Office of the Historian

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 5419

Draft Statement of Policy by the National Security Council1

top secret
NSC 5419
[Washington,] May 24, 1954.

U.S. Policy in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin America

general considerations

1.
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to which the United States is a party, provides as follows:

“Article 3

  • “1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
  • “2. On the request of the State or States directy attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

“Article 6

“If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.”

2.
Since May 1, a strike situation has developed in Honduras in which the entire north coast area has been paralyzed. There is reason to believe that the strike may have had inspiration and support from the Guatemalan side of the Honduran boundary. The situation has prompted the Honduran government to send much of the weakly organized and poorly equipped Honduran army to the strike area and to stand guard on the Guatemalan border, thus stripping the capital at Tegucigalpa of military forces.
3.
In these circumstances an armed attack by Guatemala could, perhaps, in a matter of hours, bring about the fall of the Honduran government.2 (If Guatemalan aggression took some form other than an “armed attack”, Article 3 would not apply and other provisions of the Rio Treaty would have to be invoked.)
4.
Any successor government which arose in Honduras as the result of a successful Guatemalan attack might well have the same leaning toward Communism that distinguishes the present government of Guatemala. This would pose a most serious threat to the ability of the other governments of Central America to withstand Communist penetration or control. It would thus constitute a serious threat to the security of the area and, correspondingly, to United States security interests there.

recommendations

5.
If the government of any member of the Organization of American States should, under Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Rio Treaty, request the assistance of the United States to meet an armed attack by Guatemala, and if the President should be satisfied that such an attack has occurred, it is recommended that the President:
a.
Determine that such Guatemalan armed attack is considered by the United States as an armed attack against all American states under Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio Treaty, and constitutes an imminent threat to the security of the United States.
b.
Direct that under Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Rio Treaty and to protect the security of the United States, the armed forces of the United States, in collaboration with the armed forces of other members of the Organization of American States to the extent feasible, take military action to the extent necessary to counteract the attack and eliminate the danger to the state attacked.
6.
The United States should encourage any member of the Organization of American States which requests the United States to come to its assistance, also to request such action by other members of the Organization of American States pending a decision by the Organ of Consultation.
7.
The United States should take all practicable steps to ensure that the other members of Organization of American States are prepared for collective action under the Rio Treaty to assist any member of Organization of American States threatened by aggression or internal subversion inspired by Guatemala.
8.
The Chairmen of appropriate congressional committees should be immediately informed of the above policy.
9.
The timing of public disclosure of the above policy should be determined by the Secretary of State.

  1. This paper was based on a memorandum drafted in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) by Mr. Jamison and Mr. Leddy on May 12, 1954, not printed, and submitted to Director of the Policy Planning Staff Bowie by Assistant Secretary Holland on May 13. That draft was subsequently returned to ARA and revised after consultation between officers in ARA and Louis J. Halle of the Policy Planning Staff. The revised draft was resubmitted to Mr. Bowie on May 19, and forwarded to the NSC Planning Board on the following day. In a memorandum to Mr. Bowie, dated May 20, not printed, Mr. Halle commented that he had doubts about the reliability of some of the factual statements contained in ARA’s draft memorandum (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Guatemala”). The NSC Planning Board amended the revised draft at its meeting on May 24, and also approved submission of the amended draft as NSC 5419 to the NSC for consideration (record of the meeting of the NSC Planning Board, S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1).

    Under a covering note dated May 24, not printed, NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted the draft statement of policy to the NSC for consideration at its meeting on May 27, 1954; see infra.

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  2. In his memorandum to Mr. Bowie, dated May 20, Mr. Halle stated that he believed a Guatemalan attack on Honduras was unlikely.↩