700.022/4–3052

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)1

secret
  • Subject:
  • United States Policy towards Colonial Areas and Colonial Powers

Mr. Knight’s preliminary memorandum on United States policy towards colonial areas and colonial powers interests me very much. I think it is an excellent beginning. Since you suggest that you would be glad to have comments I am jotting down a few ideas that came to my mind as I read it.

I think there is a fundamental point which does not emerge clearly in the preliminary memorandum. The point is that the problem is complicated by the attitude of a large number of states, chiefly located in the Middle East and Asia but to a certain extent including also some Latin American states. These states are the vocal and active champions of the dependent peoples. Many of them have recently emerged from their dependent position to a position of full membership in the international society. Some of them no doubt champion the dependent peoples for reasons other than an idealistic concern with the welfare of these peoples. The fact remains, however, that the problem needs to be looked at in terms of our relations with the so-called colonial powers, our relations with dependent peoples, and our relations with the champions of dependent peoples. Viewed in the light of this additional party to the controversy it may well be that the importance of the attitude of the dependent peoples has more real significance even in terms of the hard substance of military effort than is indicated, for instance, in the bottom paragraph on page 2. The hostility or even the neutrality of any large part of this total group might be a very serious burden in case of war.

It is in part the existence of this group of champions or sponsoring states, particularly with reference to operations of the UN, which makes it difficult for us to control the timing of the attainment of independence by some of the dependent peoples. The UN decisions on [Page 1109] Libya and Somaliland are examples. Other cases may well arise of a similar character.

As I think Mr. Knight’s paper brings out, we have a job of selling our views to a number of different audiences. Mr. Knight brings out very well some of the points which have to be made clearer to American opinion. I think one could emphasize more strongly the necessity for bringing home to the colonial powers the fact that even though they are the ones faced with the immediate responsibilities in dependent areas, we have with them a common problem which we must meet together. It seems to me they are more ready than they were a few years ago to recognize that our interest is legitimate even though they still maintain “these are internal matters”. For instance, the UK is at last beginning to recognize the legitimacy of our interest in the problem of the Sudan and our last message to Paris on the Tunisian case contains a strong argumentation in support of our interest in this matter.

Obviously we must try to meet the point which Mr. Knight brings out at the bottom of page 3 in regard to the suspicions about American motives. I hope that our record on Indonesia bears out our early attempts to satisfy the Dutch that we were not trying to supplant them economically in the area. We would need to be on our guard constantly to avoid justifying the fears which some elements in the colonial countries now have.

I think we also are faced with a large problem in trying to sell our position to the states which I have described as the champions of the dependent peoples. I think we could in appropriate ways bring home to some of these governments the fact that their situation as they gain in power is somewhat akin to that of the colonial powers. India, for example, in regard to Nepal and Tibet has an attitude which does not square with its attacks upon us or upon the colonial powers. One could probably lift out of official statements of the government and officials of Pakistan statements about the Afghan proposal for Pushtoonistan which would not square with Bokhari’s statements in the Security Council on the Tunisian case. India’s attitude in regard to Hyderabad is another example in point. The Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan and towards Libya does not seem to be wholly free from an attitude which they would call “imperialistic” if it was held by the UK. I am not suggesting that we accuse them of being two-faced, but that we try to point out to some of them that basically their interests and ours are similar and that they are really not 100% in favor of a free hand for dependent peoples.

The discussion of the communist problem on page 4 raises some questions in my mind but I am not sure enough of the facts to quarrel with the conclusions.

  1. Jessup sent copies of this memorandum to Matthews, Bohlen, Hickerson, Byroade, Nitze, and Knight.