Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

714.00/7–754

The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

secret
No. 5

Guatemala City, July 7, 1954.

Subject:

• Memorandum of Negotiations Leading to Signing of Pact of San Salvador, July 2, 1954¹

In accordance with telephonic instructions from Assistant Secretary Holland, I left Guatemala for El Salvador with Col. Batten,² Chief of the U.S. Air Force Mission in Guatemala, and Harold E. Urist, Public Affairs Officer, in the Air Mission plane at 11:30 a.m. July 1. We took along a number of U.S. news correspondents and representatives of each of the five Guatemalan independent newspapers. Upon our arrival in San Salvador at 12:15 p.m. I was met by the Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Antonio Alvarez Vidaurre, representing the Salvadoran Government.

Ambassador Alvarez drove me to the Palace, where Ambassador Michael McDermott and Counselor of Embassy Andrew E. Donovan were waiting. I was presented at 1:30 p.m. to President Osorio. Also present during the interview were Sr. Peralta, President of the Salvadoran Assembly, who was to be President Osorio’s personal representative during the negotiations, Ambassador McDermott, Mr. Donovan, and Mr. Urist who served as interpreter. We had barely exchanged greetings when I received a telephone call³ in the President’s private office from Secretary of State Dulles, who emphasized the importance of bringing the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion and that, if it were necessary, I was authorized to “crack some heads together”.

President Osorio told me that the negotiations between Colonels Elfego Monzón and Carlos Castillo Armas had been carried on until 4 a.m. that morning (they had begun the evening of June 30), but that the two men were as far apart as when they met. He said Col. Monzón would not give an inch and that in his opinion Col. Castillo Armas should be the President of the Military Junta which was ruling Guatemala, and that if I could bring them together, I was a better man than he. I mentioned to him my conversation with Secretary Dulles and emphasized the deep concern of my Government with regard to the situation in Guatemala and how important it was that the two sides be brought to a satisfactory understanding and agreement. I said I was going to do everything in my power to resolve the basic differences and take the two colonels back to Guatemala with me and the other diplomatic advisers who had lent their good offices. I then told President Osorio that I desired to meet privately first with Colonel Castillo Armas and then with Colonel Monzón. This was immediately arranged, and at 2 p.m. I met with Colonel Castillo Armas in one of the reception rooms, with only Mr. Urist present.

I told Col. Castillo Armas that I was sorry to hear that there had been some difficulties between him and Col. Monzón in reaching an understanding, that I believed this was the time for true patriots to put aside personal ambitions and interests and work together for the good of Guatemala. The basic and common aims of both sides, I said, should be the total eradication of Communism from the country and the restoration of peace and tranquility. The colonel was in absolute agreement. I said I could see no reason for a divergence of opinion between him and Col. Monzón, since I believed Col. Monzón also to be a sincere Guatemalan whose only interest was the welfare of his country. I pleaded with Col. Castillo Armas to leave the details of the future government and the question of who would be president of Guatemala to a time when representatives of both groups could sit down over a conference table in Guatemala and thrash out their differences. I repeated that this was not the moment to preoccupy themselves with details and programs, but that the important thing was to agree immediately on common aspirations for the good of their country and return together, arm in arm, to Guatemala, where the people were waiting to receive them. I suggested that both armies be joined together and march into the capital as one, as brother Guatemalans. Col. Castillo Armas said again he was in complete agreement. However, he believed Col. Monzón wanted to be president of the Junta, and that his military colleagues, after their long battle and sacrifices, would not accept it. I then told him I was going to speak with absolute frankness. “You know, and I know,” I told him, “how the American people feel about you. Many American people think you should be the president of Guatemala, and some time in the not-too-distant future, say six months from now, you should hold free and democratic elections, and I personally will do all in my power to help you. For the present, I think you should be taken into the Junta. And, confidentially, I’ll tell you something else. Col. Cruz Salazar (one of the three members of the Junta) told me that he was on your side, so you should have no problem at all.” He seemed to be pleased and reassured by these last statements.

We completed our conversation at 2:30. I told him I was now going to see Col. Monzón and that I thought the two colonels and the diplomatic advisers should meet as a group at about 4:30 to clarify any remaining details which might need discussion.

I then met with Col. Monzón. He reiterated previous statements made to me, declaring that he was interested only in restoring peace and tranquility to Guatemala, that he had no personal ambition with regard to the presidency of Guatemala, and that, if necessary, he would be happy to sign a statement to that effect. The only point on which he was adamant was that he wanted to save the honor of the Guatemalan army. He said, quite logically, in my opinion, that since he had been appointed chief of the Military Junta by the army staff, he would have to return to Guatemala in the same capacity. He was in complete agreement with the idea of an immediate accord with Col. Castillo Armas on general objectives. He said he would be happy to accept Col. Castillo Armas in the Junta, and that after they had returned with me to Guatemala the Junta could elect Castillo Armas president.

I asked Col. Monzón if there were any immediate problems he felt needed discussion. He said the only serious problem was getting food to the Government troops in the field, and he hoped Castillo Armas would give immediate permission for supplies to be dropped. We terminated our discussion at 3 o’clock.

I then informed President Osorio of our discussions without going into detail, and told him I would return at 4:30 p.m. to meet with the two colonels and the other three advisers.

After luncheon at Ambassador McDermott’s residence, I returned shortly before 5 p.m. to the Palace and met with the group participating in the negotiations.

I led off the discussions with a résumé of the principal objectives both parties should take into consideration before they went into detailed negotiations. This was a re-statement of my introductions to the talks held with the two colonels. The entire group agreed. Col. Castillo Armas, however, who had meanwhile been talking with his legal advisers (Lic. Juan Cordova Cerna, Lic. Luis Alberto Coronado Lira, Lic. Carlos Salazar, hijo), brought up the question of the number of members in the Junta. He pointed out that if only he joined the Junta there would be a preponderance of members representing the other side. He said that he would like, therefore, to include another person representing his forces and proposed the name of Major Enrique Oliva,⁴ who, in his opinion, was one of the most capable and hard-working professional military men in Guatemala. He said Major Oliva had no political ambitions and would be a valuable asset to the Junta. Col. Monzón accepted this proposal without reservation. One of the advisers then pointed out that there would still be three against two. The Papal Nuncio offered as a solution the possibility of having a Junta of six members, three for each side. This point was discussed for some time, but was finally dropped when it was agreed that 1) three members on each side could easily lead to a stalemate when voting takes place, and 2) a Junta with six members was really too large and unwieldy.

The advisers all agreed with me that on the details of the future administration of the country all should be left until the two colonels had returned to Guatemala and were able to sit down with the other members of the Junta to work out their problems together. The entire arrangement seemed satisfactory to both parties and to the diplomatic advisers, and the meeting was terminated at 6 p.m. so that the two colonels and their legal advisers could meet alone to draw up a statement of their common decision. Meanwhile, the diplomatic advisers retired to a nearby room to be available at any time for consultation.

From that moment until midnight we held individual and group meetings. Castillo Armas’ advisers were apparently in disagreement with the colonel and felt that any document signed by him should be ad referendum. He could then return to his headquarters in Chiquimula to obtain the approval of his staff officers. I fought strongly against this, reviewing once again the importance of arriving at a general agreement then and there, because I felt that if Castillo Armas needed the approval of his staff, it would be only just that Col. Monzón would also have to obtain the acquiescence of the two other Junta members in Guatemala, thereby losing the opportunity to create the maximum psychological impact which could be expected from their immediate return together. I was finally forced to talk with Castillo Armas alone and ask him point blank whether he was the chief of his “outfit”, since every time he agreed on a point he subsequently changed his decision after conferring with his advisers. I told him that if he was not the top man in his organization, I would appreciate his telling me who was, so that I could deal with that person.

I believe this question was the turning point of the negotiations, and Castillo Armas and his advisers accepted Monzón’s concession that within fifteen days after the signing of the pact he would agree to the election of a new Junta president. Without actually stating it, the implication was that Castillo Armas would be elected.

From midnight when the two sides finally arrived at an agreement on the basic points, the legal advisers spent their time conferring and arguing on the format and wording of the pact, and at 4 a.m. the document was finally completed.

About 3 a.m., while I was awaiting the completion of the first draft of the pact, I was visited by the Nicaraguan Ambassador to El Salvador, Sr. Carlos Duque Estrada, who said he brought an urgent message from President Somoza. He said that President Somoza wished to advise me that in view of the “breakdown” in negotiations between Castillo Armas and Monzón, he urged the entire negotiation party to come to Managua as his guests to continue their discussions there. If this were not feasible, he said, then he strongly advised that Col. Castillo Armas be made president of Guatemala, and that Col. Monzón be made Minister of Defense. He mentioned several other Cabinet appointments, which I do not recall. I thanked Ambassador Duque in the name of my Government and asked him to convey my expressions of gratitude to President Somoza. I told him, however, that it now appeared that the two sides were arriving at a satisfactory agreement and that I did not believe it would be necessary to trouble President Somoza with any of the negotiations.

Meanwhile, preparations had been made for a formal ceremony in the large banquet room of the Palace, and for the proceedings to be broadcast by radio. The entire press, both national and international, who had also been up all night awaiting the historic moment, were allowed to witness the event and take photographs. The pact was signed by the two colonels; Sr. Carlos Azucar Chávez, acting Foreign Minister in the absence of Sr. Peralta…; the Papal Nuncio, and Col. Funes. I suggested to the members of the negotiating group that the name of the representative of the United States of America be omitted from the document, thus giving the Salvadoran Government recognition as the principal mediator. Actually, Sr. Peralta had disappeared shortly after the general negotiations meeting had ended at 6 p.m., and I did not see either him or President Osorio again until the following day.

I went immediately to the United States Embassy with Ambassador McDermott in order to send the following wire⁵ to the Department:

“Holland from Peurifoy. Pact between Armas and Monzón signed five a.m. today. Both return with me to Guatemala 11:30 a.m. (Friday, July 2). Junta increased to five members. Monzón remains President for two weeks at which time members vote for new president. Election promised soon as practicable after peace and tranquility restored.”

I then returned to Ambassador McDermott’s residence at 6:45 a.m., intending to make preparations for departure at 11 a.m. with the two colonels and their advisers, since this had been the agreement made with them. Col. Castillo Armas, when he agreed to return with me to Guatemala, had explained that he was going to leave at 6 a.m., shortly after signing the pact, for Chiquimula in order to give orders to his troops and, I assume, to report to his staff on what had taken place in San Salvador. He had assured me that he would return to San Salvador in time to take off at 11 a.m. However, when I called him to verify the hour of departure, I was informed that he and members of his staff had left for Chiquimula and Honduras but had not stated when they would return. I was finally able to locate Col. Castillo Armas’ principal legal adviser, Lie. Juan Cordóva Cerna, who told me that he regretted that Col. Castillo Armas could not return by 11 a.m. as planned, that he had to visit both Chiquimula and Tegucigalpa for “very personal reasons”, and that he would either return that afternoon or the following morning.

After conferring once more by telephone with Mr. Holland, who believed as I did that it was important for the two colonels to return to Guatemala together, I alerted Col. Monzón and his party and ordered Col. Vernon P. Martin, Embassy Air Attaché, to have his crew stand by. When Col. Castillo Armas did not return that day, I made plans to take off the following morning, July 3, at 11 a.m.

The following morning, before going to the airport, I called on President Osorio to thank him in the name of my Government for his magnificent hospitality and for the significant role he had played in bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the important negotiations which would bring peace and order to the sister republic of Guatemala. He in turn expressed his satisfaction at the results of the negotiations and asked me to convey to the Government of the United States his appreciation of the part played by my country in this important Central American event. He then presented me with a medallion commemorating the Lempa River hydro-electric plant at Chorrera del Guayabo, and a special set of commemorative postage stamps as a token of his personal esteem and appreciation.

Col. Castillo Armas arrived in San Salvador about 10 a.m. and also visited the Palace to confer with President Osorio. He and his party finally arrived at the airport about 12:20 p.m. and we took off in the Air Attaché’s plane at 12:43. Accompanying me on the return trip were Colonels Castillo Armas and Monzón; Col. Miguel Angel Mendoza, officer of the Castillo Armas air force; Major Arriaga, as personal aide to Col. Monzón; Major Enrique Oliva, one of the two new members of the Junta; Licenciados Juan Ibarra and Eduardo Cáceres Lehnhoff, legal advisers to Col. Monzon; Lic. Luis Alberto Coronado Lira, legal adviser to Col. Castillo Armas; the Papal Nuncio; Ambassador Funes, and Mr. Urist. Arrangements had meanwhile been made for nine planes of various types, representing both the regular army and the Castillo Armas forces, to accompany our plane in a formation flight over Guatemala City before landing at Aurora Airport. We landed at 1:30 p.m.

John E. Peurifoy

1. An unsigned copy of the Pact of San Salvador was transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to despatch 3 from San Salvador, dated July 5, 1954, not printed (714.00/7–554).
2. Earl Batten.
3. No record of the referenced telephone conversation was found in Department of State files.
4. Enrique Trinidad Oliva Quintana.
5. Reference is to unnumbered telegram, from San Salvador, dated July 2, 1954; it is in file 714.00/7–254. There are slight discrepancies between the telegram as sent and as quoted by Ambassador Peurifoy in this despatch.