Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV

611.24/5–2752

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

secret

Washington, May 22, 1952.

Subject:

• Diplomatic relations with Bolivia

I would appreciate your authorization to announce some time next week continuation of diplomatic relations with Bolivia.

As you know, on April 9, 1952, a revolution broke out in La Paz on the part of the party known as the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) with the support of the national police and a substantial part of organized labor in Bolivia. The revolution was directed against the then ruling military junta which had been in power for a little less than one year. The military junta had taken over after the elections of May 1951 when the MNR candidate, Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro, won a plurality of the votes but not the majority required under the constitution. Under these circumstances the Bolivian constitution required the Congress to elect the President, but the Government of President Urriolagoitia¹ voluntarily relinquished the executive power to the army, which appointed the junta. Throughout the eleven-month period that the junta was in power there was a continuous series of plots and rumors of plots, many of which were based upon the strong conviction of certain elements, both in and out of the armed forces, that the army should not be in politics and that the MNR, having won over 40 percent of the votes in the 1951 elections, should be given a chance to run the country. The failure of the military junta to negotiate a tin contract with the United States contributed to the loss of its prestige. There is no doubt that the uprising of April 9 constituted to a large extent a spontaneous expression of public sentiment. On April 15, six days after the outbreak of the revolution, Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro returned from an exile of six years in Argentina and Uruguay and assumed the presidency.

Despite the fact that the revolution did constitute an expression of public sentiment, the Department of State has not moved earlier to recognize the new government because of a number of confusing factors in the situation. The first prerequisite to recognition of a de facto government is that it have control of the national territory. We have not been certain that the present government does exercise such control. The reason for this is that during the revolution civilian fighters of the MNR broke into an arsenal and seized a large number of rifles which have continued in the possession of these civilians. Further, the revolutionists inflicted such severe damage on army forces in the La Paz area that there has been doubt whether the Bolivian army in that area is an effective force. Similar reports have reached us from the mining areas where, as you will remember, two Americans were killed in 1949 by rioting mine workers.² Our Chargé d’Affaires in La Paz, Mr. Thomas J. Maleady, has discussed this situation frankly with the present Foreign Minister, Mr. Walter Guevara Arze, who is completely aware of the situation and who tells us that the Bolivian Government is quietly rounding up as many of the arms as it can trace. The Foreign Minister advises us that the present government has complete control of the national police and that it is rebuilding the army.

With regard to the question of whether or not the government is in control, another complicating factor has been the position of the present Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Juan Lechín,³ who is head of the mine workers’ union. Lechín is an extremely controversial figure of Syrian origin who has spent much of the last few years in exile in Chile and to whom the government of Paz Estenssoro owes a great debt of gratitude for the mine workers’ part in overcoming army resistance to the revolution. Whereas Paz Estenssoro, his Vice President,⁴ his Foreign Minister⁵ and his Finance Minister⁶ are moderates, Lechín and his designee as Minister of Labor, German Butrón, are, at the least, extreme radicals who have in the past shown a tendency to use violent methods, as in the abovementioned Catavi massacre of three years ago. There seems to be little doubt that there has been a struggle for power within the present government as between these two conflicting forces, but we have come to the conclusion that Paz is the ablest individual in the group and that he will stay in power. Withholding of recognition, which has had in recent days the effect of causing the scheduling of public demonstrations before various embassies in La Paz, will be an unsettling factor.

With regard to Bolivia’s willingness to abide by its international obligations, the reference to this matter in the government’s official note⁷ requesting recognition left some doubt as to the scope of the undertaking. However, the Foreign Minister in conversations with Mr. Maleady and the President in a subsequent public statement to a Time correspondent have cleared this up in a manner which we consider satisfactory.

We have been extremely concerned over Lechín’s program to nationalize the tin industry immediately. This concern does not arise so much out of sympathy for the Patiño and Hochschild interests who are in large part responsible for their present predicament, but because of (1) the unsettling effect which any confiscatory action would have on private investment in Latin America, including U.S.-owned copper interests in Chile and petroleum interests in Venezuela, and (2) the legal questions which would arise in regard to our ability to buy tin from confiscated mines, which difficulties would in turn create economic problems of great gravity for Bolivia. Our Chargé has discussed these matters very frankly with the Foreign Minister, and we doubt that there is anything more that we can do at this stage. Continued withholding of recognition is not going to prevent nationalization and may, in fact, have the opposite effect, namely, that of strengthening the radical elements in the government and pushing the government more in the direction of Peron. Paz Estenssoro last week named a commission to study the future status of the tin mines, but this could possibly be a stalling maneuver; and it is possible that they might settle for some arrangement similar to the Chilean Government’s action on copper whereby the government becomes the sole seller.

Another complicating factor has been the status of Bolivia’s leading newspaper La Razon, which has been closed down since the revolution. This closing has not been the result of any deliberate action by the government, although the government has refused to furnish protection to the publishers. During and since the revolution, armed civilians threatened the plant, and the result has been that the publishers have been afraid to attempt to resume publication. While certain liberal elements in this country will attempt to make this another La Prensa case, the parallel is not exact since La Razon is the personal property of one of Bolivia’s leading tin producers, Carlos Victor Aramayo, and the problem is thus indivisible from the tin problem and the feeling against the Big Three tin producers. In any event, withholding of recognition is not a lever with which to guarantee publication of La Razon. As conditions go back to normal in Bolivia, this situation might work itself out.

We have been in consultation with other governments in Latin America on the subject of recognition. Thus far, only Argentina, Guatemala, Paraguay and Spain have recognized. Chile and Peru are both worried about the matter, but we consider that their fears are exaggerated; it is interesting that the Chilean Ambassador in La Paz strongly disagrees with his Foreign Office. On the other hand, Brazil, which has important interests in Bolivia, wishes to proceed immediately to recognize. We believe that Brazil’s views reflect those of Uruguay. Under these circumstances, since we have had an informal agreement to proceed in concert with Brazil, Chile and Peru, we are confident that we can arrange simultaneous action next week with Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Peru and also with Venezuela and Colombia, as well as with the British and French who are awaiting our decision. We will also notify other governments in Latin America and Europe of our plans.⁸

Dean Acheson

1. Mamerto Urriolagoitia.
2. For information pertaining to this incident, which occurred in May 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ii, p. 525.
3. Juan Lechín Oquendo.
4. Hernán Siles Zuazo.
5. Wálter Guevara Arze.
6. Federico Gutiérrez Granier.
7. Reference is to the Bolivian Government’s note no. P–231, dated Apr. 16, 1952, transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 735, dated Apr. 17, 1952, not printed (724.00/4–1752).

8. A memorandum of conversation with President Truman, by Secretary Acheson, dated May 22, 1952, reads as follows: “I went over the memorandum with the President and left it with him for his consideration. He said he had been following the matter closely through the cables and had expected this recommendation and thought that it was probably the right course of action. He would like to give it some further thought” (724.02/5–2252).

   President Truman approved Secretary Acheson’s recommendation on May 27, 1952. On June 2, Chargé Maleady at La Paz delivered a note to Bolivian Foreign Minister Guevara Arze informing him that the United States was continuing relations with Bolivia; the text of the note, dated June 2, 1952, was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 845, dated June 3, 1952 (611.24/6–352).