Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

330.14/9–2052

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs ¹

confidential

[ Washington , September 20, 1952.]

Colonial Questions in the United Nations, 1952

observations of the department of state on the aide-mémoire from the british embassy dated september 3, 1952

(The numbers in parentheses refer to paragraphs in the memorandum appended to the British aide-mémoire.)

General Policy—(paragraphs 1–6)

The United States agrees with the view of the United Kingdom Government that the interest of the world in the affairs of non-self-governing territories, springing from a variety of motives, is a legitimate interest which finds an opportunity for expression in the United Nations. We agree wholeheartedly that the United Nations also provides an excellent opportunity for administering authorities to publicize their policies and achievements, to expound on the complexities of the problems they face, and to allay anxiety and prejudice in world opinion concerning colonial affairs.

We are pleased to note that the United Kingdom seeks to avoid retreating into negative arguments, and we agree that the administering authorities have made too little use of the strong case inherent in their record of achievement. We agree further with the view of the United Kingdom that certain non-administering delegations are beginning to adopt a more mature approach to colonial questions, and that this tendency should be encouraged. We believe that the cooperative and restrained attitude which the United Kingdom plans to adopt in the 1952 Assembly will assist materially in enlisting the sympathy and support of moderate elements.

With regard to the five limitations in paragraph 5 which you would wish to place on United Nations action, we feel that a distinction must be made between what is desirable and undesirable in practice and what is legal and illegal under the Charter. As you are aware, our interpretation of the Charter would not provide a legal basis for your view that you cannot concede the right of the United Nations to discuss political affairs of non-self-governing territories, and that you cannot recognize the right of the United Nations to make recommendations relating to particular non-self-governing territories. We do believe, however, that the proper and most orderly way to initiate a discussion of political affairs of non-self-governing territories would be to have such items placed on the agenda in the normal manner. And as a practical matter we consider that, in general, action by the United Nations along these lines should be discouraged. We do not believe, however, that discussion of political affairs of non-self-governing territories would necessarily have such far-reaching consequences as you anticipate. With regard to the despatch of Visiting Missions to non-self-governing territories and the holding of United Nations plebiscites in non-self-governing territories, we share your view that such action should not be taken except with the consent of the administering authority. With regard to the right of petition in matters relating to non-self-governing territories, and the granting of oral hearings, we believe there is no legal basis in the Charter for extending to non-self-governing territories the system of oral hearings and petitions established in the international trusteeship system, and we think that proposals to this effect should be opposed.

We are gratified to note the large measure of agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on the positive and constructive approach which should be made in the Fourth Committee. As you will note from our comments on specific issues, however, we are concerned lest the limitations which you wish to place on United Nations action might jeopardize the success of your tactics.

Administrative Unions—(paragraph 8)

We note that the United Kingdom is reasonably satisfied with the operation of the Trusteeship Council’s Standing Committee on Administrative Unions and is prepared to accept the Committee’s reports as a basis of discussion in the Fourth Committee. The United States shares this view. Furthermore, we hope that the United Kingdom is correct in the belief that the Fourth Committee will in time tend to follow the Trusteeship Council’s lead in accepting the administrative unions while maintaining a close watch on their operation in practice. In the General Assembly’s Committee on Administrative Unions, which is to present its observations to the Assembly on the Special Report on Administrative Unions (T/1026) prepared by the Trusteeship Council, the United States will attempt to persuade the Committee to present favorable observations on this report. We note that the United Kingdom is prepared to appear before the Committee, but we hope that the Committee will limit itself to examining the Special Report of the Trusteeship Council, and will not attempt to question the Administering Authorities concerned, as we believe that this function should be performed by the Trusteeship Council. We share the view of the United Kingdom that the General Assembly’s Committee on Administrative Unions is superfluous, and we should take the position that it should not be reconstituted for another year.

Ewe and Togoland Unification—(paragraph 9)

We are in general agreement with the view of the United Kingdom that the future of British Togoland lies with the Gold Coast. The views of the inhabitants of the two Togolands are in a state of flux, however, and we do not feel it possible to prophesy at this time the outcome of the Ewe and Togoland unification problem. The wishes of the inhabitants might be (realized, for example, if all or part of British Togoland should unite with all or part of French Togoland and the larger area become a part of the Gold Coast. We are not suggesting this as a solution of the problem. We are merely stating that while we share your views as to the ultimate future of British Togoland, we feel that the problem is somewhat more complex than your memorandum indicates. We note, moreover, that you make no mention of French Togoland, although developments in that territory are an inextricable part of the problem.

We are disturbed by reports of incidents in French Togoland which might be interpreted as efforts to interfere with the free expression of the views of pro-unification groups to the Visiting Mission. We feel that such reports make it difficult to avoid extreme action by the General Assembly. In general, we feel that the Assembly will desire convincing evidence of the real wishes of the inhabitants of the Southern as well as the Northern sections of both Togolands. It would probably not be sufficient, for example, to demonstrate that a majority of the inhabitants of British Togoland desired association with the Gold Coast unless it were also clear that such a majority included a majority of the inhabitants of Southern Togoland. In this connection we have been puzzled by reports of resistance on the part of inhabitants of Southern Togoland to a recent visit to that area by the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast. We would appreciate any further information on this matter which might clarify the situation. With regard to French Togoland we also feel that the views of the inhabitants of the Southern section have an importance somewhat greater than the proportion of the total population of the territory that they represent.

It is not clear to us that the Ewe and Togoland unification movements are “necessarily abortive”, at least in the long range, and we cannot therefore support your efforts to discourage further United Nations interest in this matter. In our view the General Assembly has thus far acted with considerable moderation. It has limited itself to efforts to ascertain the state of public opinion in the territories and to encourage the development of machinery for cooperation between the two territories on their common problems. The Assembly has come to recognize the complexity of the question, and we feel that a frank discussion of its continuing complexities is more likely to lead to moderate action by the Assembly than would efforts to discourage further consideration of it. Nor do we feel that the former course of action would add any obstacle to the closer association of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, a process which we agree is already demonstrating its advantages to the former.

Cameroons Unification—(paragraph 10)

We agree with the view of the United Kingdom and are satisfied with the action of the Trusteeship Council, which felt that no recommendations on the unification of the two Cameroons was necessary and limited itself to expressing the hope that the measures being taken by the Administering Authorities will eliminate frontier difficulties. The Cameroons unification movement does not appear to have obtained substantial popular support in either territory. In view of the rapidly changing political situation in West Africa, however, it seems likely that the Trusteeship Council will wish to continue to keep this matter under review. In this connection, it could be pointed out in the Fourth Committee, if necessary, that the 1952 Visiting Mission will presumably give attention to the views of the inhabitants of the two territories on the unification question. It would be premature, therefore, for the General Assembly to go into the matter until the Trusteeship Council has had an opportunity to examine the Visiting Mission’s Report.

Participation of Indigenous Inhabitants of Trust Territories in the work of the Trusteeship Council—(paragraph 11)

The United States considers that the basic approach embodied in the Trusteeship Council’s resolution, by which indigenous inhabitants would be attached, where appropriate, to the Delegations of Administering Authorities, represents the most practicable and satisfactory means of providing for the closer participation of the inhabitants of trust territories in the work of the Council. In principle, we consider it undesirable to provide for representation in United Nations bodies for the inhabitants of trust or non-self-governing territories apart from the representation of the responsible administering authorities or their territorial administrations. Nonetheless, in view of the widespread opinion in the General Assembly that a closer association of the inhabitants in the work of the Council is desirable and in view of the value which such closer participation, appropriately brought about, might have, not only for indigenous populations and the United Nations, but also for the administering authority concerned, the United States believes that the best course of action in the Seventh General Assembly will be to support the Trusteeship Council’s action as a practicable and positive alternative to other more extreme proposals which may be forthcoming. While certain methods for bringing such association about are already in operation, the United States will give careful consideration to any proposals which may be made with respect to further methods for achieving such association, to the practical and legal problems which they may raise, to the advantages which they may offer, and to any suitable variations in phrasing of the resolution adopted by the Trusteeship Council which might make it acceptable to a larger number of United Nations Members without altering the principles involved. The United States will actively oppose any proposal which would advocate or attempt to establish associate membership or other forms of dual representation for trust territories or their inhabitants in the Trusteeship Council.

In connection with this question, we should like to discuss with the United Kingdom the steps which might be taken to implement the Trusteeship Council’s resolution. We are giving consideration to attaching a suitably qualified inhabitant of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to the United States Delegation, and we understand that at one time the United Kingdom was considering attaching inhabitants from trust territories under United Kingdom administration to its delegation.

The problem of time-tables or schedules for the attainment of self-government or independence—(paragraphs 12–13)

The United States believes that no useful purpose will be served by setting strict and detailed time-tables in accordance with which all Trust Territories would be expected to achieve self-government or independence. The United Kingdom will recall that the United States abstained at the Sixth General Assembly on Resolution 558 (VI) in which the Assembly requested information on this matter. The basis for the United States abstention was our opposition to the rigid language of sub-paragraph (e), which asked for information on “the period of time in which it is expected that the Trust Territory shall attain the objective of self-government or independence.”

We believe that the information requested in sub-paragraphs (a) through (d) can be supplied by administering authorities and that an appropriate answer can be made to sub-paragraph (e) explaining in detail the reasons why a rigid statement cannot be made as to the period in which it is expected that a territory will attain self-government or independence. We intend to supply this information in relation to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in as great detail as possible since we feel that a full and frank presentation of the problems involved will assist administering authorities in rallying responsible opinion in the Assembly to support their view that, in general, specific time-tables are impracticable. We consider, however, that in certain cases in which a territory is nearing the goal of self-government or independence, there may be advantages in announcing a date for the achievement of the goal as the United States did in the case of the Philippines.

Future of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories—(paragraphs 14–17)

The United States recognizes the practical advantages of having the information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter discussed initially in the balanced Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, and we believe that the Committee serves a useful purpose. A continuation of the practice of giving major consideration annually to one of the functional fields covered by information transmitted under Article 73(e) can result in a substantive contribution by the Committee. We do not believe that changes in the terms of reference of the Committee are either necessary or desirable.

The United States hopes that, despite the wide degree of sentiment which may be present in the Committee and the Assembly for the establishment of the Committee on a permanent basis, it may be possible to reconstitute the Committee for an additional three year period.

In view of Article 22 of the Charter, we cannot agree that the establishment of the Committee on a permanent basis would be tantamount to an amendment of the Charter by resolution. Our reason for favoring a three-year extension of the Committee is based on pragmatic rather than constitutional grounds. We believe that if the tenure of the Committee is subject to periodic review, it will be easier to divert efforts to extend the functions of the Committee.

Discussion of political information—(paragraphs 18–20)

The United States believes that it would be unwise for the General Assembly to state explicitly that it has the right to discuss political conditions in non-self-governing territories and hopes that a situation can be avoided where the General Assembly would undertake to do so. However, we believe that a certain amount of “political” discussion is inevitable even in connection with economic and social questions, and that it will be difficult if not impossible to draw a sharp line. When such discussion is believed by an administering authority to have serious effects on the internal situation of a territory it would be appropriate to appeal to the common sense of delegates.

While the United States maintains the view that the transmission of political information is not required under Article 73(e), the United Kingdom is aware that the United States has voluntarily transmitted such infomation without serious effects. The transmission of such information does not, of course, prejudice the right of administering members to determine the status of their territories under Chapter XI.

We believe that the transmission of political information can in certain instances be beneficial to the administering authorities since it may prevent unjustified suspicions and give the administering authorities an opportunity to publicize the political progress made in their territories.

Factors determining whether or not a Territory is Non-Self-Governing—(paragraph 21)

The United States agrees that each administering Member has the right to determine the constitutional position and status of any particular territory under its sovereignty. The United States also considers that the decision with respect to specific territories rests solely with the administering Members concerned. It is assumed that administering Members and all other Members of the United Nations would wish to respect any opinion or judgement handed down by the International Court of Justice with respect to Chapter XI of the Charter. The United States does not consider, however, that the interpretation of the expressions “non-self-governing territories” and “territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”, since they appear in the Charter, is a matter for unilateral determination by individual administering Members. The United States considers, therefore, that in view of Article 10, the General Assembly would not be exceeding its authority in discussing and attempting to define these expressions, in recommending to administering Members generally the consideration of any definition the Assembly might be able to arrive at, or even in expressing its opinion in general terms, on the principles which have guided or may guide Members in determining on which of its territories it will transmit information. As for a General Assembly resolution concerning the decision of an administering authority to cease transmission of information, we believe that such a resolution should not be worded in a manner which would imply that the decision of the administering authority is subject to approval or disapproval by the General Assembly.

With regard to the general problem created by the cessation of transmission of information, we find it understandable that certain United Nations Members may be concerned lest Chapter XI be circumvented by premature cessation, and we believe that the administering authorities should seek to avoid arousing apprehensions on this point.

Central African Federation—(paragraphs 22–26)

With regard to the possibility of a Central African Federation, we note the statement of the United Kingdom that it is by no means certain that a Federal Authority will in fact be set up. This being the case, we agree that the General Assembly should not discuss such hypothetical issues when it has so many real issues to consider. Because of our view of the General Assembly’s wide powers under Article 10, however, we could not support the United Kingdom’s views that the establishment of the federation is a constitutional subject and thus outside the competence of the General Assembly, or the United Kingdom view that this question is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. We appreciate the fact that the three Central African territories might derive economic benefits from a federation, and we assume that the United Kingdom’s traditional respect for the will of the indigenous inhabitants of its territories would prevent it from establishing a federation against the wishes of these inhabitants. We believe that such a step might damage the United Kingdom’s reputation for wisdom and justice in its relations with dependent peoples, and might jeopardize efforts of the West to maintain the friendship of Africans.

Kenya Land Question—(paragraphs 27–32)

We share your hope that discussion of the Kenya land question can be confined to the corridors. However, it is not clear to us on what legal basis we could prevent it from being referred to the Second, Third, or Fourth Committee. It is our feeling that if reference should be made to this question in one of the above committees in connection with related agenda items, a brief moderate reply on the substance by the United Kingdom representative would be the best tactic to avoid building this matter up into one on which the Assembly might feel called upon to express itself.

With regard to the possibility of a request for an oral hearing for anyone claiming to represent the Kenya Africans, we feel that such hearings should be granted only in exceptional circumstances. We hope that discussion of this question can be avoided or kept to a minimum in the United Nations at this time.

Racial Discrimination—(paragraphs 33–35)

The United States is in general agreement with the United Kingdom’s approach to United Nations discussion of race relations in non-self-governing territories. Full and free discussion on this difficult subject can only be valuable to the extent that it is conducted in an objective and dispassionate manner.

We believe that the wisest course for the administering authorities in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories would be to present their experiences in a free and frank manner and to invite non-administering Members to make available their best thought and experience on the subject.

While recognizing that the practice of racial discrimination is not restricted to any particular group, we are not yet convinced of the wisdom of an “attempt to demonstrate that anti-white discrimination constitutes a potential menace to international peace and a serious bar to the economic and social development of mankind”. Such an attempt would undoubtedly provoke a strong reaction from certain Members of the United Nations and would have the effect of provoking that type of discussion which we seek to avoid.

With regard to your suggestion that this question might be referred to ECOSOC, we think it might be feasible, after the question has been adequately discussed, to refer the records of the discussion to ECOSOC, if such a proposal is made. We do not wish to create the impression that we are attempting to prevent a discussion of the problem.

Human Rights and Non-Self-Governing Territories—(paragraph 36)

The United States notes that arrangements are going forward with respect to the application of the European Covenant on Human Rights to all British non-self-governing territories. It is to be hoped that the principles embodied in this Covenant and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will be increasingly observed in all non-self-governing territories.

We share the view of the United Kingdom that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is intended to be a goal of achievement toward which the people not only of non-self-governing territories but of all nations should strive. We believe that constructive results can be achieved in the furtherance in all countries of the principles of the Declaration through the provision of information regarding its implementation in all countries, including non-self-governing territories. The United States will continue to report on significant developments in this field, and hopes that all administering Members will do so in respect of their own territories. In this connection, the United States intends to submit to the United Nations a report supplemental to its 1951 report on the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This report deals almost entirely with those articles of the new Puerto Rican Constitution which pertain to Human Rights. On balance, we believe that the administering authorities, particularly the United Kingdom, would gain far more by meeting the General Assembly’s reasonable wishes on this question than by any other attitude.

British Honduras—(paragraphs 37–40)

The United States Government agrees with the United Kingdom Government that it is not possible to forecast the specific combination of circumstances which might provoke discussion at the United Nations on the question of British Honduras. We believe that there are two distinct parts of the Problem: (1) the competence of the General Assembly to discuss conditions in individual non-self-governing territories, including information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter, and (2) the question of sovereignty over British Honduras.

We agree that the question of sovereignty over British Honduras is a legal issue which is not an appropriate matter for discussion in the Fourth Committee. We agree, moreover, that it would be desirable to keep discussion of individual territories and of political conditions to a minimum, and to endeavor to ensure that the recommendations of the Assembly in this field are couched in general terms which do not refer to any particular non-self-governing territory. We cannot find a basis for eliminating discussion of such matters as British Honduras any more than we have been able to find a basis for preventing the Soviet Union from discussing conditions in Puerto Rico.

We believe that the remarks of the Representative of Guatemala concerning British Honduras at the last session of the General Assembly were quite ill-advised. We have been impressed by the fact that none of the other non-administering Members have shown any sympathy or support for the Guatemalan position. We hope that the poor reception of his remarks last year will induce the Guatemalan representative to speak with greater moderation at this Assembly. In any case, we hope it will be possible for the United Kingdom to handle this question in such a way as to avoid generating support for Guatemala.

Participation of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the work of the Special Committee—(paragraph 41)

The United States considers that, in general, the same approach should be followed in dealing with this question as was followed in the Trusteeship Council. At the 1952 meeting of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories the United States intends to support action which will endorse the practice of some administering Members in attaching qualified persons from their territories to their delegations to the Committee and will favor the continuation and increase of this practice where appropriate and practicable. We would oppose in the Committee any proposals which would establish separate or dual representation for dependent territories through associate membership or by other means.

The United States considers that the participation in the work of the United Nations through service on the delegations of administering authorities provides an opportunity for bringing dependent areas into closer contact with the work of the United Nations; similarly, their participation in this form can be of value not only to the United Nations body concerned, but to the administering Member of whose delegation they form a part. This is particularly true in the case of responsible indigenous leaders and qualified indigenous experts in various fields. Even in the absence of indigenous personnel suitably qualified for such an assignment, there would be advantages both to the United Nations and the administering Member from such participation by non-indigenous personnel from territorial administrations. To secure these advantages, however, there is no need to create a new status of “associate membership” for the territorial administration. The creation of such a status for territorial administrations would no doubt lead to increased pressure to make the representation of associate members completely separate from that of the administering authority, and to provide that the representative in each case should be chosen directly by the people. Since the United States is opposed in principle to dual representation—that is to representation of the responsible government, on the one hand, and of the people governed, on the other—it believes that it would be wise to try to avoid creating a situation which might lead to increased pressure to bring about that end.

On the assumption that the Committee’s action on this subject at its present session will be basically the same as that taken by the Trusteeship Council, the United States will take the position in the Assembly that such action represents the most practicable and satisfactory means of providing for closer participation for non-self-governing territories in the work of the Committee, and will actively oppose any proposals in the Assembly which would advocate or attempt to establish associate membership or any other form of dual representation for non-self-governing territories or their inhabitants in the Committee.

Human Rights: Resolutions on Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations—(paragraphs 49–53)

We agree that the General Assembly is not likely this year to be concerned in detail with the article on self-determination drafted by the Human Rights Commission for inclusion in the Human Rights Covenants. We are prepared, if necessary, to point out that, in view of the fact that the Commission has been asked to complete the draft Covenants for submission to the Eighth General Assembly, it would be desirable to defer consideration of a draft article for those Covenants at the forthcoming Seventh Session. If, nevertheless, there is general debate on this draft article, we would make clear that the United States supports the principle of self-determination and intends to promote its realization in accordance with its constitutional processes and the provisions of the Charter. We would, however, reserve our right to propose changes when this Article is considered in detail. Such a course might avoid precipitating a controversial debate on the draft article in the Third Committee, which might prejudice our efforts subsequently to eliminate certain objections which we, too, find in the present draft.

With regard to the two resolutions on self-determination adopted by the Human Eights Commission we should like to point out that they were not “endorsed” by the Economic and Social Council; they were transmitted by ECOSOC to the Assembly “without comment”. You may recall that in these circumstances the United States Representative in ECOSOC indicated that, despite certain objections to both resolutions, we would support their transmission “without comment” to the Assembly and would again set forth our position on their substance in the latter body.

Our substantive position on the two resolutions remains the same as that expressed in ECOSOC. We consider that Resolution A can be rendered acceptable by amendments such as those we introduced in ECOSOC, which would: (a) eliminate the phrases characterizing the colonial relationship as “slavery”, (b) make more flexible the means provided for ascertaining the wishes of non-self-governing peoples (i.e. permit the use of means in addition to United Nations plebiscites), and (c) provide that actions in this field be in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We are prepared to introduce or support amendments along these lines in the Third Committee.

Resolution B is not interpreted by us as bearing any relation to the self-determination article of the Covenants. We agree, however, that it is in effect a recommendation to transmit political information on non-self-governing territories. While the transmission of such information is not specified as an obligation under Article 73(e) of the Charter, you will recall that the United States has voluntarily transmitted such information on the governmental institutions of its territories. We expect to continue to do so in the future. However, we believe that the omission of political information from the categories specified under Article 73(e) was deliberate, and we therefore have opposed, and in this instance will oppose, resolutions which “recommend” the transmission of such information. In our view Resolution B falls in this category despite its use of the word “voluntarily”, as that word is deprived of much of its significance both by the use of the words “recommends” and by the cumulative effect of resolutions on this subject.

Preparatory and Ancillary Measures—(paragraphs 51–55)

(i) Diplomatic Approaches

The United States, like the United Kingdom, is undertaking consultations with many Members of the United Nations in respect to items on the Fourth Committee agenda.

(ii) Inter-delegation Contacts before and during the Assembly

With respect to the suggestion of the Netherlands Government for a meeting of all administering powers prior to the opening of the Assembly to consider the various questions which may arise and to concert their action in respect thereto, we have informed the Netherlands Government that we would not favor at this time a formal meeting of all administering powers. We wish to avoid, in so far as possible, any charge that the administering Members are taking a broad, concerted stand against the non-administering Members in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and the General Assembly.

On the other hand, we will welcome, as in the past, exchanges of views as fully and as frequently as may be desired with the delegations of administering and non-administering states. Such exchanges would be useful both before and during the Assembly. In this connection, however, the United States cannot agree that an informal but regularized procedure whereby a particular grouping of Members would meet from time to time to discuss Fourth Committee matters would be desirable. Whether such meetings were limited to administering members or broadened somewhat, as suggested in the United Kingdom memorandum, the United States considers that such an arrangement, which would inevitably become known, would intensify the “bloc” sentiment in the Fourth Committee.

As the United Kingdom is aware the United States has for some time exerted its efforts to minimize this tendency and to develop a moderate and reasonable body of opinion in the Fourth Committee which would not be identifiable as either administering or non-administering, colonial or anti-colonial, western or eastern. The United States does not share the view expressed in the United Kingdom memorandum that irresponsible elements in the Fourth Committee have enjoyed easy successes mainly as a result of the divisions between administering Members. A perusal of the resolutions adopted by the Fourth Committee in recent sessions and the voting records thereon does not indicate that the extreme and irresponsible elements in the Fourth Committee have enjoyed easy successes. In any event, the United States doubts that concerted action by administering Members on a regular and continuing basis would substantially improve Fourth Committee decisions; it might well result in a crystallization of sentiment in support of the extreme anti-colonial point of view. Such a development would jeopardize efforts to minimize the bloc approach and secure support for compromise measures, which by avoiding negativism, serve as a counter attraction to irresponsible radicalism. We believe that the administering members can play their most useful role in the Fourth Committee if they retain a certain independence and flexibility. Even some diversity of view may be advantageous. Therefore we feel that it would be unwise to set up such an organized group as is suggested in the United Kingdom memorandum.

The ability of administering members to secure the support of moderate and friendly delegations lies more in the merits of the case which administering authorities espouse than in the unanimity with which they act. Furthermore, an assumption that even the most uninformed criticism, aside from that emanating from the Soviet bloc, stems from sincere motives will, we feel, help to keep the tone of Fourth Committee discussions moderate. Conversely, a rigid, uncompromising and legalistic attitude on the part of administering members engenders suspicion and antagonism in all quarters and makes it difficult to appeal to moderate sentiment in the Fourth Committee.

1. This paper was prepared for the forthcoming colonial policy talks with the British; and was a reply to the British aide-mémoire of Sept. 3, 1952. The paper was cleared on Sept. 19 in a meeting of representatives of the Bureau of UN Affairs, the geographic bureaus, and the Assistant Legal Adviser for UN Affairs. The memorandum was transmitted to the British Embassy On Sept. 20 under cover of the Department of State aide-mémoire, Sept. 20, supra.