Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussion of Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held at the Pentagon, 11:30 a.m., May 21, 1954 ¹

top secret

May 21, 1954, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follow a list of those present (25) and discussion of matters unrelated to Guatemala.]

Mr. Murphy then said the next question for discussion was the situation in Guatemala. He asked Mr. Woodward to outline the Department’s views.

Mr. Woodward stated that there was a general strike of the labor force on the banana plantations in northern Honduras and that while the Standard Fruit Company had apparently reached a settlement, United Fruit had not. We suspected that Guatemalan agitators were involved in the strikes and in view of the recent arrival in Guatemala of 2,000 tons of armaments the situation might become serious. The State Department is, therefore, most interested in the reevaluation of the military strength and significance of each of the Central American republics² which it understood would be initiated in the NSC Planning Board on May 24. In addition, the Department was requesting an NSC decision regarding the powers of the President to use American troops to assist Honduras in repelling an attack from Guatemala and particularly whether the President could use force without specific Congressional approval. Article 3 of the Rio Pact provides the authority for any country to come to the aid of another immediately and also provides for consultation among all the members of the Pact.³

General Ridgway inquired if the State Department had considered the desirability of Nicaraguan troops being sent to Honduras to augment the latter’s strength as an alternative to the use of U.S. troops. He felt that if any U.S. force landed in Honduras there was bound to be trouble and we would end up killing a few Hondurans.

Mr. Murphy replied that the Department was considering this possibility but that it was felt if we tried to use straw men no one would believe we were not the instigators.

General Ridgway said that Nicaragua under the Rio Pact was as qualified as we were to come to the aid of Honduras and he seemed to feel this would be preferable.

Mr. Murphy raised the question of President Somoza’s attitude. Mr. Woodward said Somoza would probably be willing to aid Honduras if he felt his troops could handle the situation. However, he has told us in confidence that he feels his military force is incompetent and one of the purposes of the military evaluation of the Central American republics referred to earlier would be to gain an accurate assessment of Nicaragua’s strength.

Mr. Murphy said President Somoza would doubtless expect us to participate in any action if we called upon him to contribute force.

Admiral Radford stated that regardless of how the situation might develop the Joint Chiefs were going ahead with plans so that they would be in a position to carry out any orders they might get.

Mr. Murphy then referred to a New York Times article this morning which reported statements emanating from the U.S. were uniting Guatemala opinion against us.

General Cabell of CIA said his information was not consistent with the New York Times report and CIA understood the army particularly was becoming uneasy about the situation.⁴

Admiral Carney stated that they were carrying out air surveillance in the general area and watching shipping operations.

General Cabell said in response to Admiral Radford’s question that it is not yet known what the recent 2,000 ton equipment consisted of although it did include mortars, artillery and small arms. CIA is not certain whether ammunition was in the shipment. This may be on the way.

[Here follows additional discussion of matters unrelated to Guatemala.]

1. Attendees at this meeting included 14 representatives from the Department of Defense (all of the Joint Chiefs were present), 8 from the Department of State, 2 from the Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Gleason from the National Security Council. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy headed the State group, which also included Messrs. MacArthur, Bowie, Woodward, Landon, Hoey, Anschuetz, and Linebaugh.
2. In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Holland, dated May 21, 1954, summarizing the meeting with the Joint Chiefs, Deputy Assistant Secretary Woodward stated in part the following: “I did not mention to the Joint Chiefs on this occasion the advisability of our increasing the amount of military assistance that we are giving to other Central American countries, because when I mentioned this to Mr. Murphy he suggested that we take it up with Mr. Nolting. In any event, Mr. Murphy did not believe there would be any difficulty on this score if there should be a sudden need for assistance to the Central American countries.” (714.00/5–2154) Frederick E. Nolting, Jr. was Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs.
3. At its 197th meeting on May 13,1954, the NSC had noted a statement by the Secretary of State that “if Guatemala makes an armed attack upon Honduras, the United States should be prepared to respond, under the Rio Pact, to a possible request by Honduras for U.S. armed assistance.” (NSC Action No. 1122–b) The Council had also noted President Eisenhower’s statement that Congressional leaders should be briefed on the Honduras situation on a bipartisan basis. (NSC Action No. 1122–c) The memorandum of discussion at the NSC’s 197th meeting, including Action No. 1122, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, NSC records.
4. A telegram from Guatemala, dated May 20, 1954, reported that information from available sources indicated that many Guatemalan army officers were pleased to have the newly delivered arms, but they also had misgivings about the shipment for the following reasons: 1) it demonstrated the closeness of the Arbenz government to the Soviet Union, 2) it raised the possibility of the replacement of the U.S. Military Mission by Soviet or satellite military instructors, 3) it provided evidence that the Communists intended to take over Guatemala completely, and, 4) it would motivate the United States to take drastic action resulting in “terrible consequences” for Guatemala.