Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

738.5 MSP/12–3152

The Chargé in Haiti (Folsom) to the Department of State ¹

secret
No. 424

Port-au-Prince, December 31, 1952.

Ref:

• Department’s Circular Airgram of November 24, 1952, 3:45 p.m.² (Control No. 2139)

Subject:

• Status of Programs Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951³—Haiti—Quarter Ended December 31, 1952.

Summary

The present report, as the first in this series, is much more lengthy than will be the case with succeeding reports since this report is considered as basic and will serve as a point of reference in the future.

Implementation of the basic foreign policy objectives of the United States in Haiti is carried out through the Embassy. The IIAA–TCA with its agricultural and health missions, its training program, and its supervision of a rubber experimental station, the naval and air force training missions, a mapping mission and miscellaneous other special assistance missions provide the instruments by which U.S. aid is brought to Haiti. Of these, only the IIAA–TCA operations come under the Mutual Security Program, though all of them contribute to raising living standards, improved production or health, better administration or the imparting of technical knowledge. Indirectly, all contribute to internal stability and hemispheric cooperation and solidarity. The very backwardness of the country, the vast field offered for economic, social and technical development, imposes the major obstacle to attainment of spectacular results. Other complications inherent in the social structure and the form of government also provide inhibiting factors to development of private investment. Certain foreign influences are not conducive to improvement of relations with the United States, but at present it should be noted that there is no communist influence. There are no obstacles placed in the way of administration of the aid programs, and, on the contrary, the Haitian Government seeks and does all possible to facilitate aid. Compliance with commitments appears to be complete and Haitian contribution to the aid programs appears to be consonant with the nation’s resources.

I. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

The objectives of United States foreign policy as applied to the Republic of Haiti seek to obtain Haitian support of efforts to promote world-wide and inter-American peace and prosperity, to encourage developments in Haitian national life and internal affairs which will make Haiti a more stable and effective democracy, to raise living standards and to improve economic conditions in Haiti, to encourage maintenance of internal order and the ability of Haiti to contribute to western hemispheric defense and to improve relations and promote mutual understanding between Haiti and its neighbors.

II. Instruments of Application of the Foreign Policy Objectives

The instruments for application of the foregoing foreign policy objectives of the United States in Haiti are as follows:

1. The Embassy of the United States

2. The IIAA–TCA operating through

(a) The Agricultural and Food Production Mission (ratio of contributions: Haiti–3, USA–1)

(b) The Health and Sanitation Mission (ratio of contributions: Haiti–3, USA–1)

(c) The Training Program (scholarships, fellowships, etc.)

(d) The Marfranc Rubber Experimental Station (under IIAA–TCA supervision but run by the United States Department of Agriculture which provides almost all of its financing with the Haitian Government providing land and certain support)

(e) The proposed Artibonite Valley irrigation and agricultural development program (will be carried out with IIAA–TCA assistance and financed jointly by the Haitian Government and the Export-Import Bank.).

3. Other

(a) The U.S. Naval Mission—a training mission

(b) The U.S. Air Force Mission—a training mission

(c) The Inter-American Geodetic Survey Project—a mapping program.

(d) Miscellaneous American assistance through the IIAA–TCA, United Nations, Organization of American States, and United States Departments and Agencies for special advice on special subjects.

III. Progress in Achieving Foreign Policy Objectives

The agricultural and food productions programs of the IIAA–TCA have already achieved progress in increasing food production and the proposed Artibonite irrigation, drainage and agricultural program can be counted on to do even more in the future. The health and sanitation program has improved health and living conditions. Both programs have aided in the development of an underdeveloped nation and indirectly have promoted internal stability.

The rubber experimental station is an excellent combination of economic development, production of an essential material for collective defense and inter-American cooperation.

The Naval and Air missions provide excellent examples of constructive technical aid, the former in the field of coast guard training with special emphasis on aids to navigation and the latter in development and training of a small but very competent military air force which also acts as a domestic commercial line. The IAGS project, while designed to provide the United States with mapping data, also makes these available to Haiti and provides a training service for Haitians in this field.

The various specialists working to improve Haitian economy, administration, education, health, etc., whether acting under the IIAA–TCA or other U.S. agencies or whether working for some international organization are, in fact, directly or indirectly furthering United States aims in aiding the development of Haiti.

Indirectly all these programs serve to make for internal order and to promote development of a more stable and effective democracy. Some of them promote inter-American understanding and the Naval and Air Missions contribute in a small way to strengthening of the Caribbean defense system.

IV. Major Obstacles and Difficulties

The attainment of United States foreign policy objectives is hampered by various factors.

The very backwardness of the country, its lack of natural resources, its growing population, its illiteracy, extremely bad health conditions and the like, all make the task of economic and social development an intricate and difficult task.

The existence of repressive measures, graft, corruption and past efforts of presidents to extend their terms of office beyond the legal limits, as well as a relatively rigid social system, the existence of an underlying conflict between the mulatto elite and the black masses, complicated by the recent emergence of a new power elite, including both blacks and mulattoes, all have served to hamper development of a stable and effective democracy.

A history of government interference with and insistence upon participation in profitable business enterprise has not been encouraging to foreign investment and this year, for example, it resulted in withdrawal of the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company from Haiti. Despite this fact, foreign (with U.S. dominant) investment in manufacturing, business and commerce exceeds that of Haitians.

Relations with the Dominican Republic, never good, though somewhat better at present, constitute a factor of distrust in hemispheric cooperation and cause Haiti to be very jealous of all military and financial assistance provided its neighbor.

Historic and cultural ties with France also hamper at times the full attainment of U.S. objectives in Haiti.

The efforts of Argentine representatives, especially in the fields of propaganda and labor, while in most part ineffective and insignificant, are worthy of note as an anti-American influence.

Finally, it should be noted, negatively, that there is no communist influence in Haiti at present.

V. Specific Obstacles and Difficulties Affecting U.S. Aid

Strictly speaking, there are no obstacles or difficulties affecting the administration of U.S. aid to Haiti.

On the contrary, the nearness of the United States, the Marine Occupation, and years of financial and economic tutelage by the United States have predisposed the Haitians not only to accept, but to seek and expect U.S. assistance. Each Government has sought to obtain its full share of aid. Succeeding regimes have criticized not only the previous administrations but also the U.S. aid in some cases, but this has in no way deterred them from seeking more.

VI. Replies to Specific Questions

a. Haiti’s Adherence to Commitments Made in the Course of MSP Aid Negotiations

There is no evidence of any failure to provide complete compliance with and adherence to commitments. Each Haitian contribution has been forthcoming on schedule. This is not to say that the Government would not like to reduce the 3–1 ratio of financial contributions, but it adheres to the schedule.

b. Political Developments Affecting Prospects of Adherence to a Progress towards JCS Force Targets, Including Action on Defense Budgets

The total military force of Haiti numbers about 5,000 men and officers. It is an internal security or police force in concept. The air force and coast guard units are small and the most effective unit is the Palace Guard of some 500 men. With this small force, Haiti cannot be expected to play any significant role in JCS force targets. Maintenance of internal security and assistance of minor importance in protection of the Windward Passage in time of emergency is all that can be expected. Financial resources do not permit maintenance of an important military establishment. In this respect, it may be noted that the national budget in 1952–53 is about $28,000,000 (US) of which the armed forces receive 18 per cent (this is an increase of about 23 per cent in the amount of money allocated in 1951–52.

c. Major Economic Developments Which Might Appreciably Affect Aid Levels

Declining agricultural prices and restricting dollar markets are affecting most of the major export crops of Haiti with the exception of coffee. Unfortunately, the coffee crop for this year is forecast at below normal levels. This will adversely affect Government revenues, which are based primarily on customs duties on imports and exports. Haiti has had a balanced budget for some forty-odd years and falling revenues undoubtedly will restrict the ability of the Government to undertake certain of its planned public works. This may cause it to seek more outside aid in the coming year.

d. Defense Alliances and Other Developments in International Relations Affecting Security

None.

e. Effect of MSP Aid in Furthering Internal Political Stability and Security

Discussed in III above.

f. General Progress in Activation of Planned Forces

The Haitian General Staff has not obtained the complete agreement of its own Government for the creation of a mobile task force for use as an instrument of U.N. policy (under the Uniting for Peace Resolution⁴), nor has it received any encouragement from the United States on this score.

g. General Effect on Progress towards Force Goals of Deliveries of U.S.-Furnished End-Items

No military items furnished.

h. General Ability of Haiti’s Defense Establishment to Utilize Military Aid

See VI–b.

i. Major Developments with Respect to Defense Production Plans and Programs

Not applicable (unless applied to the commercial production of sisal, which may be expected to decline for the next few years).

j. Major Trends with Respect to Economic Development Plans and Programs

The Haitian Government is presently engaged in implementation of its $40,000,000 Five Year Plan for the economic development of Haiti with emphasis on construction and repair of schools, construction of hospitals and dispensaries and other public health and sanitation projects, agricultural development including irrigation, drainage, stock breeding, farm demonstrations, grain storage, etc., road construction, and urban development. Expenditures to date have been included in the regular national budget and are set at $5,000,000 for 1952–53.

Also included in the national budget is provision for implementation of the Artibonite Valley agricultural development program with an allocation of $1,500,000 for 1952–53 to be spent in coordination with the Exim Bank loan of $14,000,000.

The Haitian budget for 1952–53 also sets aside $255,000 for health and sanitation and $200,000 for agricultural development, although the Haitian Government has agreed to provide $317,000 to match the U.S. contribution of $105,000. In addition to these local contributions to the IIAA–TCA programs the Haitian Government has provided $196,000 as the local contribution to a World Health Organization anti-yaws campaign.

In addition to these budgetary commitments, the Haitian Government is seeking to extend its road system, to rehabilitate its telephone system, and has under study plans for construction of an international airport, harbor improvements, construction of two new workers’ cities, extensive municipal improvements in Cap-Haitien and Gonaives, and numerous other projects in more or less advanced stages of planning.

Finally, in 1949 Haiti adopted legislation designed to promote industrial development, providing in the law for special customs and tax privileges for so-called “new industries”.

k. Economic and Social Effects of Point IV Programs

Total expenditures of the Point IV Program in Haiti in the fiscal year 1952–53 may be estimated at $750,000. While a substantial sum, expenditures of this size spread over a people numbering some 3,000,000 with a national income of perhaps $150,000,000 and a national budget of $28,000,000 cannot be expected to have spectacular economic and social effects. The Point IV Program is providing a very useful service in irrigation extension, in demonstration farms, stock and poultry breeding and the like and will be instrumental in development of some 60 to 70,000 acres of land in the Artibonite Valley. The health and sanitation part of the Program is gradually reducing the incidence of yaws, hookworm, malaria and other diseases prevalent in the country. Over a longer period the effects of these two programs will vitally affect the lives of thousands of Haitians. The rubber experimental farm is providing high grade seed and clones for rubber development (as well as in fields of health, education, administration, sphere.

The capacity of Haiti to receive aid in almost all fields of economic development (as well as in fields of health, education, administration, etc.) is limited more by the amount of aid available than by capacity to absorb such aid. Its capacity to utilize effectively aid provided, has increased in recent years and with few exceptions has been adequate. Careful screening of expanded aid by the Embassy, the local IIAA–TCA office, and the control offices in Washington is, I believe, sufficient guarantee that aid will not be extended into fields which might prove unproductive or in amounts beyond the local capacity to absorb.

l. Attitude of the Haitian Government and Public towards U.S. Aid Programs

Public and Government attitude is very favorable and cooperative with reference to the Point IV Program, and indeed toward all aid from abroad. The United States is expected to supply most of the aid. It may be noted that in the past, U.S. programs to aid Haiti have been welcome, but in some cases have been criticized following conclusion of the project; this has been especially true of projects which have resulted in increase in the public debt or liabilities of the State. It will probably not be the case with pay-as-you-go programs such as the agricultural and health and sanitation programs. It may arise in the case of the Artibonite project should that undertaking not be a demonstrable success after a reasonable period of years.

Finally, in line with the Mutual Security Program objectives, a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation is now under consideration and has reached the discussion stage between the Haitian Government and representatives of the United States Embassy.⁵

I believe that the contents of this report provide the assurances requested to show that Haiti has taken decisive steps towards self-help and mutual cooperation, thus justifying continued aid (compliance with Section 511(c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951).

Robert S. Folsom

1. Drafted by Chargé Folsom.
2. The referenced airgram requests Embassies to submit quarterly reports concerning the status of programs under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (700.5 MSP/11–2452).
3. Public Law 165, approved Oct. 10, 1951; for text, see 65 Stat. 373.
4. Reference is to Resolution 377(V) of the General Assembly, approved Nov. 3, 1950; for text, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 10–12.
5. The referenced discussions were suspended in mid-1953; pertinent documents are in file 611.384 for 1952 and 1953.