ODA files, lot 60 D 512, “US–UK Colonial Talks, 1952”

Informal Minutes of Colonial Policy Talks With the United Kingdom, Washington, September 25, 1952, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.1

confidential
United Kingdom United States
Sir Gladwyn Jebb (UK Delegation to UN) Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs
Sir John Martin (Colonial Office) Mr. Benjamin Gerig, Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs
Mr. Dennis Laskey (UK Delegation to UN) Affairs
Mr. A. C. Mathieson (UK Delegation to UN) Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European
Mr. Robert H. Fowler (UK Delegation to UN)
Mr. J. K. Thompson (British Embassy) Mr. Robert R. Robbins, UND
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR
Mr. Michael Wenner (British Embassy) Miss Ruth Bacon, FE
Mr. Harry Howard, NEA
Mr. James R. Fowler, UND

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson opened the meeting and recalled that there had been an exchange of memoranda between the British Embassy and the Department on the various items to be discussed. He suggested that the discussion might begin with the first subject dealt with in these memoranda under the heading “General Policy”.

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Agenda Item 1: General Policy

Sir John Martin: Sir John Martin recalled that following the colonial discussions with the United States in 1950, the UK had changed its general attitude in the UN and followed a more positive approach. He felt that the experience of the last two years had shown this to be a profitable decision. The UK acknowledged the legitimate interest of the world in the affairs of non-self-governing territories and recognized the continuing interest of the UN in these affairs. He felt that perhaps the UK had still not fully exploited the tactics which they had adopted; however, they intended to continue along the same line.

Sir John pointed out, however, that there were certain limits which the United Kingdom placed on UN activities in the colonial field. These limits were briefly discussed in the UK memorandum but he wished to review them briefly. If these limits were over-stepped he felt that the UK position in their territories would be undermined. The UK was convinced that its fears on this score were real, not imaginary nor exaggerated. In particular they felt that the discussion of political affairs of non-self-governing territories by the UN and the extension of the concept of accountability by the examination of conditions in particular territories, or of petitions from the territories or the despatch of visiting missions to the territories would have ruinous consequences. He felt that it was with respect to these limits that the basic disagreement existed between the UK and US. He recalled, however, that in the previous discussion the US had indicated that it did not consider the discussion of political conditions in non-self-governing territories to be desirable.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson stated that this was not exactly the US position. We felt that the UN was competent to discuss political conditions. In the case of Tunisia, however, we felt that the UN could not settle the matter in any event, and that discussion of the issue in the present atmosphere would probably not facilitate a settlement by the two parties. We did not feel that the discussion of political conditions would have the ruinous consequences which the UK anticipated. He recalled that the US submitted political information on its territories. We had not found that this action nor the discussion of the information had led to any difficulty. Mr. Hickerson thought that if the UK had from the start submitted political information voluntarily and had not made an isssue of this matter, it would have avoided a lot of trouble.

Sir John Martin: Sir John pointed out that US territories were not in the limelights as were the UK territories. Africa was the center of interest at the present time. World opinion was not anxious to annoy the US whereas other countries did not worry about annoying the UK. With respect to the basis for the UK position, he felt that they had a [Page 1260] legal case but their practical reasons were primary. Chapter XI of the Charter was a new idea—administration was not to be carried out behind closed doors and a system of reporting had been evolved to insure this. It was clear, however, that a system of control had not been set up by Chapter XI. The Administering powers were not answerable to the Assembly; in this respect the situation differed as between trust and other non-self-governing territories.

Turning to the practical arguments, Sir John reviewed briefly the situation in Kenya and the difficulties the UK faced there. He pointed out that the local administration was faced with the growth of an African secret society. The situation was very delicate, and the UK felt that the discussion of conditions in Kenya with perhaps a hearing for an African and a resolution on the subject would greatly weaken the local authorities in handling the matter properly. In the Gold Coast the situation was simple in comparison to many other territories, but even here there was a danger that sectional and special interests would appeal to the UN with dangerous and difficult consequences. He felt that continued pressure might lead the UK to pull out of Africa prematurely, leaving the African to slip back into chaos and confusion.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson said that, legalities aside, he felt we agreed almost entirely with the UK view. The fact that we felt that it was not illegal to discuss political conditions in the territories did not mean that we favored such discussion. In the case of Cyprus and Kenya we would work behind the scenes to avoid such a discussion. We do not feel that an open attempt to stop discussion would be helpful. With respect to the other limitations mentioned by the UK, we agreed that visiting missions and UN plebiscites should not be held without the consent of the administering authority and we agreed that there was no legal basis in the Charter for a system of petitions and oral hearings such as existed in the Trusteeship System.

Sir John Martin: Sir John said that he felt that US position would be most helpful. He felt that it would be wise for us both to undertake a clear exposition of our positions in the corridors and behind the scenes, not in an aggressive manner, but with the hope of avoiding precipitate action. The whole matter had been given consideration at a very high level in London, and it was felt that the UK position must be upheld. If a resolution were passed which invaded the limits set by the UK, they would consider seriously withdrawing from the particular UN body concerned.

Mr. Mathieson: The UK felt that the practical grounds for its position were the primary ones. For purely political reasons, the UK was determined that discussions of political affairs in non-self-governing territories should not take place.

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Mr. Hickerson: If the issue was placed on legal grounds as a matter of competence, he was sure we would lose; therefore, every effort should be made to discourage the discussions behind the scenes.

Mr. Allen: Mr. Allen pointed out that it did not necessarily follow from the US position on the matter of competence, that we felt that the Fourth Committee was competent to discuss political issues in non-self-governing territories. We felt that the normal way to bring about such discussion would be to place the items on the agenda in usual manner.

Sir John Martin: Sir John felt that this was a better way to go about it. Furthermore, other Committees might be better balanced organs in which to have such a discussion. The UK would not feel there was such a problem if the land problem in Kenya were discussed in connection with other land problems of the world. The UK would not rigidly insist that no political matter could ever be mentioned in the Fourth Committee; if such a discussion were not pressed and if a resolution were not put forward, the UK would not oppose.

Mr. Mathieson: The UK has decided that if its bounds are overstepped, it will consider withdrawing. He asked what would be the US position if the UK took such action?

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson stated that the US would not withdraw.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb: Sir Gladwyn asked if the US would participate in the debate in the event that the UK withdrew.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson stated that our action would depend upon the nature of the debate and the particular issue. In general, the US would try to exercise a moderating influence. If a discussion of political affairs arose we would seek to make such a discussion helpful rather than harmful.

Sir John Martin: Sir John asked whether the US would consider a recommendation by the General Assembly concerning political affairs in a non-self-governing territory to be legitimate.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson replied affirmatively although he pointed out the exact position might depend upon the nature of the recommendation. Some recommendations might be considered out of order.

Mr. Mathieson: Mr. Mathieson stated that the UK was considering making a major opening speech at the next Assembly in which it would review its policies generally, point to its record of achievement and express its desire to be left alone to continue its work without irresponsible criticism from the UN. Such a speech would be moderate in tone and would not contrast too vividly the conditions in British territories with conditions in other countries.

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Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson felt that considerable caution should be used in such an approach. He pointed out that we do not yet know the situation which will develop.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb: Sir Gladwyn felt there was a need for an opening statement to make the situation clear at the outset.

Sir John Martin: The UK was not considering an aggressive speech but one whose mood could best be described as “rebuffed”.

[There followed a brief discussion of the order of agenda items during which it was decided to discuss items number 17 and 16 at once before Sir Gladwyn Jebb’s departure.]2

Agenda Item 17: Inter-Delegation Contacts

Mr. Mathieson: Mr. Mathieson stated that the UK was concerned about the US refusal to participate in regular machinery for consultation with respect to colonial problems at the Assembly. The UK wished to establish periodic and regular meetings of the administering Members to consider the problems they face in the Fourth Committee. He felt that the bloc approach was universally accepted at the UN and he urged that the US participate with the other administering Members in consideration of matters which were of great importance to it.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson pointed out that the US did not participate in any of the blocs at the UN. We would not be able to join the grouping which was suggested by the UK.

Sir John Martin: Sir John pointed out that the UK was not suggesting a formal arrangement.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson stated that the US could not agree to an informal but regularized procedure. We could not be in a position where we could be accused of being a member of the colonial bloc.

Mr. Mathieson: The UK would concert with other administering members as a colonial power. In such consultations it was necessary and helpful to have the views of the US.

Mr. Hickerson: The US will always be glad to discuss its views with other Members of the UN, both administering and non-administering, but we will not be able to join an organized group for the purpose of such consultations. The US has been re-examining its over-all position on colonial questions in the UN, and while no final decisions have been made, we were about to conclude that there was no other role we could play in this matter other than the one we have followed in the past. It should be remembered that the US was trying to bring 80 million people to the side of the West.

Sir John Martin: Sir John pointed out that the US was already, in effect, a member of the administering bloc, both because of its own [Page 1263] responsibilities in the administration of territories and because of close ties with the other Western European colonial powers. It would seem that it would be in the interest of the US to recognize its position and join with the others to prevent chaos in the non-self-governing territories of the world.

Mr. Hickerson: We agree fully that it is in our interest to prevent chaos wherever it might occur; however, we believe we can help most by staying outside any regular group and exerting our influence independently. He reiterated that the US will always welcome the views of the UK and others on colonial matters.

Self-Determination

Mr. Mathieson: Mr. Mathieson noted from the US memoranda that the US was in favor of the principle of self-determination. He was puzzled by this statement since he did not know the meaning of that principle.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb: Sir Gladwyn referred to the question of secession as it related to self-determination and to the difficulties which self-determination poses in specific cases.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson reviewed the US position on this matter as stated in the memorandum given to the British Embassy. With respect to Resolution A he pointed out that the US would oppose the resolution unless we obtained amendments eliminating the reference to slavery and providing more flexible wording with respect to the use of UN plebiscites. With respect to the amendment which would state that UN actions in this matter should be in conformity with the Charter, the US position was not yet finally determined. It was possible that we would only insist upon the first two amendments and not insist on stating explicitly the need for conformity with the Charter.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb: Sir Gladwyn asked if there were any chance that the US would merely vote against the resolution as it stood.

Mr. Hickerson: Mr. Hickerson replied negatively, stating that it was the objective of the US to improve the resolution so that it could support it. Mr. Hickerson then reviewed the US position with respect to Resolution B.

Mr. Mathieson: Mr. Mathieson stated that it appeared that the US and UK agreed completely on Resolution B.

  1. The United States–United Kingdom talks on the United Nations were held in Washington Sept. 23–26, 1952 (with social preliminaries on Sept. 22). Regarding the talks on general UN affairs, see pp. 1 ff. The so-called colonial talks were held on Sept. 25. The record of the morning session only is printed here, pertaining to general colonial policy. A complete set is in ODA files, lot 60 D 257, “1952 Colonial Policy Talks”. The minutes printed here were prepared by James R. Fowler of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs on Sept. 30.
  2. Brackets in the source text.