320/9–3052
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs ( Wainhouse )1
US–French Talks on the UN September 30—Morning Session
- Participants:
- France:
- Ambassador Henri Hoppenot
- United States:
- Mr. John D. Hickerson
- Mr. David W. Wainhouse
- Mr. Ward P. Allen
- Mr. John Utter
- Mr. Robert McBride
tunisia
1. United States Position and French Tactics.
Mr. Hickerson, after reviewing the Secretary’s discussion last summer with members of the French Cabinet and our general views on this matter as outlined in previous instructions to Paris, informed Ambassador Hoppenot of our position on inscription of the item as set forth in Deptel 1780, and as had been conveyed by Ambassador Dunn to Foreign Minister Schuman a few hours before.
Ambassador Hoppenot expressed his understanding and said he thought the position a reasonable one for us to take. Emphasizing again that the French Cabinet had not reached a final decision on the matter, Ambassador Hoppenot stated he felt there was a good chance they would not resist inscription and outlined for our comments the following possible courses of action which the French Delegation might take thereafter:
- a)
- Make a statement to the effect that they do not recognize the competence of the United Nations to consider or deal with this matter and that therefore they will not take any account of any resolution which the Assembly might adopt and thereupon proceed to a general statement of their program and objectives in Tunisia. Mr. Hickerson strongly urged that the French Delegation not state in advance that they will refuse to take any account of any resolution, since such a statement at the outset would infuriate the Arabs and Asians and only have the effect of an embittering debate and provoking more extreme resolutions. It would certainly be appropriate for the French Government to state that they have felt and continue to feel that the United Nations is not competent to deal with this matter and that they fully reserve their position on this point. If the Assembly passes a resolution which the French find unacceptable they could at that time determine their attitude toward it and make such statement as they may then find necessary.
- b)
- Ambassador Hoppenot indicated that consideration was being given as an alternative to introducing a resolution under which the General Assembly would declare itself incompetent to consider the matter. We replied that in our view this also would be unwise and counter-productive and that we ourselves could not vote for it. It was a foregone conclusion that such a resolution could obtain no more than four or five favorable votes and could serve no useful purpose.
- c)
- Ambassador Hoppenot raised as a third alternative tactic the introduction of a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the competence question. We replied that such a proposal would be more logical and defensible than the other two alternatives but it seemed also highly unlikely that it would receive a majority. We pointed out that it would be regarded by the Arabs and Asians as still another device to muzzle them and prevent them from stating their case in the United Nations and we thus seriously doubted that the requisite majority could be obtained. We also suggested it might be tactically unwise since if, as the United States Legal Adviser believes, the International Court of Justice should decide against the French contention, the French would be in a worse position and the role of the United Nations in the problem would be materially strengthened. Moreover, by leaving the matter thus in suspense in United Nations forums such a move would make bilateral discussions with the Tunisians more difficult since they would be more likely to remain intransigent pending the outcome of the Court’s decision.
2. Participation in the debate.
In response to our question as to the extent of French participation in the debate, Ambassador Hoppenot said he felt beyond the initial exposition of their program and objectives the French Delegation would not participate because that would consitute a surrender of their position that the General Assembly is not competent. We took the view that it would be far preferable for the French to participate wholeheartedly in the debate throughout, reserving, if they desired, at the beginning of each intervention their position on the competence issue. We suggested that their refusal to participate in the debate would leave the field to the other side, make it more difficult for France’s friends to help her and would mean that only the unfavorable charges would receive publicity in the world press. We felt it would be much wiser for the French to make replies to incorrect statements during the debate by setting forth the real facts of the matter.
3. General Assembly Resolution.
Turning to a discussion of the nature of the resolution which might emerge from the General Assembly, Mr. Hickerson stated that we cannot now think of any resolution we could vote for except one which would call upon the parties to resume negotiations. We would, of course, oppose any resolution condemning France or seeking to interject United Nations machinery in the solution of the question. In response [Page 1266] to Ambassador Hoppenot’s question, Mr. Hickerson stated we would oppose any provision in the resolution which would result in automatically placing this item on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. We will have to consider what our position should be on a provision in the resolution which would ask the French Government to report to the Secretary General or to Members of the United Nations on the matter in the future, a provision which Ambassador Hoppenot was confident would be strongly resisted by the French Government.
4. Hearing Tunisian Representatives.
We discussed at some length the difficult problems raised by the certain desire on the part of a majority of the Assembly to invite some Tunisian representative or representatives to be heard. Ambassador Hoppenot initially expressed himself most strongly (as did Ambassador Bonnet at a later luncheon conversation) that the French Government would not countenance the granting of a hearing to any Tunisian representatives and would not participate in the discussion should a representative be invited to appear. We indicated that since an invitation to some Tunisians appeared as certain to us as inscription on the agenda, our present thinking is to support granting a hearing to “a representative of the Bey”. We felt this would probably, from the point of view of the French, be the less undesirable of two evils, and that if, as Ambassador Hoppenot indicated, the French Government would refuse to permit any representative of the Bey to leave Tunis, the repercussions would be very serious indeed. If this were the case the Assembly would certainly proceed to invite other Tunisians to appear, very likely Salah Ben Youssef, an ex-Minister in the Bey’s Cabinet, now in Cairo, and perhaps Ladgham and others. Both Ambassador Hoppenot and Ambassador Bonnet remain extremely skeptical that their Government would consent to the appearance of any Tunisian representative but felt that the only possibility of their doing so would be the realization that to permit the presence of a properly selected representative of the Bey was the lesser of two unhappy choices.2
- This memorandum was a joint effort; the codrafter was Ward P. Allen, UN Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs.↩
- A second session was held with Ambassador Hoppenot on the afternoon of Sept. 30, which dealt with noncolonial subjects except for a brief exchange on Morocco, in part as follows: “Ambassador Hoppenot said that with respect to Morocco the problem is the same as Tunisia and the French have the same approach to it. Mr. Hickerson stated that … we have not taken a final decision on our position. In general, we believe the Moroccan and Tunisian cases to be similar and we will probably take the same position on Morocco as we are taking on Tunisia.” (320/9–3052)↩