State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum on Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held in the Pentagon, 11 a.m., May 22, 19531

top secret

[Here follow a list of those present (21) and discussion of matters relating to Indochina and Yugoslavia.]

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Military Assistance for Central American States

General Bradley: We understand that you want to discuss the question of military assistance to Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. We have been talking this over and what has worried us was how we could justify such assistance from a military point of view. It might be possible to present a reasonable military justification in the case of Nicaragua since that could be done in terms of anti-aircraft for the defense of the Panama Canal or defense against sabotage and infiltration, but for the countries other than Nicaragua we thought we would have great difficulties in testifying on the Hill as to the military justification for assistance.

Mr. Cabot: We have a serious situation in Guatemala with the Communists infiltrating and influencing the Government. Our first task is to keep this Communist nucleus from spreading and our second task is to eliminate it. My understanding is that the neighboring countries do not at present have sufficient forces to meet a military intervention. Nicaragua has asked us for a military assistance agreement. Salvador has stated its willingness to buy a certain amount of military equipment, but for political reasons would like to have any military assistance agreement in part kept secret. Honduras has so far not asked us for military assistance. For frankly political reasons it would help us as against Guatemala to be able to undertake military assistance to these countries. In terms of money or quantity of equipment there would not be a great deal involved.

General Collins: We could be on sound military grounds in justifying assistance to Nicaragua. The main threat against the Canal in case of war is basically the threat of guerrilla type infiltration and sabotage. Since we can honestly certify that military assistance to Nicaragua is justifiable, could we undertake an agreement with Nicaragua and let the other two countries purchase equipment?

Mr. Cabot: I would be prepared to settle for a certification for Nicaragua. The three Governments work very closely together in any case, and I am sure the other two would be glad to have a friendly country strengthened in a military way.

General White: Can’t we do something about Guatemala? It seems to me that we shouldn’t tolerate a Communist Country in Latin America.

Mr. Cabot: It isn’t Communist yet but the Communists are infiltrating the government. This proposal for military assistance to neighboring states is, we think, a first step in doing something about Guatemala.

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Mr. Nash: I have shared your anxieties about Guatemala but I have grave doubts that to grant military assistance to the neighboring countries is the way to cope with the situation. It might conceivably do more harm than good. The question I have about it is not related to the amount of money or equipment involved but really as to whether a political problem like this is solvable by the approach of military assistance.

Mr. Cabot: We agree that the problem cannot be solved by purely military means, but the first thing we want to do is to develop some military strength on the Guatemala borders and in the second place in doing this it might be useful in pointing out to the Guatemalan Army the kind of help they are losing because they have the misfortune of operating under a Communist-influenced government.

Admiral Fechteler: Our people in the Navy share some of Nash’s reservations.

Mr. Cabot: We naturally can’t be assured that this will work out as a significantly successful approach, but our feeling is that it might do some good and we should at least make a try. We should demonstrate our willingness to help in Latin America in difficult situations like this and should as a minimum not be in the position of not having tried to do anything.

General Collins: I would like to say that from the Army’s point of view I think it would be helpful for us to have closer relations with the Nicaragua military. It would assist us in gaining better intelligence and the closer staff connections would, it seems to me, lead to a good political effect. The Latin American officers who work with us and some of whom come to this country and see what we have and what we can do are frequently our most useful friends in those countries. I think that by and large our military assistance programs for Latin America is money well spent and I believe that programs of this type and specifically the suggested program for Nicaragua would add to the security of the United States.

Mr. Cabot: I am glad to hear you say that, General, and I must say that I thoroughly agree with you.

General Bradley: Doesn’t the problem really boil down to a political question? From the military point of view, the JCS think that it is sound military justification for assistance to Nicaragua.

Mr. Nash: I agree that the question is primarily political.

Mr. Cabot: We think from our point of view that it is politically advantageous to undertake an assistance program.

General Collins: Since the Chiefs agree that assistance to Nicaragua is militarily justified, isn’t the question primarily between State and Defense?

Mr. Nash: Is State willing to have an agreement with Nicaragua and not with Salvador and Honduras?

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Mr. Cabot: Yes, we would be willing to go ahead on that basis. We would like, however, to reserve the possibility that we might make a proposal for similar agreements with Salvador and Honduras at a later date if that should then seem desirable.

Mr. Nash: Then I would suggest that the JCS send their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and we can work it out with State.2

[Here follows discussion of matters related to Korea.]

  1. Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler were present; General White attended for General Vandenberg. Mr. Matthews headed the Department of State group. Representatives were also present from the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense.

    A note on the source text reads as follows: “(Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.)”

  2. In a letter to Secretary Dulles, dated June 18, 1953, not printed, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash stated that the Department of Defense supported the Department of State’s efforts to weaken Communist elements in Central America, and that Defense was prepared to recommend the inclusion of Nicaragua, but not of El Salvador or Honduras, in the grant military assistance program. (716.5 MSP/6–1853)

    In a letter to Secretary Wilson, dated July 23, 1953, not printed, Mr. Matthews indicated the Department of State’s concurrence with Defense’s recommendation concerning Nicaragua, and he stated that the eventual participation of El Salvador and Honduras in the military assistance program should not be precluded, because this might become necessary to the accomplishment of the Department of State’s political and psychological objectives in Central America. (717.5 MSP/7–2353)