Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

714.00/5–1454

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

[Washington,] May 14, 1954.

Subject:

• Recommendation that the U.S. Invoke Consultative Procedure under Rio Treaty to Consider Problem of International Communism in Guatemala.²

It is recommended that promptly the United States invoke the Organ of Consultation specified in Article VI of the Rio Treaty to consider the problem of the penetration of Guatemala by International Communism.

The Problem

From time to time around the world frontal tests of strength between the force of the free nations and that of the Communist organization arise. One occurred in Korea. Another is in progress in Indochina. A less publicized collision is now reaching its crisis in Guatemala.

In this last situation the test is whether the world Communist organization has the strength to establish a satellite nation in this hemisphere and, conversely, whether the free nations have the power to resist that attempt.

Importance of Problem

This contest is of crucial importance in the global struggle between free nations and the Communist forces. The reason is twofold.

1. It has been asserted that Moscow cannot establish a satellite state save where the weight of the Red Army can be brought to bear directly or indirectly. Obviously, Russia recognizes, therefore, that establishment of a satellite state in this hemisphere would mark a victory which would strengthen the power of Communist forces in every free nation of the world. Establishment of a satellite state in this hemisphere, and particularly so close to the United States, would enable Russia to claim throughout the world that the power of Communism lies in its appeal to men’s minds and not in fear or force.

2. The greatest significance of the Guatemalan test lies in its effect on all regional organizations similar to the Organization of American States.

Because of the Soviet veto in the United Nations free states have had to rely upon such regional organizations as the vehicles for their fight against Communism.

Free states throughout the world are relying in their fight against International Communism upon the collective security afforded by these regional organizations. This grand strategy gives small nations exposed to invasion the courage to resist. By combining the individual strength of separate states into a massive aggregate it becomes possible to match and surpass the force which Russia can bring to bear at any time and at any point in the world. Obviously, a major policy of this Government is to bring all of the free states of the world into strong and determined regional organizations, contributing to them the maximum force and purpose of which we are capable.

Russian leaders see clearly the effectiveness of collective effort through regional organizations. For years, therefore, a major purpose of Moscow has been to weaken and destroy the Organization of American States, the oldest and one of the most effective of the regional organizations.

A reiterated and fundamental purpose of the Organization of American States is to defend this hemisphere, and particularly at this time to defend it against International Communism. Soviet leaders know that establishment here of a satellite state will demonstrate that the world’s oldest regional organization is helpless to stop Communist expansion. If it can be demonstrated that the Organization of American States cannot achieve its most basic purpose then the Organization will become progressively discredited and useless.

For this reason the world Communist organization has expended fantastic effort and wealth in its attempts to establish a satellite state in the Western Hemisphere.

Their efforts to achieve this goal have been strengthened by the fact that this is the only area in the world in which the United States has formally renounced the right to take unilateral measures to resist Communism. While the Red Army cannot support Russia’s effort to convert Guatemala into a Communist state, the United States Army cannot oppose it. Russia can bring to bear the force and the violence of its trained agents, but the United States in resisting that effort must respect its treaty obligations against intervention. This creates a serious test of the efficacy of the Organization of American States.

Why Moscow Chose Guatemala as a Testing Ground

The selection of Guatemala as the place for Moscow’s major effort to establish a satellite state was partly fortuitous. For years Russia has, as you know, been carefully probing in the American states. For a time these efforts were concentrated on larger states such as Brazil and Chile. There, they achieved considerable initial success but were finally defeated because, as here, the governments and economies they sought to dominate were strong. Russia’s efforts then became concentrated on the Central American and Caribbean states. The reasons are obvious. Their size and comparative weakness made them particularly susceptible. Because of their proximity to the Panama Canal domination of any one would give Russia an important military gain.

Guatemala afforded peculiar advantages because there the Communists could disguise their efforts as a genuinely national effort directed against the United Fruit Company and other large United States interests in the country. Actually, the United States would go no further in defending the interests of United States enterprises in Guatemala than it has gone and will always go anywhere in the world. This Government’s efforts on behalf of United States interests in Guatemala have been limited to conventional representations to the governments asking that United States interests be granted due process of law and adequate compensation for expropriated properties. Nevertheless, the Communist organization has done a rather effective job of persuading public opinion that the real purpose of our efforts to prevent their penetration is the defense of United States enterprises there.

The Present Situation in Guatemala

In any analysis of the situation in Guatemala it must be recognized at the outset that evidence that the Communist program in Guatemala has been organized and directed in the world capitals of Communism, and that Communism in Guatemala is a part of the world apparatus, must be largely circumstantial. I doubt very much that there is in this hemisphere any writing which would demonstate these conclusions. On the other hand, to our students of the international Communist organization it is abundantly clear that what has happened in Guatemala is a part of Moscow’s global strategy.

All of the signs which have identified similar occurrences elsewhere in the world are apparent in Guatemala. The methods of achieving initial penetration and of enlarging and strengthening those first footholds are the same. The training of leaders and the development of programs through exchanges of persons in strategic positions is identical. The extensive use of popular front organizations effectively controlled by a handful of experts is the same. We also have the reliable evidence of a blind unwavering adherence to the Communist Party line as enunciated in Moscow. As elsewhere in the world the agents of Communism in Guatemala have immediately adopted every public attitude announced from Moscow, regardless of the inconsistencies and local embarrassments which have resulted. As always in these stages of the program the Communist organization has been careful to preserve the appearance of minority representation in the Congress and other comparable organizations. At the same time, they have here, as elsewhere, succeeded in substituting small informal Communist controlled councils for the lawful policy-making bodies.

Attached hereto is a brief,³ summarizing the evidence described above.

The people of Guatemala are overwhelmingly Catholic and anti-Communist. However, they are unorganized and entirely helpless to resist the well-planned and executed campaign directed against them from Moscow. It was precisely for the protection of a small nation in such a situation that the policy of collective security through regional organizations was devised.

Alternative Courses of Action

The three most obvious courses of action for this Government are the following:

1. We can continue to express our concern about the rapid expansion of international Communism in Guatemala. This course has been entirely ineffective thus far, and it seems certain that it will continue to be.

2. We can notify the other American States of our intention to move unilaterally in Guatemala to defeat Moscow’s purpose there. Such a course of action would be inconsistent with our treaty obligations and the firm policy which we have followed in this hemisphere for more than 20 years.

3. We can attack the problem through the Organization of American States, utilizing the mechanisms specifically designed for problems of this nature. In my judgment the latter course is clearly that which we must follow.

It is my conclusion and that of the experts who are following this problem that, while there are some anti-Communist elements left in Guatemalan political institutions, they have lost their independence of action. These anti-Communist elements can be eliminated by the Communists whenever they consider it desirable. Therefore, we must recognize that the political institutions of that American State are now dominated and controlled by the international Communist organization.

Therefore, I recommend to you that this Government request that the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States be requested to meet and consider this problem. Because of the great rapidity with which anti-Communist elements are being eliminated from all political institutions, I feel that this move should be taken with the greatest urgency.⁴

1. Drafted by Mr. Holland.
2. On May 12, 1954, Edward A. Jamison, Deputy Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs, forwarded to Assistant Secretary Holland a memorandum prepared by Marjorie Whiteman of the Office of the Legal Adviser, commenting in detail on the authority of the Executive Branch to take action against Guatemala under the Rio Treaty, and a covering memorandum discussing enforcement action under the treaty’s provisions. (362/5–1154) Additional documentation on the legal aspects of implementing the Rio Treaty with respect to Guatemala is in file 362.
3. No attachment was found with the source text.
4. Secretary Dulles apparently took no action on Assistant Secretary Holland’s recommendation at this time; however, see the notes of the meeting of the Guatemalan Group held at the Department of State, June 25, 1954, p. 1186.