Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

824.2544/3–1353:Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bolivia ¹

secret

Washington, March 20, 1953—8:11 p.m.

227. Department giving careful consideration to urtels 274 and 275² and to possible alternatives action proposed urtel 275 but still not in position take definite step. Department also prefers defer action until Bolivian Cabinet considers matter more carefully since there are advantages to having initiative with Bolivians.

It is hoped you are having frequent and frank talks with Bolivian authorities in attempt prevent misinterpretation and convince them (1) US not engaged in power play; (2) in present purely factual situation extraordinary measures behalf Bolivia could be justified, if at all, only on basis Bolivian preparedness take sound measures solve such problems as compensation and maintenance mineral production, and initiative therefore rests with Bolivia;³ (3) if Bolivian Government maintains problem political rather than commercial it should recognize US domestic political realities as well as Bolivian; (4) interests of neither country would be served by allowing present cooperative consideration problem degenerate into controversy, as might be case if matter not kept confidential; (5) specifically if serious Bolivian public antipathy to US anticipated by Bolivian Foreign Minister does develop it will be of no advantage to Bolivian Government and will make even more politically difficult cooperation in solution common problems.

Regarding Foreign Minister’s contention world tin surplus caused by political restrictions on sales to Curtain countries, you may wish point out total Curtain deficit, which is made up through purchases from Free World, estimated at only 5,000 to 8,000 tons, whereas Free World surplus is expected to be on order of 30,000 tons in absence stockpiling by US.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Mr. Hudson; cleared with Assistant Secretary Cabot and the Office of International Materials Policy.
2. In telegram 275, from La Paz, dated Mar. 13, 1952, Ambassador Sparks inquired whether the Department was still willing to consider Foreign Minister Guevara Arze’s proposal of Mar. 11, concerning compensation and the negotiation of a tin agreement (824.2544/3–1253).
3. A memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Andrade and Mr. Cabot, drafted by Mr. Hudson, dated Mar. 13, 1952, reads in part as follows: “Mr. Cabot pointed out carefully and emphatically that the decision [of the RFC not to negotiate a long-term tin contract] had not been a political one. The Department had merely transmitted to the Ambassador a description of the factual situation in which the RFC had found itself. The decision had been taken not on grounds of policy at all but on the basis of the RFC legal position under its Congressional authority to operate. The Department was fully cognizant of the seriousness of this matter for Bolivia and was sincerely desirous of cooperating toward a solution. Since a solution would be difficult and the difficulties would increase as time went on, Mr. Cabot suggested the desirability of the Bolivian Government’s acting as rapidly as possible to remove the obstacles which were within its power to remove.” (824.2544/3–1353)