Holland files, lot 57 D 295, “Panama, 1954”
The Ambassador in Panama (Chapin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland)
official–informal
Dear Mr. Holland: From the meagre reports that percolate South to the Embassy and to the Commander-in-Chief Caribbean it would appear that the rebel movement in Guatemala is not meeting with much success and, in fact, is apt to disintegrate at any time. From what we can gather Castillo Armas hazarded everything on the belief that the population would rise and that a substantial portion of the Guatemalan Armed Forces would defect. This apparently has not been the case so far. It would seem to make little practical difference whether this is because of loyalty or mistaken patriotism or whether as is probably the case the peasants, workers and soldiers have not been impressed with the possibility of a successful revolt and are therefore just plain scared. From my own experience behind the Curtain I would doubt extremely whether sincere belief in communist ideology plays much of a part except for the leaders in the Guatemalan Government.
It is no use “crying over spilt milk”, beyond expressing some regret that the expedition was not better organized and better timed. Whether the rebels had or have any support from unofficial American sources I do not know or wish to know. If so, it is to be regretted that such support was not greater and more intelligently directed. In any event, however, I feel sure that it would be impossible to persuade the average Latino that the rebel forces did not have some backing official and unofficial from the U.S. I say this as a result of conversations with Panamanians and Latin American Diplomatic colleagues who are apparently friendly to us and are deeply concerned with the march of events in Guatemala. If this be true of such intelligent and well informed and well disposed, how much more true it must be on the part of the man in the street not to mention the professional Yanqui hater?
It is perhaps gratuitous of me to remark that human reactions are very often illogical in that they sometimes run opposite to ones own interest. There are very few real communist sympathisers in these countries but there are a great many people who descend from generations long influenced by a belief in the superiority of Latin culture to that of the Anglo-Saxon and who have been indoctrinated since birth with the fear of Yanqui imperialism and jealousy of the Colossus of the North. While these catch words have happily passed out of current language in most Latin American circles the sentiment and interest which engendered them remains latent ever ready to come to the surface. This is one reason why even among our friends I sometimes detect a certain well concealed satisfaction when the U.S. stubs its toe.
[Page 1450]It is ironical that in this day and age we, as the greatest Democracy on earth, seem to find our friends in this area among the more reactionary dictatorships and some of our Latin American friends, particularly those to the South, have not been slow to seize upon it unquestionably is an additional source of this rising anti-American feeling since they continually throw at us that we do not practise in our Foreign relations what we preach.
Then there is another factor which might be mentioned. Although many of our Latin leaders complain that we do not give them enough economic support etc. they are well aware that they have been treated rather generously although in recent times perhaps they have not received as much of the gravy as has Europe. Nevertheless it appears to be a strong feeling—alas not limited to Panama—that big hearted stupid old Uncle Sam will, in the last analysis, come to the rescue financially if the screech is loud enough economically. In other words, they have a feeling that no matter how often we say no we will eventually come across. In this connection they seem to believe that the U.S. will tolerate almost anything because of its wish to be loved or to put it in a negative sense its wish not to be hated. They are quite willing to work these two themes to the limit and I suggest that in doing so they build up a kind of contempt of what they feel is essentially a weakness in our international policy.
While I of course have no recent personal experience in Latin American sentiment to the South I confess myself disturbed by the newspaper reports from Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and even our former staunch supporter Uruguay of their reaction to the Guatemalan embroglio. It seems possible to me that this anti-Americanism which is beginning to be noticeable here may have advanced even further in those countries to the South particularly those of Hispanic origin. In the other direction Guizado mentioned to me yesterday his concern over the reported attitude of the Ex-President Cardenas–Mexico, who is stated to have come out with some remarks strongly supporting Arbenz.
As I stated in mytel 375, June 23,1 I have the feeling that no matter how the Guatemalan revolt comes out we will be blamed for having incited it and for supporting the rebels if, as seems likely, at present writing the Government should win out we will be faced with a situation which may be cause for the most extreme measures to put right. I cannot conceive that irrespective of right or wrong we could tolerate a full fledged Soviet satellite in such a strategic spot close to our own frontier and to the Panama Canal. I base this statement on the supreme and overriding policy which is that right of self preservation. While I am not prepared nor would it be my place to suggest at this time any active intervention by the U.S. in the Guatemalan struggle I [Page 1451] think it would be only realistic to recognize that if the Arbenz Govt should win out we may eventually have to use such measures and if economic and other sanctions are not enough we may have to use force. I say this in full recognition of the gravity of my statements and after living with the problem for several days. The thought has also occurred to me that since blame is a relative term and we are already receiving blame for the situation in Guatemala that strong measures applied at this time if they almost have to be uni-lateral on our part or with the support our friendly Latin American countries may in the long run prove less damaging to our general interests in Latin America than would greater pressures and the use of larger forces at some later date.
In the meantime one thought occurs to me which I venture to pass on. It is one which could be considered as pressure only in an indirect sense but which I believe might be effective on Latin American opinion in this particular area although less so admittedly to the South. What I suggest is that consideration be given from primarily a political point of view to sending one entire North American Combat Division to the Panama Canal Zone. I suggest that the repercussions of keeping such a force “in being” as Old Naval strategists used the term it might have a very deterrent effect upon any active anti-American activities throughout Central America and if it were necessary throughout Northern South America. The existence of a trained, equipped force of this character kept with means of transport would be both a warning and an assurance of protection. As for the Panamanians needless to say they would be delighted from the purely profit motive!
I have not talked over this matter at length with General Harrison who as you know has just arrived, although when I briefly mentioned it to him Wednesday he was not unreceptive and promised to give the matter some study. I gather that in any event there are sufficient quarters left over from the large garrison here during the war to house such a body of men. I would think moreover that from a military point of view it might be good practise to have at least one U.S. Division trained in jungle or tropical warfare.
Summing up what I wish to make clear that I have no thought that this Division or whatever additional strength of the Forces down here might be effected would be used in active operations unless the situation should deteriorate even to a greater degree than I think possible but rather that such Forces would form what in the eyes of some of these countries would appear to be a potential expeditionary force of overwhelming strength.
With all kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
- Not printed (363/6–2354).↩