Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

ODA files, lot 62 D 228, “Attitude of u.s. on Colonial Question”

Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight)¹

secret

[Washington,] April 21, 1952.

• Subject:
• Preliminary Thoughts on the Subject of a U.S. Policy towards Colonial Areas and Colonial Powers.

Our recent endeavors to develop an agreed and effective line of argument against proposals to express a U.S. position on the Colonial question in the text of the MSP legislation² have made it clear that our difficulties go beyond the problem of public presentation of the Departmental point of view. They go, in fact, to the definition of this point of view—to the basic policies which guide our actions in dealing with issues affecting dependent peoples. While there is a wide area of agreement within the Department on issues of this kind, there is also evidence of considerable disagreement on purpose, method, emphasis, etc.

The fundamental problem is very old, and is vitally important to the future course of American foreign policy. It’s solution is perhaps as difficult as any that has confronted the United States Government in the whole history of its foreign relations. The solution involves a reconciliation of the long-term interests of the United States with its immediate and short-term interests; it also involves a reconciliation of a widespread popular sentiment with certain international facts which are not always evident to people not actively engaged in the business of diplomacy. Perhaps no complete solution is possible in any case, in the sense of a pat formula which can be depended upon to guide U.S. actions in all of the varied circumstances in which the colonial question presents itself. It seems desirable, nevertheless, to seek a wider area of agreement on certain fundamental principles which must be taken into account in all such circumstances.

First, it must be recognized that the basic sympathy of the United States for the aspirations of dependent peoples for freedom and self-Government is so deep-seated that, in the long run, it is beyond serious question that the United States will offer strong support for these aspirations. There is likely to be little disagreement about the proposition that the United States policy aims at the eventual freedom and self-government of dependent peoples everywhere in the world and that the United States will continue in the future, as in the past, to exert its influence to this end. The attitudes which support this aim are numerous. They have their roots deep in our history, and their offshoots may be found in the present opinions of many different groupings of Americans.

There are few topics in the realm of foreign affairs on which there seems to be such essential popular agreement as upon the American attitude toward dependent peoples. Democrats and republicans, liberals and conservatives, isolationists and internationalists—all these tend to join forces at least to accept the principle that the United States should support the aspirations of dependent peoples. There are certain exceptions, of course, and it must also be noted that a certain part of the public sentiment described is perhaps not so interested in the fate of dependent peoples as in sniping at the colonial powers. Even so, the sympathy of the American people for dependent peoples is a fact of life that is both healthy and strong. Most practical politicians realize that it is virtually impossible to gain votes, or even to placate critics by supporting the position of the British in Egypt or of the French in Morocco.

Even if popular sentiment were different, those directly responsible for the day to day conduct of foreign affairs would be required to recognize the necessity, in terms of American self-interest, of a benevolent attitude toward the aspirations of dependent peoples. Over a long period of years, it is inevitable that these dependent peoples will gain self-government. Nations of the Western world cannot at the same time maintain their own democratic political institutions and take the meassures which would be required to stiffle the demands of the dependent peoples, even if they should desire to do so. The strength and security of the United States in years to come will depend to a considerable extent on friendly relations with these dependent peoples, and the United States cannot hope for such relations if it takes the side of colonial powers in the innumerable conflicts which will inevitably sures which would be required to stifle the demands of the dependent peoples will develop strong democratic institutions and thereby add to the stability and security of the free world can be realized only if these peoples receive sympathetic support and guidance by the United States during their period of evolution.

On the other hand, American policy with respect to dependent peoples is complicated by the fact that the United States today finds itself, through no choice of its own, in the midst of a power struggle with the strongest and most dangerous dictatorship in history. Our long-term interests will have little meaning unless they are reconciled with our immediate security interests. There would be little value in throwing our support to dependent peoples with a view to developing worth-while democratic friends in half a century, if, by so doing, we might seriously jeopardize present American security and the continued survival of democracy itself. This means that our attitudes, together with our calculated long-term policy aims, must be tempered in particular situations by certain considerations of immediate self-interest.

First among these is the hard fact that the U.S. is now engaged in a far-reaching mutual security undertaking with certain nations which are foremost among the world’s “colonial powers”. Full cooperation with these nations is essential to the security of the U.S. and to the success of its policy of containment of the U.S.S.R. and of deterring aggression by that policy. The dependent peoples cannot, at the present time, make more than a token contribution toward the real defensive strength of the free world. Therefore, the U.S. must either choose the almost impossible course of attempting to defend itself in isolation, or must rely upon the colonial powers of Western Europe to make an addition to American strength sufficient to deter and to hold in check the tremendous military power of the Soviet armies. We have chosen the latter course. And in order to pursue this course successfully, it is obviously essential that we maintain the friendliest possible relations with our European allies.

It may be argued that our alliance with the colonial powers in NATO would not be affected fundamentally by the U.S. policy toward dependent peoples, because our allies have no alternative but to continue cooperation with the U.S. This argument is frequently advanced in the Congress and elsewhere, and takes the form of various proposals for U.S. action in which such countries as Great Britain and France will have no choice but meekly to acquiesce or submit. “We’re paying the piper” it is said, “and we are calling the tune”.

This argument embodies some of the most dangerous assumptions that can be made in analyses of present-day foreign policy. In the first place, it assumes that the peoples and the political leaders in the European NATO countries will always react rationally and logically to their own self-interest, quite contrary to the known facts of political life. It is no exaggeration to say that unqualified support for dependent peoples by the U.S. would not only cause a most serious rift between the members of the North Atlantic alliance, but could under extreme circumstances cause the withdrawal of such powers as France, Belgium, and even the Netherlands therefrom. The NATO is an association of sovereign nations and the colonial powers amongst them consider that their relationships with their dependent overseas territories are entirely an internal matter. They have made it abundantly clear that their reports to the United Nations on social and economic matters therein are made as evidence of their recognition of their humanitarian responsibilities and that this cooperation with the UN does not, and can not, infringe on the political relationships existing between these countries and their dependent areas or on the sovereignty of the reporting nations.

But even if we should judge that an actual break up of the North Atlantic alliance is unlikely, the problem of maintaining “full cooperation” remains. A paper alliance would be of little value. The success of our security policies demands that our allies do their full share of the common task, and the development of strong anti-American feelings within these countries would make this task impossible of accomplishment. To be realistic, we must recognize that, in seeking to influence the NATO governments to take measures deemed essential by our mutual defense, we are dealing with politicians who must go to the people at regular intervals and obtain public support. It would be easily possible for criticism of the U.S. and resentment against its policies to grow so strong in European countries that cooperation with the U.S. would be a political liability rather than a political asset for individual leaders. If such a development should take place, the NATO defense program for all practical purposes might well become a failure in fact even though continuing to exist in theory.

In this connection it is well to note that the peoples of the European colonial powers do not by any means tend to regard the basic American sympathy for dependent peoples as an outgrowth of altruism or idealism. Some of the more charitable regard it as an indication of American immaturity and of a confused appraisal of American self-interest, but there are many people who are convinced that American policy is deliberately aimed at “stealing” the dependent territories on behalf of a new “colonial theory” in which American trade and exploitation could take the place of open political control as under the traditional colonial policy. This conviction is strengthened whenever the U.S. sides with nationalist movements in territories which are clearly incapable of self-government.

A second major consideration which must temper the long-term U.S. attitude toward dependent peoples is the danger of the seizure of these territories by Communist or other hostile totalitarian elements. This danger results not so much from the possibility that local movements towards independence may be Communist dominated (which is true only in rare instances) as from the fact that the Soviet Union profits whenever a “situation of weakness” develops anywhere in the world.

It is part of the Communist gospel (1926 Comintern meeting at Moscow) that Leninists-Stalinists must first support fully any and all nationalist groups with a view to weakening the “imperialist’s powers” by detaching their overseas dependencies from them. Only after this first objective has been attained can the Communists then turn their primary attention to fostering the second revolution, “the revolution of the Proletariat”, i.e., the subjection of the recently liberated people to the full control of the Communist agents of Moscow. This second revolution can be relatively easy if the “independent” territorial government is so weak that it cannot maintain internal order or if the results of independence have disillusioned the population.

Even in most favorable instances, the government of a newly created nation inevitably faces the most serious political, economic and social problems. And where self-government is attained prematurely, these problems are magnified. If we lived in an age where the Communist will to world domination did not exist, the painful consequences of premature self-government might nevertheless be risked. Over a period of years one could expect the dependent peoples, through the slow process of trial and error, to gain the confidence, the wisdom, and the sense of responsibility required for real independence. However, the Communist danger does exist, and its threat to the dependent territories cannot be ignored. Premature independence, even with non-Communist governments in control at the start will usually lead to mass dissatisfactions and dissillusionments which can be skillfully exploited by the Communists and which can lead within a relatively short period of time to a Communist seizure of power. The difficulties and frustrations of the nascent state do not lead to a reorientation of the popular mind to the West since local leaders find it politically profitable to focus the hatred of the people on the Westerner in order to cover up their own weakness and selfishness. Therefore, by fostering premature independence, we definitely play into Communist hands.

A final consideration which we should bear in mind when confronted with the “colonial question” is that the U.S., regardless of whatever policies it may adopt, can never hope to outbid the Soviet Union for the affections of the extremist elements in the dependent territories. Our internal political processes, as well as our foreign ties, require us to act responsibly. And the responsible can never outbid the unscrupulous. Communist leaders and agents have promised dependent peoples the world on a silver platter; we can not. We can not commit ourselves to provide a bed of roses for newly-independent nations, nor to pick up the check for the social and economic failures which so often occur in connection with early experiments in self-government. Therefore, even with the most sympathetic policies, the U.S. cannot hope to convince the extremist elements in the dependent territories that America is much more than “A little better” than the European colonial nations.

For these reasons, our best interests as well as common sense should lead us to pursue the same policy which we have sought to follow for many years; to assist loyally and frankly both parties in the colonial dialogue along the road of evolution towards the political autonomy of all peoples on a basis of true democracy and enlightened self-interest, of the people as a whole towards the disappearance of colonial bonds. Indeed we should assist as impartial well wishers towards the substitution therefor of freely negotiated and accepted economic and cultural—and sometimes even political—relationships, knitting together the free world into an ever stronger, larger and more prosperous community of equals instead of an anarchic conglomerate of weak, poor and dissatisfied political entities which could provide all too easy victims to Soviet Communism.

It is also desirable for us to seek ways and means of achieving a clearer understanding among the American people and their political leaders of the dilemmas which the U.S. confronts in dealing with the colonial question. It is particularly desirable that we foster a recognition of the fact that the issues are not simple and clear-cut, that the U.S. has conflicting interests, and that our policies must be tailored to fit particular situations. This will be a very difficult task, but it is a task which must be undertaken if the U.S. Government is to be assured of the public support which the successful execution of this long-term evolutionary policy requires.

1. Knight was assisted in the drafting of this memorandum by William T. Nunley of the Office of European Regional Affairs. Under cover of a memorandum of Apr. 28 the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) transmitted this memorandum for information and study to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen), the Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs (Hickerson), the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Byroade), the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze).
2. For documentation regarding the mutual security program, see volume ii .