to assist French in support of force figures submitted by them to council on last Sat. In final note, would like to emphasize complete understanding and acceptance by State reps and other members of US delegation on points advanced in behalf of Def Dept.

1. The source text appears to be one of several copies of this message received in the Defense Department as telegram DA IN 110307 and distributed in the State Department. Lovett departed from Lisbon for Washington on Feb. 25. For two other reports on this meeting, see infra and p. 171.
2. No other information has been found in Department of State files regarding the course of the Eden–De Gasperi meeting. For documentation on Trieste, see volume viii .
3. The discussions under reference here are further documented in the East Asia regional compilation in volume xii .
4. Documentation on U.S. export control policy is presented in volume i .
5. For the text of the United States-French memorandum of understanding under reference here, see p. 273.
6. For the text of the agreed memorandum of conversation of Feb. 23 under reference here, see telegram Actel 9, Feb. 25, from Lisbon, p. 142.