719.00/3–2152

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to the Ambassador in Panama (Wiley)

top secret
official–informal

Dear John: We have been giving considerable thought to your memorandum to me of March 11 entitled “Disorders in Panama”1 in which you raise the question of possible intervention by American forces in the Republic in the event of serious disorder such as a “Bogotazo” occurring in the Republic. As you point out this problem raises policy questions of the first magnitude. It is our view that we should get up a joint State-Defense paper on the subject which would serve as a directive both to you and to General McBride, which would deal as specifically as it is possible to do, in advance of the actual outbreak of any such disorders, with what your course of action should be. Pending the preparation and clearance of such a directive, I am writing to give you my preliminary views as a result of talks which we have had here.

Our preliminary views are as follows:

1)
We are in principle opposed to any intervention in Panama, even at the request of the Panamanian Government. Last May during the revolution which unseated Arias, we were insistently requested by Arias to intervene; we refused to do so; and our judgment was subsequently borne out to be correct.
2)
It is impossible in advance of knowing the exact situation that may transpire to authorize either the Embassy or CINCARIB to deviate from our treaty commitments against intervention. Consequently, we are not able to delegate any blanket authorization which would contemplate intervention. Authorization to either the Embassy or CINCARIB to intervene in Panama without prior specific consultation at the time with Washington would appear to presuppose a failure of communications. In the event that a special situation such as a “Bogotazo” should arise wherein the Ambassador and/or CINCARIB [Page 1400] would feel that intervention should be authorized, a telecon can be set up between the Canal Zone and the Pentagon which would permit a decision to be reached rapidly on the specific recommendations of the Embassy and CINCARIB in the light of then existing conditions. Consideration might be given to establishing a secure direct line between the Embassy residence, the Chancery and Quarry Heights so as to facilitate communication between the Embassy and the Zone.
3)
If political rioting should occur centered around the Palace, as in the case of the revolt against Arias last May, it would probably not be necessary to order or permit intervention by U.S. troops in the Republic even if the civil authorities of the Republic should request it. The mere fact that U.S. troops happen to be conveniently accessible to the Republic of Panama should not alter the general inter-American rule with respect to intervention. In fact the very proximity of the Canal Zone would argue against any such exception since American civilians residing in the Republic have ready access to a haven which is not found in the case of other countries in the Hemisphere.
4)
The foregoing does not of course affect operations under the evacuation plan for Panama. Nevertheless the evacuation plan will be reviewed immediately to make certain that it takes into consideration all of the circumstances mentioned in your memorandum.
5)
If rioting of the proportions of a “Bogotazo” should occur where the total destruction of Panama City would be threatened and this in turn would endanger the safety of Balboa, a different set of circumstances could arise in which it would be neither morally appropriate nor in accordance with our self-interest to refrain from intervening with troops. However, before authorizing intervention even in such circumstances, the whole situation should be reviewed by telecon or other means of communication. Naturally, in the unlikely event of failure of communications the decision would have to be left in the hands of the Embassy and CINCARIB.

We will as promptly as possible prepare the joint directive contemplated in the first paragraph of this letter. Meanwhile you should be guided by this letter although we would be glad to have any comments you may have on it.

Sincerely yours,

Edward G. Miller, Jr.
  1. Supra. The reactions of Assistant Secretary Miller’s subordinates to Ambassador Wiley’s letter are contained in memoranda by Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs Siracusa (719.00/3–1252, 611.19/3–1152), and by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mann (719.00/3–1352).