611.19/8–2153
The Ambassador in Panama ( Wiley ) to the Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs ( Leddy )
official–informal
Dear Leddy : Naturally, we have been thinking a good deal about the course the negotiations will take in Washington, and for such interest as it may present I shall attempt a résumé of the way things look to us in Panamá.
From our point of view the domestic situation in Panamá assumes considerable importance. President Remón has put himself at the head of a movement for a radical alteration in the relationship between the two countries and with the Canal Zone. What the consequences in Panamá may be is subject to varying interpretations. Highly qualified observers are apprehensive lest the eventual reaction in Panamá to possible disappointment be violent. For example, Dr. Harmodio Arias has spoken to me very seriously of the danger of an “explosion.”
In considering the negotiations from a purely tactical point of view I have in mind five dates, namely, the initiation of the negotiations on September 10, the visit of President Remón to Washington on September 28–30,1 the convening of the National Assembly on October 1, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Republic on November 3–4, and the visit of the Queen of England to Panamá on November 29. I believe it would be very desirable to try to bridge this chronology with tranquility. For the purpose, the following technique might perhaps be used:
When the negotiations start on September 10 it might be well to devote as much time as possible to questions involving organization [Page 1413] and procedure. Then, following the suggestion of Mario de Diego, great emphasis might be placed on clarifying the terms of reference for the negotiations. This could take time, particularly if questions were raised which required the Panamanian delegation to seek new instructions from Panamá. In any event, it would be desirable to keep the negotiations in the realm of innocuity until the advent of President Remón.
At that time there will undoubtedly be a conversation or conversations with President Remón on the policy level. I think every effort should be made then to straighten out his thinking. It might be well, tactfully but forcefully, to let him know that the American Government has been neither impressed nor pleased by his efforts to gain outside support for purely bilateral negotiations and that his sponsoring the popular demonstration to be held on August 27 is looked upon as extracurricular and as setting a precedent that might eventually work against a mutually satisfactory solution of the questions at issue between the two countries. I would suggest, though, that no inkling be given him at this time of any negative attitude the American Government might eventually adopt with regard to questions of principle which may be posed by the Panamanian delegation.
Of greatest importance with President Remón is, in my opinion, the need of persuading him, when he returns to Panamá for the opening of the National Assembly on October 1, to make only a restrained and constructive statement instead of further disturbing the situation by demagogic declarations. From what he has told me in the past, I know that he has had a burning desire to announce at that time a dramatic achievement or the imminence of such an achievement; or, on the other hand, to assume a somewhat violent position if Panamá appears to have been rebuffed. Even for him to appear before the National Assembly and address it in the tone he used in his speech of March 15 would not be helpful. If at all possible, President Remón should be committed in advance to what he will say when the National Assembly convenes.
In Panamá there is common talk that the negotiations will, in the pattern of the past, require from one to several years before the questions under discussion are resolved. At this end, I am quietly and discreetly endeavoring to exploit this concept, pointing out that as a result of World War II the American Government has grown to great dimensions, that in the forthcoming negotiations many governmental departments and agencies will be involved and that, of course, the task of composing different points of view among them will require considerable time and effort on the part of the Department of State. I am therefore urging that the Panamanians approach these negotiations in a spirit of great patience. Perhaps the same line could be emphasized in Washington.
[Page 1414]I mention above the commemoration of the cincuentenario. There will be many foreign delegations and the celebration may take on somewhat the aspect of a very minor Congress of Vienna. Caribbean diplomacy will be active. It would not be a good moment for the airing of grievances on the part of Panamá or the crystallization of conflict between our two countries. Also, during the visit of the Queen of England the eyes of the world will glance briefly at Panamá. That too would not be a good moment for unfriendly demonstrations.
Indeed, I think the negotiations should be kept in as fluid a state as possible for as long as possible. I suggest this for several reasons. It would give the Department an opportunity to study carefully the Panamanian position and techniques in presenting the Panamanian point of view. Also, I think it likely that there will be a growing lack of harmony within the Panamanian delegation, which might perhaps be exploited. Moreover, the State Department would have fuller opportunity to compose differences of viewpoint in Washington, to crystallize the American position and, perhaps, to formulate a positive policy toward Panamá in studied compensation for whatever negative attitude it may be found necessary to adopt toward Panamanian demands. Also, in the world in which we live it is impossible to foresee what developments may take place in, say, the next six months, and this in turn might have an important bearing on the negotiations. There is one thing in particular that I hope we avoid: the premature use of the negative. For example, the Panamanians will probably offer base sites to the United States. It is equally probable that we shall not desire to accept the offer. I would, however, keep the matter under consideration for a very protracted period. In fact, in approaching the negative I would not for the present go beyond “perhaps.” It might be well, for, say, the first three months, to keep the negotiations treading water with greatest energy, then recapitulate and set the course of the future.
I would be glad if you would discuss this letter with Ambassador Muccio.
Yours sincerely,
- The Department in telegram 24, dated Aug. 18, 1953, authorized the Embassy in Panama to invite President Remón to Washington for the period of Sept. 28–30, 1953 (719.11/8–1853).↩