Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

714.001/6–954

Notes of a Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, Held in the Department of State, June 9, 1954 ¹

secret

June 9, 1954

• Present: Holland, Pawley, Dreier, Leddy …, Woodward, Burrows, Atwood, Sanders, Wieland, Herron, Pearson

1. Consultation on Draft Resolution

(a) Holland reported a number of conversations with the Ambassadors here on the text of the draft resolution. However, it is too early to determine how many of the LA countries would accept it as it stands.

(b) It was agreed that AR under Dreier’s direction should draft all outgoing cables on this subject that were not drafted by Holland himself. Also, AR will be responsible for all messages relating to the OAS meeting with appropriate checking with other officers of the Bureau.

(c) It was decided not to give the draft resolution general distribution to the LA or OAS Ambassadors in Washington until it breaks publicly.

(d) Wieland is to prepare guidance for USIA for use when the draft resolution appears publicly.

(e) It was decided not to suggest to the LA countries that they have their Ambassadors negotiate the text here.

(f) Burrows was to cable Hill to tell the Costa Rican Government that if Figueres will agree to the text of the draft resolution, Hill will be in a position to put pressure on the Department to hasten the delivery of arms.

(g) Holland wanted to be sure that an answer was going out to Beaulac’s query as to how many approvals we had for the meeting and the draft resolution.

2. Consultation with LA Ambassadors to UN

(a) Dreier reported a message was being sent to Wadsworth to instruct USUN to (1) give necessary background materials to the LA Ambassadors, and (2) stress the importance of the Guatemalan problem to us.

(b) Dreier was to talk with Key concerning the desirability of Holland’s having a dinner for the LA Ambassadors to the UN in order to meet them and explain our position on the Guatemalan problem.

3. Consultation with West European Maritime (WEM) Countries

(a) Holland asked that three documents—Communism in Guatemala, the Communist Party in Guatemala, and Communist Penetration of Czechoslovakia and Guatemala—be sent to our Embassies in the WEM countries for their use in getting across the necessary background to the respective governments.

(b) Woodward was asked to talk with Merchant in an effort to get advice and help from EUR on this phase of our problem.

(c) It was decided that in our reply to Bonn concerning claims arising from our stopping ships we should hedge since … the source of any indemnification is not clear.

[Here follow paragraphs 4 through 7 dealing with procedural aspects of the proposed OAS conference.]

8. Withdrawing Technical Assistance from Guatemala

It was decided that we would not withdraw the nine technical assistance people and their families from Guatemala any time before the OAS meeting. Stassen and the Defense people had recommended immediate withdrawal. Holland pointed out that immediate withdrawal would be contrary to the main line he had followed with the LA Ambassadors that we would not take any unilateral economic or other steps before the meeting.²

9. Preparation of the Case

(a) It was decided that not only would the details of our case be made available to the LA countries in advance, but we would ask any Ambassador who might be useful to help in the actual preparation of the case. Zuleta was particularly anxious to help. If several participated, the parallel approach in the calling of the meeting would be strengthened.

(b) Dreier was to send a message to Peurifoy to get his views on what he thought the Guatemalans would present at the meeting, but the actual coordination and preparation would be done here in Washington.

(c) Sanders reported that some chapters of the case would be completed by the end of this week and ready for Holland’s examination Monday, June 14. Holland said the case would not be completed until the eve of the meeting because of the constant adjustments which would have to be made.

(d) Holland put considerable stress on the need for us to develop the Guatemalan case in actual written outline so that we would be sure that our own case took account of all the points.

10. Anticipating Guatemalan Maneuvers Before the Meeting

At this point Holland read a memorandum.…

(a) Holland indicated we must be in a position to counter a move by Arbenz in which he may fire a few Communists and superficially reorganize his government.³

. . . . . . .

11. Economic Measures

(a) Holland reported that the proposed statement by the President on lead and zinc, sugar, and Venezuelan oil would not be made. Instead, it has been decided that the President will make the decision on lead and zinc, followed presumably by a public statement on this subject. Holland would try to get some Congressmen and Senators to make statements opposing restrictive trade measures by this Government.

(b) Atwood called attention to an Eximbank announcement to be made tomorrow on subjects included in the economic memorandum.

(c) Atwood noted the Bolivian reference to their need of an economic program appearing with their reply on the OAS meeting.

(d) Atwood was to prepare a memorandum for Holland indicating whether or not we should get RFC to change its decision on the terms of the recent tin purchase from Bolivia which resulted in $350,000 less for Bolivia.

(e) Holland expressed the view that there would be no other economic price for the OAS than the Bolivian aid program.

12. Congressional Consultation

(a) Pearson was to arrange consultative meetings with the LA Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees at which Holland was to (1) bring the Subcommittees up to date on developments, and (2) endeavor to get some of them to issue statements or make speeches opposing restrictive trade measures by the U.S.

(b) Burrows and Atwood were to brief Holland for these meetings.

[Here follow paragraphs 13 through 15 which deal briefly with publicity, other cases, and psychological attack, respectively.]

1. Prepared by Mr. Pearson.
2. In a memorandum to Governor Stassen concerning the subject of withdrawing FOA aid from Guatemala, dated June 14, 1954, William M. Rand, Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, stated in part that “at the June 2 OCB luncheon I took the position that, by leaving our men in Guatemala, we had a line of communication, we had the friendship of the people, and we were doing a job of mercy with our hospital work and could possibly be valuable.” (ICA Director’s Files, FRC 56 A 632, “Latin America”)
3. A telegram from Guatemala dated June 9, 1954, stated that information had been received indicating that representatives of the Guatemalan Council of National Defense had called on President Arbenz ostensibly to thank him for procuring arms, but actually to declare the army’s anti-Communist solidarity and to request that he rid the government of Communists. Another telegram from Guatemala reads as follows: “Officer corps torn between conflicting loyalties … and forthright declaration U.S. intentions may sparkplug opposition.”