732.5 MSP/7–1254
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to
the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)1
secret
[Washington,] July 12, 1954.
Subject:
- United States Military Relations with Brazil
Discussion:
We have four serious immediate problems with Brazil in the military
field.
- 1.
- The establishment of a new combined defense board with Brazil has
been delayed since 1952 because of our argument with the Pentagon
over Department and Foreign Office membership on the Board. The
Brazilians are pressing for action and are unhappy about our delay.
(Tab A)
- 2.
- The JBUSMC in Rio has proposed
a $50 million equipment program for the Brazilian Army, Air Force
and Navy. The Pentagon is stalling, maybe with good reason, but the
Brazilians are unhappy because they thought their chances were good.
(Tab B)
- 3.
- The Brazilians are very irritated about not obtaining from the
U.S. a baby carrier, two submarines and four destroyer escort
vessels. They threaten to reduce the size of the U.S. Naval Mission,
slow down improvements of Brazilian naval bases, and cut down
privileges of the U.S. naval radio facility in Recife. (Tab
C)
- 4.
- The Pentagon is about ready to ask the Department to negotiate an
agreement with Brazil to establish an Army 1000-acre, 500-man radio
relay station in Brazil, three air bases and 75 acres for a guided
missile tracking facility for the Air Force, and an extension of the
Navy radio facility agreement at Recife. (Tab D)
Recommendation:
That you call Secretary Wilson,
refer to his request for Secretary Dulles’ views on the new Combined Board, (see Tab A),
and tell him:
- 1)
- You believe the new Board should be established without
further delay, and with Department and Foreign Office full
membership. The new Board should immediately undertake a review
of our bilateral military arrangements with Brazil, including a)
the $50 million JBUSMC
program, b) the latest Brazilian Navy request for fleet units
and c) negotiation of the base rights and facilities needed by
the Pentagon.
- 2)
- You would appreciate Secretary Wilson’s reply before July 15, to inform
Ambassador Muniz, who is
going to Brazil and says he will be
[Page 654]
confronted by his Government with the
first three problems outlined above.2
[Tab A]
3
Proposed Combined Defense Board, Brazil–United
States
Agreement was reached with Brazil in 1952 to establish a new Combined
Defense Board, but its creation has been delayed principally because
of differences with the Pentagon over State Department and Foreign
Office membership on the Board. The Brazilians have made known their
dissatisfaction over the long delay, and are pressing for
action.
The Department believes that Foreign Office and State Department
representatives should be members of the Board because some of its
most important problems will have significant political
ramifications, and that such membership will be invaluable in
solving them. One such problem includes negotiation of extensive
U.S. base rights and facilities in Brazil. The Foreign Office, the
Embassy, the top U.S. military officers of the existing Joint
Brazil–U.S. Military Commission, and Assistant Defense Secretary
Struve Hensel concur.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff reject the Department and Foreign Office
membership on the grounds that it “would alter the concept of the
Board to that of a Government-to-Government body, thus opening the
way to include political and economic matters as well as setting an
unwanted precedent …” Since certain military issues have now reached
the position where they threaten the harmony of our political
relations with Brazil, the JCS view
appears unrealistic and potentially dangerous.
[Page 655]
Assistant Secetary of Defense Hensel agrees with our view and has suggested to
Secretary Wilson that he
discuss the problem with Admiral Radford rather than overrule the JCS at this time.
The Defense Secretary has aked Secretary Dulles for his comments on an unsigned draft
letter4 from Defense setting forth and concurring in
the views of the JCS. ARA has recommended to Secretary
Dulles that he inform the
Secretary of Defense that he does not concur with the views of the
Joint Chiefs and that State Department and Brazilian Foreign Office
membership on the proposed Board is essential to the achievement of
our military objectives in Brazil.
[Tab B]
Proposed Military Equipment Program for
Brazil
On January 13, 1954 the Joint Brazil–United States Military
Commission (JBUSMC) submitted a
recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a $50 million
equipment program for the Brazilian Army, Navy and Air Force. This
report was signed by the top Brazilian and U.S. members, including
Generals Beiderlinden and
Wade,5 and Admiral
Whitehead.6 The State Department
has not been officially informed of this recommendation.
The additional forces requested by JBUSMC for Brazil include:
|
Army:
|
1 Airborne Regimental Combat Team |
|
2 Infantry Regimental Combat Teams |
|
1 Battalion of Medium Tanks |
|
Navy:
|
16 Destroyer Escort Vessels |
|
5 Destroyers |
|
4 Fleet-type Submarines |
|
It was recommended that these vessels be made
available in four installments, the first of which would
include: |
|
4 Destroyer Escort Vessels |
|
1 Destroyer |
|
1 Fleet-type Submarine |
|
Air Force:
|
1 Squadron (12 planes) of C–32 Fairchilds |
|
1 Squadron (12 planes) of PB4Y–2 (Privateers) |
|
10 Helicopters (H19) |
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon have not taken affirmative
action on the recommendation. They have told JBUSMC that the plan is “under
consideration”. Unofficially, we understand that the Pentagon took a
very dim view of the recommendation, and are not
[Page 656]
prepared to supply the equipment. This
creates a serious problem because the Brazilians expect some
action.
In addition, the Chief of the U.S. Air Force Section of JBUSMC has recommended that six C–47
aircraft be included in the military grant aid progam for Brazil.
Brazil has also indicated its interest in purchasing from Defense
ten C–45 aircraft and six C–119 airplanes.
[Tab C]
Brazil’s Request for Navy Vessels
Brazil transmitted through the State Department to the Defense
Department a request for a baby aircraft carrier, two submarines and
four destroyer escort vessels. (This corresponds, with
modifications, to the first installment recommended by the JBUSMC equipment plan.) Admiral
Whitehead, ranking U.S. Navy officer in
Brazil, came to Washington for the purpose of personally
recommending to Admiral Carney that the Brazilian request be approved.
Admiral Araujo,7 Inspector General of the Brazilian
Navy, accompanied Admiral Whitehead to press
for favorable action. Mr. Holland informed the Navy of his favorable interest
in the matter. As yet no formal reply has been received from the
Defense Department.
Admiral Carney informally told
Admiral Araujo that the Navy
did not have sufficient ships in its reserve fleet to justify
approving the Brazilian request in the absence of any overriding
political consideration from the State Department. Ambassador
Muniz, obviously under
great pressure from his Government, has on more than one occasion
asked the Department if it would not be possible for us to come up
with the necessary political considerations.
The Navy considers its reserve fleet inadequate to justify the
transfer of these vessels to Brazil, and such a transfer would
require special enabling legislation by Congress.
On July 7 Ambassador Muniz
informed Mr. Holland that the
Brazilian Navy Chief, Admiral Guillobel,8 is very
irritated about not obtaining from the United States the vessels
which he had been encouraged by JBUSMC to believe Brazil could expect.
Guillobel threatens to reduce the size of
the U.S. Naval Mission, slow down improvements of Brazilian naval
bases, and cut down privileges of the U.S. Naval radio facility in
Recife.
[Tab D]
Desired Agreement for U.S. Military Facilities
in Brazil
The Pentagon is about ready to ask the Department of State to
negotiate an agreement with Brazil for certain rights and facilities
in
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that country. A draft
agreement9 has
been prepared and sent to Rio for the comments of the Embassy and
the U.S. military officials there.
- 1.
- The Army desires the right to construct and operate a
world-wide radio communication station at Recife. This would
require obtaining from Brazil 1,150 acres of land and permission
to station about 500 officers and men to staff the stations
after completion.
- 2.
- The Navy desires the right of continued operation of the Naval
Radio Station at Recife.
- 3.
- The Air Force lists as general requirements three Off-Base
sites as surveillance stations for missile flights, and three
Air Bases. These would require the acquisition of real estate in
several areas in Brazil, the right to use certain airports in
Rio, Belem and Natal, and the right to station approximately 840
officers and men at these bases.
Negotiation of this “package” will be virtually impossible if the
Brazilian military people remain in their present unhappy frame of
mind. Also, even in the best climate for negotiation, ARA does not believe an agreement can
be reached unless the Pentagon is willing to give the Brazilians
part of what they want (matériel under the $50 million plan) in
return for base rights.
The new Combined Board, with Department and Foreign Office
membership, should be the logical instrument to work out the
solutions to these problems.
