720.00/2–2053
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of North and West Coast Affairs (Bernbaum)
Subject:
- Political Situation in the Caribbean Area and in Latin America as a whole
- Participants: Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Angel, ex-Colombian Ambassador to Washington
- ARA—Mr. Mann
- OSA—Mr.Bernbaum
Dr. Zuleta Angel described at great length a one-hour conversation he had held with General Bedell Smith.1 He was delighted with the results of the conversation, and expressed the opinion that General Smith had a most unusual grasp of the Latin American scene. Zuleta Angel stated he had expressed the opinion to General Smith that the economic development of Latin America was one of the more important problems facing the United States foreign policy. He felt that this might best be achieved by cooperation rather than unilateral action by the United States. An effective means of assuring such cooperation [Page 367] would be Congressional authorization for the Department to negotiate bilateral pacts providing for the elimination of double taxation—that is, the exemption from U.S. taxes of the profits of American firms operating in Latin America. He expressed the opinion that the implementation of such a policy would result in the signature of bilateral tax agreements with all Latin American countries within two years.
Dr. Zuleta Angel also described to General Smith the anxiety of Colombia and other Caribbean countries over the Communist problem in Latin America. He expressed particular apprehension of Guatemala which was described as a Soviet test of United States reaction to Communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Communist success in Guatemala would be followed by attempts in other countries to the point where Communism might acquire an extensive foothold in the Western Hemisphere from which it might be dislodged only with difficulty.
He then described the unsatisfactory situation which might prevail at the next Inter-American Congress to be held at Caracas2 at the end of this year. Among the countries represented, the U.S. would be able to count only upon nine of the ten countries in the Caribbean area, Guatemala being the exception. The Argentine and its “growing number of satellites” could be expected to make trouble. Brazil also could not be counted upon for any great assistance. (No mention was made of Peru and Ecuador.) This, he stated, emphasized the need for solidifying the hard core of U.S. support in the Caribbean area by eliminating the Guatemalan cancer of Communism.
Zuleta Angel then confidentially and “off-the-record” stated that the Caribbean countries themselves were on the verge of taking matters into their own hands. Colonel Castillo Amaya [ Armas?], the Guatemalan revolutionary, and ex-Costa Rican president Calderon Guardia3 had departed from Miami only this afternoon for the Dominican Republic, presumably to consult with General Trujillo. They expected to be in Washington within four or five days to report on operational plans. Although Guatemala was naturally the primary target, Costa Rica had also to be taken into consideration because of the Communist menace represented by Figueres. Zuleta Angel said that Castillo Amaya enjoyed the complete confidence of Colonel Perez Jimenez of Venezuela and could count upon the support of the Colombian Government, Colonel Remon, General Somoza, Lt. Col. Osorio, [Page 368] General Trujillo and Colonel Batista. He repeated these names a few times. Castillo Amaya was described as an unusually effective person who could be counted upon to do a good job and who enjoyed everybody’s confidence. Calderon Guardia was stated to be completely in accord with Castillo Amaya with the objective of insuring that Figueres would not become the President of Costa Rica. Calderon Guardia allegedly had no personal ambition to become President.
Zuleta Angel described the Guatemalan Army as being very well trained. He stated that President Arbenz’ position had been solidified by the placement in strategic positions of 32 young officers who owed everything to him and who could be counted upon to be loyal to him. This situation however, had contributed to a wide-spread feeling of resentment against the Government among the officers who felt that they had been discriminated against. This was described as an important element of weakness for President Arbenz. Zuleta Angel also expressed the opinion that the hold of the Government over the Guatemalan people was shaky. He stated that most of the upper and middle class elements in the country hated the Government fiercely and were willing to do anything to unseat it. Although the Government had gained some support from agrarian reform, it could not count greatly upon effective support from the peasants who were generally peaceful and passive. Government support outside the Army was, therefore, largely concentrated in the cities. Zuleta Angel was greatly encouraged by the fact that even in the city of Guatemala which represented the Government’s stronghold, it had been possible to defeat one of the Communist candidates in recent elections.
He expressed some apprehension over Mexican reaction to an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan Government. He stated that although the Mexican Government itself would presumably not take a hand in the matter, there were many influential Army men dating back to the days of President Cardenas who had strong bonds of sympathy with the Guatemalan Army. In view of the looseness of Mexican Government control over the Army, it was entirely possible that some such units might intervene in a conflict involving Guatemala. Zuleta Angel then jokingly remarked that it was always possible in non-interventionist Mexico to buy arms for revolutionary purposes. Although arms purchased for leftist movements were very rarely interfered with, rightist purchasers of arms often found that they had run afoul of Mexican law.
Dr. Zuleta Angel stated, upon leaving, that he would keep Mr. Mann informed of developments.