There is attached a memorandum of a conversation which I had with
President Peron on February 3,
1953 at his request.
Our discussion of one hour and thirty-five minutes touched on various
subjects which, in Peron’s opinion, had contributed
to tensions in U.S.-Argentine relations during “the past ten years”. The
burden of the President’s remarks was that those tensions should come to
an end.
It is difficult to say what motivated the President in taking this
initiative. Perhaps he felt that Argentina’s anti-U.S. campaign had
overreached itself, and that the new administration in the United States
affords him an opportunity to embark on a policy of closer relations
with us. Whatever his motives, he impressed me as being genuinely
desirous of seeking rapprochement.
I realize there are many obstacles in the way of improved Argentine-U.S.
relations. Among them are the probability that the critical attitude of
the U.S. press toward Argentina would not readily be modified (even
assuming that Peron continues to
restrain his own press), and the probable restiveness of Peron in the event his approach,
unprecedented in recent years, is ignored by us. In the latter [Page 428] event, it would probably be
some time before a similar overture by the Argentine Government could be
expected.
I therefore urge that this development be given careful consideration in
formulating our Latin American policy. There can be no doubt that any
appreciable improvement in U.S.-Argentine relations would contribute to
hemispheric solidarity and strengthen the defense of the free world
against communist aggression.
[Attachment]
Memorandum of Conversation With President
Peron
Late on Friday evening, January 30th, the Foreign Minister, Sr.
Remorino, telephoned me to
say that he had told the President of our talk on January 26 (see my
memorandum of January 27, 19532)
and that the President had expressed a wish to see me on Tuesday,
February 3. I told Remorino
that I would be glad to call on the President and he said he had
been asked to accompany me.
Peron received me Tuesday at 4 p.m. in his home
on Avenida Libertador General San Martin. He
was extremely affable, even more so than on the occasion of the
presentation of my credentials. Our meeting, which lasted 95
minutes, was cordial throughout.
He reminded me that when I last saw him he had suggested that we get
together for a heart-to-heart talk with “all our cards on the
table”. He had, he said, purposely delayed seeing me because he
wanted me to have a chance to familiarize myself with the local
scene, but he felt the time for the meeting had now come and he had,
therefore, asked me to call.
I told the President that I welcomed the opportunity to have a chat
with him inasmuch as over five months had elapsed since our last
conversation. I said I felt it was especially opportune for me to
have some indication of what was in his mind in view of the recent
change of administration in the United States.
Peron thereupon launched into a lengthy
dissertation on what he considered to be the main causes for the
state of tension between our two countries which, he said, had now
existed for about ten years.
He first dwelt upon Argentina’s geographic position. He compared
Argentina’s position in the far south to that of Sweden in the far
north [Page 429] which, he said,
explained why both countries had for many years been traditionally
neutral and isolationist. Being so far removed from the center of
the conflict, the Argentine people had been inclined to view the two
world wars with a certain detachment and had been strongly opposed
to any participation therein. This explained Argentina’s position
with regard thereto and why it would be practically impossible,
politically speaking, for Argentina to send troops to Korea. The
United States itself, he added, had not entered World War I until
after it had been in progress for three years, and its entry into
World War II had been delayed for over two years even though the
U.S. interests were deeply involved. He implied that it had taken us
a long time to get away from isolationism, and that it would take
Argentina even longer due to its remote geographic position.
As might have been expected, Peron then took up the subject of Ambassador
Braden.3
Braden, he said, was mainly responsible for the
friction which had so long existed between Argentina and the United
States. His attitude here had been more like a member of the
opposition party than an Ambassador of a friendly country. Peron said that he, nevertheless,
owed Braden a debt of gratitude because
Braden’s attacks on his candidacy served to
unite behind him the Argentine electorate, many of whom deeply
resented the interference of a foreign diplomat in Argentina’s
domestic affairs. Even though Mr. Messersmith
and the other ambassadors who succeeded Braden
were men of tact and discretion who scrupulously refrained from
interfering in the country’s internal affairs, the bad effects of
Mr. Braden’s actions were never entirely erased
from the minds of the people and the government of Argentina.
Another cause of discontent in Argentina had been, Peron said, the blocking of
Argentine exchange balances and gold in the United States during
World War II which, together with Britain’s suspension of sterling
convertibility, had at the time caused Argentina serious economic
difficulties. When Argentina was finally able to avail itself of its
holdings in the United States, in 1946–47, their purchasing power
had decreased by almost 50%. (Peron made a
similar statement in November, 1951—see despatch 896 of December 4,
1951,4 entitled “Peron’s
Statement to Visiting Congressmen”.)
He also mentioned the assurances allegedly given him by former
Ambassador Bruce5 that Argentina had nothing to worry about,
since purchases under the Marshall Plan would take care of all its
exportable [Page 430] surpluses.
Argentina, he said, went to the extent of cancelling sales that had
already been made to Russia and other countries, but Mr. Bruce’s assurances never
materialized. Fortunately, he added, export prices rose at about
that time so that Argentina suffered no economic losses.
As another reason for Argentina’s attitude, Peron mentioned the Export–Import
Bank’s refusal last year to permit Argentina to apply the unused
portion of the 125 million dollar credit (granted in 1950)6 to the purchase in the United
States of agricultural equipment and other capital goods.
I interrupted the President to say that I was familiar with this
transaction having, as he knew, been a member of the Joint United
States-Argentine Economic Commission which met in Washington during
the latter part of 1949 and early part of 1950. I had also been in
Washington when the Argentine request regarding the unused portion
of the credit (about 28 million dollars) had been received and had
discussed it with the Export–Import Bank. The bank’s refusal, I
said, did not reflect on Argentina’s economic solvency, with regard
to which the bank had a high regard. The fact was that under the
terms of the agreement, the credit could be used only to cover
dollar arrears owed U.S. exporters for shipments to Argentina made
before the agreement was signed. It would not have been possible,
therefore, to agree to Argentina’s request without entering into an
entirely new agreement and this, I said, was impracticable at the
time in view of the state of public opinion in the United States as
a result of the anti-U.S. propaganda which Argentina had
unleashed.
The President also mentioned the visit to Argentina of Mr. Miller,7 then
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs. He had hoped that
Mr. Miller’s visit would
bring about an improvement in relations between the two countries,
and in order to help bring this about he had granted a number of
requests which Mr. Miller
made. These included:
- 1)
- Settlement of the problems confronting the American meat
packers in Argentina;
- 2)
- The transfer of the head office of Swift International
(now known as International Packers) from Buenos Aires to
the United States. He [Page 431] said this was against the advice of
members of his Cabinet and had resulted in a loss to
Argentina of “250 million dollars”;
- 3)
- Permission for the entry of Braniff International Airways
into Argentina;
- 4)
- Permission for the American motion picture companies to
resume importation of their films; and
- 5)
- An improvement in the situation of the Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey (ESSO).
All this, the President added, had been to no avail, inasmuch as the
American press had continued attacking him, his wife and his
government.
He then repeated all he had told me during our previous meeting8 about how he refused for several
years to permit Argentine newspapers to retaliate and that it was
not until 1950, when pressure by Argentine newsmen became very
strong that he authorized them to reply to attacks against him in
the United States press. He admitted that Argentina had not limited
itself to refuting anti-Argentine statements which appeared in the
United States, but had taken the offensive on the theory that
offense was often the best defense. In any event, he said, United
States press attacks had shown no signs of abatement and this,
together with Argentine attacks on the United States, had been
largely responsible for maintaining the present unsatisfactory
situation.*
At this point I told the President that I would like to speak very
frankly. I showed him the article by Edward
Tomlinson which appeared in the January 27 issue of
Look, entitled
“Peron’s War on the United States”. This
article carried two of the more vicious anti-U.S. cartoons
distributed throughout the Hemisphere by Argentine labor attachés. I
told him that he could readily see why propaganda of the kind
published in the local papers and distributed by Argentine labor
attachés must inevitably lead to unfavorable articles in the United
States press, including such articles as the one by Mr.
Tomlinson.
I said one of the things about Argentine propaganda which had created
considerable concern in the minds of the American people was its
similarity to the communist line. As examples, I mentioned the
articles by Josephine Baker which had been
head-lined in all the local papers; the constant references to
“Yankee Imperialism” and “Yankee Capitalism”; and the consistent
efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and Latin
America. Moreover, for every article in the local press attacking
Communism there had been at least a dozen articles [Page 432] attacking the United States. It was
only natural, therefore, that our people should wonder whether
Argentina was really anti-Communist or whether it might not be
playing Russia’s game.
The President reacted strongly to this. He said I doubtless knew that
Argentina was strongly anti-Communist. There were in Argentina
relatively few Communists and all of them were well known to the
Government and under constant police surveillance. As a matter of
fact, his Government not only had full records of all Communists in
Argentina but also of those in other countries, including the United
States. These records were at our disposition should we wish to use
them.
I ventured to remark that there were Communists who were very close
to the Argentine Government and mentioned the names of
Puiggros and
Libenson9 (so-called “dissident
Communists” who have been closely identified with the Argentine
Government). Peron replied
that they were Comunistas domesticados. “We
use them” he said “for our purpose”, to which I replied that
“leopards did not change their spots”. Peron agreed but said that they would not dare to
fall out of step with his government. There was, he added, no real
threat of Communism in Argentina but Communism was a very real
menace in other Latin American countries such as Guatemala, Bolivia,
Brazil and even Cuba. “Those are the countries” he said “that are
the Communist danger spots of the Hemisphere—not Argentina”.
I next remarked that I had noticed with satisfaction a definite
decline in anti-U.S. propaganda in the controlled Argentine press
and that I had been gratified over the favorable press which
President Eisenhower had received here.
Peron said that he had ordered the press to
temper its attacks against the United States shortly after my
arrival because he considered me to be a “man of good will”. (As a
matter of fact there was no substantial let-up in the anti-U.S.
press campaign until after the elections at home.) He added that
while the press was amenable to suggestions from him, he could not
entirely control its editorial policy, as he was not a dictator. In
any event he was glad that there had been such a marked improvement
in its attitude; it was his considered judgment that the
discontinuance of press attacks on both sides was a prerequisite to
the establishment of the type of climate which would have to be
created if our two countries were to forget the past and reach an
understanding. He felt it was essential that the tension that had
existed between our countries for a decade come to an end.
I suggested that if existing tensions could be eliminated it would
help the cause of Hemispheric solidarity and added that I had seen
the editorials [Page 433] in the
January 30 issues of Critica and La Prensa which said that friction between
our two countries had only helped the enemy (see Embtel 566, January 30, 195310). I
asked whether the “enemy” referred to was Communism, and the
President said, “Naturally”.
I asked the President whether Argentine labor attachés had also been
instructed to discontinue anti-U.S. propaganda. These officials, as
he knew, had been distributing such propaganda in Argentine Embassy
envelopes and under diplomatic frank. He said, “Yes, we have put a
stop to all that”.
Remorino said at this point
that Argentine labor attachés were really “laborers” with the
mentality of “laborers”, who had merely taken a course in a local
school for labor attachés. Most of them were not particularly bright
and had considered it their duty to circulate in the country to
which they were accredited any and all propaganda material received
from the Argentine General Confederation of Workers (CGT) regardless of its nature. He
himself had been instrumental in bringing about the recall of
several of them, including one in the United States. They had not
acted under instructions from the Argentine Government. Peron interrupted to say that if
his government had been responsible for the distribution of the
propaganda, it would have used more subtle methods.
I said I was gratified to learn that Argentina had initiated action
by instructing the press and the Argentine labor attachés to
discontinue attacks on the United States. At this point Remorino said he hoped that the
United States press would also cease its attacks on Argentina. I
said that this would be up to the United States press over which, as
he and the President knew only too well, our government had no
control whatsoever. In fact, any attempt on its part to induce our
newspapers to discontinue their attacks on Argentina might well have
the opposite effect. I could only hope, I said, that the improvement
in the press here would eventually be reflected in the press in the
United States, and that they could not expect a change over night.
The President said he realized this and that he would have to be
patient.
Remorino interrupted to say
that while he knew the press in the United States was free, it was
also true that Tito,11 a Communist dictator, and
Franco,12 a Fascist
dictator, were receiving friendly treatment and that there was
little or no adverse comment on the dictatorships of Somoza and Trujillo. He thought this
indicated that our press was amenable to friendly suggestions and
remarked that any action taken in this respect might be facilitated
by the fact that the great majority of U.S. newspapers were well
disposed toward President Eisenhower.
[Page 434]
I replied that if there had been a change in the attitude of the U.S.
press toward Tito and
Franco the change had doubtless been a very
gradual one and that I thought his statement to the effect that
Franco’s treatment in the United States
press was a friendly one, at best somewhat exaggerated.
As an example of positive acts which might produce a favorable
reaction in the U.S. press I mentioned Peron’s
recent statement to local Jewish leaders deploring Soviet
anti-Semitism. Peron seemed
pleased at my mention of this and I enquired why the full statement
had not appeared in the Argentine press. He said that it had been
published by the Jewish language papers. I remarked that their
circulation must be very limited; whereupon he said the story had
been given to the wire services. (The official release issued by the
Secretaria de Informaciones had
considerably tempered the force of the anti-Soviet remarks Peron made in the presence of the
Jewish community leaders.)
I said that I had also noticed with interest the recent statements by
Ambassador Paz and by the
President himself with regard to foreign investments. I said that
there was an investment in Argentina of some 400 million dollars in
U.S. capital and that I was sure he would agree that it had made a
very substantial contribution to the economic progress of the
country.
The President said he was, of course, interested in attracting
foreign capital but on terms that were equitable both to Argentina
and to the investors. He said that Argentina wanted no more
investments like the Smithfield Packing House which was established
in 1911 with a capital of 1 million pounds sterling. Up to the time
that Argentina purchased the plant, it had sent annual profits to
England equal to its entire initial capital. His government, he
added, was working on new regulations governing foreign capital
investments, which he thought would be equitable to all concerned
and which he hoped would have a stimulating effect on its inflow
into the country.
Remorino next called my
attention to the statements made by Secretary Dulles before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and produced a copy of the Congressional Record. He said the President had been
disturbed by the Secretary’s remark that there was fascism in
Argentina which was spreading its tentacles elsewhere, but that he
was reserving judgment until he had had a better opportunity to
observe developments in Washington.
Remorino said that he was a
friend and admirer of Secretary Dulles and that he had written him a letter13 in which he had refrained from any criticism of
the Secretary’s remark, but had asked him to look into [Page 435] the Argentine situation
objectively and after doing so to “let his conscience be his
guide”.
Remorino also referred to
statements against Argentina attributed to Mr.
Braden at a recent forum at Tulane
University which he claimed were unusually derogatory and
inflammatory. He said that these statements had not been published
here at the express instructions of the President who felt they
would needlessly exacerbate Argentine public opinion and make an
understanding more difficult.
As the meeting was drawing to a close I enquired whether they had
anything else in mind I could tell my government. Remorino replied that they were not
in a position to give me a bill of particulars. The President,
however, interrupted to say very emphatically that Argentina wanted
nothing whatsoever from the United States and that his only purpose
in speaking so frankly to me was to express his desire that the
friction which had so long existed between our two countries finally
come to an end.
The meeting broke up at 5:35 p.m., and Peron escorted Remorino and me to my car. Remorino, whom I dropped off at the
hotel, appeared highly pleased over the conversation. In repeatedly
expressing his satisfaction over the President’s attitude, he
implied that it was now up to me accurately to convey that attitude
to my government.
