Office of the Historian

Hickerson–Murphy–Key files, lot 58 D 33, “Memoranda of conversations (General), 1954”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative at the united Nations (Wadsworth)

secret
[New York,] April 2, 1954.
  • Subject:
  • Geneva Conference; Communist Chinese Representation in the United Nations

In a conversation this noon at the UN Headquarters, Ambassador Von Balluseck stated his opinion that it would be extremely difficult to achieve anything at the Geneva Conference; that his Government was not at all anxious to participate, but felt that they should.

Pursuing the subject in a friendly and understanding manner, he thought it a pity that the United States position on Red Chinese UN membership had to be so inflexible. He explained this by giving his opinion that Red China, together with other Communist countries at the Conference, might well come forward with a proposition whereby they would guarantee to cease aggression or any kind of intervention in Korea and Indo China as a price for admittance to the United Nations. In such a situation, he believed, the United States would be put in a position of a flat refusal in the face of an apparently bona fide offer to take a dramatic stride toward peace in the Far East.

He said he realized the force and quality of American public opinion, and that it would take a “politically untouchable” person to start the ball rolling toward a conditioning of public and Congressional opinion toward what he considers was an inevitable acceptance of the Peiping regime as the de facto government of China.

I pointed out that the American people would hesitate to place great faith in guaranties offered by the Peiping Government, and that neither the American people nor the Congress could be expected to soften their position toward the Chinese Communists merely on the ground that they had offered such guaranties. He admitted the validity of the “deeds not words” argument, but held to his original position that it was a pity that the United States had taken such a rigid stand. He intimated that in the face of apparently bona fide assurances on the part of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets, it would be extremely difficult for public opinion in Europe to understand our position.