Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

OSA files, lot 55 D 475. “Arms”

The Ambassador in Peru (Tittmann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

secret
official–informal

Lima, February 25, 1952.

Dear Ed: I saw President Odría on February 18 at his request. He wanted to talk about the Military Assistance Bilateral Agreement and the Bilateral Defense Plan. He said that while he felt that the Agreement was all right, he was, on the other hand, not over enthusiastic about the Plan. Nevertheless he would give orders to have both documents signed by the Peruvian authorities (this was done on February 22, 1952), so that the treaties could be submitted to Congress for ratification as soon as possible. He felt that the Plan was inadequate, offering as it did, so little to Peru and he was especially unhappy about the Army’s share, since he was an Army man and his fellow officers were sure to feel that he could have done better for this own branch of the Armed Forces. He demonstrated some apprehension lest Peru might be even more hindered than she was at present in purchasing the necessary equipment and supplies for her “internal defense” (that is, her defense against the Communists and her allegedly covetous neighbors) under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949¹ if she tied herself up too tightly with the Mutual Security Act of 1951² (I wrote him a letter³ which, I hope, will counteract these fears). Odría recalled that Peru had always experienced a great deal of difficulty in securing delivery of the equipment she had purchased under the Act of 1949. What Odría wanted very much was some kind of assurance from us that when the Peruvian Armed Forces needed equipment and supplies, Peru would not only be able to continue as before to purchase them in the United States, but also that we would permit the arms thus purchased actually to be shipped to Peru. In this connection, it was obvious that Odría had been made suspicious, rightly or wrongly, of our methods and motives. We seem to him to be placing one obstacle after another in the way of delivery, especially as regards the DE’s and the F–47 aircraft which had been fully paid for by Peru. He hoped very much that when I reported his ideas to you, we would be able to tell him something to set his mind at rest on this score.

Odría went on to say that Peru was 100 percent on the side of the United States in the struggle against Communism and that we could count on her whole-hearted cooperation at all times. He added, however, that in order to make this cooperation effective Peru must be strong and able to defend herself internally as well as externally. What was the point, he asked, in preparing for an external attack if Peru were unable to defend herself internally. In the event that a shooting war with Russia were to break out today, the Communists all over Latin America would start agitation within their respective countries. In his opinion, Brazil and Peru were the only two countries capable of dominating this agitation. Therefore, Odría concluded, it was in the highest interests of the United States that the latter should see to it that Peru continued strong internally as well as externally. Solely in this way could she remain the bulwark against Communism in Latin America that she is today.

Odría asserted emphatically that it was ridiculous to think that Peru would ever use her armaments in an aggressive act against a neighbor. He pointed out that at the present time relations were not good with any of her neighbors (they all wanted something), including even Brazil, which looked with covetous eyes on the petroleum possibilities in eastern areas of Peru. It was therefore unthinkable that Peru would ever take the offensive against a neighbor as this would mean that one or all the others combined would eagerly and greedily fall upon her from the rear. Under these circumstances, her defeat would be certain and her lands divided up among the victors. On the other hand, a well-defended Peru would discourage any neighbor from attacking her and the peace in this area of Latin America would thus be maintained.

I enclose two memoranda of conversations⁴ on the foregoing subjects: one dated February 14 between General Morla,⁵ the Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Army, and the Military Attaché of the Embassy;⁶ and the other dated February 21 between President Odría, General Niergarth,⁷ and the Military Attaché.

My overall impression is that Peru so far is not particularly keen on the military grant-aid project, especially since other important countries seem rather slow in accepting the same thing. Contributing factors to this attitude are: (1) emphasis on external rather than internal defense (the latter is the only thing that really interests the Peruvians at this stage of world developments); (2) a faint suspicion that the new project will make it still more difficult for the Peruvians to purchase arms and supplies in the United States under the Act of 1949; (3) a fear that Peru will be treated less favorably than other countries as regards military grant-aid, the revelation of which might have an adverse effect on Odría’s political position.

While I am confident that Peru will go along with us in almost anything we may propose in regard to military matters involving the defense of the continent, I nevertheless think that it would be a good thing to smooth the way wherever possible. Permission to purchase one of our old cruisers would create a very favorable popular reaction all over the country and would help us politically no end. I don’t believe the Department fully realizes the popular appeal of a cruiser. DE’s, new submarines, and other vessels are probably appreciated by naval men more than an old cruiser, but it is the cruiser that impresses the rank and file and is therefore a political asset. I understand that it has been explained to the Department why a new cruiser for Peru should not upset the balance of naval power on the West Coast since it would merely replace the three old ones which the Peruvians now possess.

Sincerely yours,

Harold H. Tittmann

1. Public Law 329, approved Oct. 6, 1949; for text, see 63 Stat. 715.
2. Public Law 165, approved Oct. 10, 1951; for text, see 65 Stat. 373.
3. Not identified.
4. Attached to the source text, but not printed.
5. Manuel Morla Concha.
6. Col. Frank N. Leakey.
7. Brig. Gen. Omer O. Niergarth, USAF; chief of the U.S. team which negotiated the Military Assistance Agreement with Peru.