718.5/8–454
The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Secretary of the Army (Stevens)1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to the conversation between Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert F. Woodward and Brigadier General Russell L. Vittrup, Chief, Operations Division, OAC [Page 856] of G–3, on July 31, 1954.2 General Vittrup wished to insure a clear, concise understanding for planning purposes, on action to be taken by United States armed forces in the event that Costa Rica requests assistance under Article III of the Rio Treaty; he stated that it is essential that precise instruction be obtained on what action the Department of State wishes the military to undertake.
It is contemplated by the Department of State that before any employment of United States armed forces in Costa Rica, in response to a request of the Government of Costa Rica under the obligations of the Rio Treaty, efforts would have been exhausted to arrive at a solution to the conflict without resort to the use of our forces. However, in the event of failure of these efforts, final reliance on United States armed forces to defend Costa Rica would be made on authorization of the President of the United States. It is understood that no such action of United States armed forces would occur until such authorization.
The purpose of alerting the Department of Defense on the possibility that the Rio Treaty might be invoked by Costa Rica was to permit time for advance planning on the nature of military action which would be necessary to defend Costa Rica against armed attack by Nicaragua. The nature and extent of military action suitable for defending Costa Rica from such attack is a military decision on which the Department of State is not qualified to pass. The Department of State nevertheless appreciates that problems may arise on which the unit commander might wish a broad definition of policy for his guidance, which is offered as follows:
- 1.
- The minimum forces numerically sufficient to perform the mission should be assigned;
- 2.
- Extraordinary care should be exercised to limit objectives to hostile military units and to avoid causing death or injury to Costa Rican or Nicaraguan civilians;
- 3.
- The border of Nicaragua should be the point of maximum advance, wherever it can be clearly defined, and in other cases no advance should be made into doubtful territory except as a military necessity to repel or prevent armed attack on Costa Rican soil.
The effective cooperation of the Department of the Army, which has enabled the Department of State to determine its policy in this problem, is deeply appreciated.
Sincerely yours,