Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

611.14/12–2353:Telegram

The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State

secret

Guatemala City, December 23, 1953—3 p.m.

163. As a result my interview with President Arbenz (mytel 154 December 17),¹ I am convinced Communists will continue gain strength here as long as he remains in office. My staff agrees fully on this. Therefore, in view of inadequacy of normal diplomatic procedures in dealing with situation, there appears no alternative to our taking steps which would tend to make more difficult continuation of his regime in Guatemala. In present telegram, I shall deal with measures which, while they may not in themselves prove sufficient to produce political change here, are designed to contribute to creating climate favorable to such change.

Before Caracas conference, we should concentrate on preparing other well-disposed governments in Latin America for supporting our anti-Communist resolution² and on publicizing abroad through press channels Communist developments in this country. At same time we should carefully avoid any overt acts to which Guatemalan delegates at conference could point as evidence of persecution of Guatemala or intervention in its affairs. We should also avoid emphasis on fruit company problems since these might cause confusion among Latin American delegates as to true nature of our differences with Guatemala. We should at same time step up locally… anti-Communist propaganda. …Krieg referred to this matter in letter of December 3³ to John Fisher.

I propose that between now and time of conference we carefully work out program designed to create situation in which non-Communists whether now supporting or opposing government would feel forced to coordinate their organizations and take action against government and I suggest Department and Embassy give special attention to determination feasibility and manner and time of application of following steps as part of an overall program:

1. Withdrawal of US Army⁴ and air missions from Guatemala. Effect of this announcement would be greatly heightened if made more or less simultaneously with announcements of military assistance pacts between US and neighboring Central American countries.

2. Announcement of withdrawal, effective June 30 of FOA personnel from construction of Roosevelt Hospital and from agricultural mission, not including those on Entrerios Rubber Experiment Project which is important to us.

3. Announcement of cancellation within six months of RFC’s contract with UFCO for growing abaca in Guatemala.

4. Denunciation of reciprocal trade treaty⁵ with Guatemala.

5. Campaign through columnists and radio commentators for voluntary refusal by American coffee importers to buy Guatemalan coffee. Even though purchases did not decrease, campaign would give local growers increased sense of urgency and stimulate their willingness to aid anti-government movement.

6. Placing of impediments in way of issuance of export licenses on shipments of goods from US to Guatemala. Form of these impediments must be determined in light of attitudes shown at Caracas conference, and could range from general refusal of licenses to consistent delays in their issuance, particularly for road and port building equipment on which Guatemalan Government is especially interested.

7. Final or partial suspension gasoline shipments to Guatemala.

With these proposals as starting point for study, and without necessarily approving all of them or excluding others, Department and Embassy should be able to work out program which while flexible enough to allow for adjustments to developments at Caracas, should be concrete enough to permit its implementation promptly upon closing of conference. Program should be applied in progressive steps which would build up increasing sense of urgency among non-Communist Guatemala.

Program should be undertaken with full realization it could provoke Guatemalan Government to swing sharply to left, to assume dictatorial power, to seek to win mass support through strongly nationalistic stand, and to expropriate or take other extreme reprisals against American companies in Guatemala. Guatemalan Government could be expected to make international issue of intervention, might ask my recall or even break off diplomatic relations with United States. It is quite conceivable it would lead to considerable bloodshed.

Nevertheless, implementation some such plan should not be deterred by these possible unpleasant consequences since continuance of present regime would also lead to most of them though at a slower pace and at the convenience of the Communists.

Peurifoy

1. Supra.
2. Reference is to Resolution XCIII, the “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism”, adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference; for text, see Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1–28, 1954: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America With Related Documents (Department of State Publication 5692, Washington, 1955), pp. 156–157, or the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 638–639.
3. Not found in Department of State files.

4. A memorandum of conversation at the Secretary’s staff meeting, held in the Secretary’s office, Nov. 20, 1953, 9:15 a.m., by Director of the Executive Secretariat Scott, reads in part as follows:

   “8. Guatemala

   “The Under Secretary stated that he is getting a paper from Mr. Wisner today concerning CIA’s recommendation as to whether or not we should remove our military mission from Guatemala. It was his own personal belief at the present time that it served no useful purpose in keeping a military mission to a government that was Communist-dominated and in which the Army was evidently loyal to that government.” (Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75)

   The Secretary of State’s staff meetings were attended usually by the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretaries of State, and certain office directors. The Secretary of State presided at these meetings.

5. Reference is to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, signed at Guatemala City, Apr. 24, 1936, and entered into force, June 15, 1936; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series (EAS) No. 92, or 49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3989.