Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

310.2/3–2554

Memorandum by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State

secret

[New York,] March 30, 1954.

1. It is of the highest importance to reach another agreement with the British for postponing the question of Chinese Representation to the United Nations and I hope that such an agreement will be reached.

2. In view of the Geneva Conference,¹ however, and the recent remarks of Jebb, Hammarskjold, Prime Minister St. Laurent, and Pearson, new elements have been brought into this situation which raise a new doubt as to whether an agreement for postponement can be reached.

3. We must, therefore, be ready for an attempt to raise the main question at the next General Assembly and we must be able to debate the issue on its substantive points and meet it head on.

4. United States opposition to seating the Chinese communists is a matter of the utmost necessity. Admission of Red China would be a blow of major proportions to public confidence in our U.S. Administration. Apart from the fact that U.S. public opinion and the U.S. Congress is overwhelmingly opposed to it, there are two other reasons, relating particularly to the United Nations, which must be controlling:

A. To seat the Chinese communists would be to give formal sanction to a basic change in the nature of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter was based on the moral concept of an organization of peace-loving nations. This, of course, would be completely flouted by deliberately admitting a government which, at the time of admission, flagrantly advocates the use of war and aggression as an instrument of its national policy. The fact that the Soviet Union also believes in using aggression as an instrument of its national policy and that the Soviet Union is a member, is, of course, no argument whatever for seating the Chinese communists. For one thing, two wrongs don’t make a right and for another, the United States would never have favored having the Soviet Union a member in 1945 if the truth about the Soviet Union had been known at that time. To change the United Nations from an organization devoted to maintaining peace into a “continuing diplomatic conference”, to use Hammarskjold’s phrase, or into a group of opportunistic political adventurers, is a change of such magnitude that it should only be accomplished by a revision of the Charter and it is not hard to imagine how such an attempt to revise the Charter would fare when it came up for ratification by a ⅔’s vote of the United States’ Senate.

B. The United Nations at present is a marvelous vehicle for organizing the free world coalition in case World War III should ever come. It is only prudent to assume that World War III is a distinct likelihood, provided that our assumptions do not cause us to do things which will accelerate the likelihood of World War III. As regards the admission of the Chinese communists, there is no doubt whatever that their admission would seriously weaken the great potential of persuasion and voluntary action which exists in the United Nations and which would play a tremendous part in getting all kinds of support—moral, material and in manpower—in case World War III should come. If we have reached the stage in world affairs where it is either we or they—and prudent statesmanship must assume that this is the case—it would be folly to weaken and vitiate this great potential organ for organizing the free world in case of war.

5. The following steps should be undertaken in anticipation of an attempt to bring the matter up at the Ninth General Assembly:

A. There should be a series of carefully planned dinners, receptions and other entertainments now so as to establish friendly feelings and good personal relationships at a time when it does not appear that we want anything out of anybody. I have started such a program.

B. If the matter is brought up in Plenary Session, I would seek to have it referred to a committee, either the ad hoc Political Committee, Committee 1 or any other appropriate group.

C. In this committee, I would plan to deliver several full-length speeches, spaced several days apart so as to take fullest advantage of the opportunity to answer pro-Red arguments and with an eye to adequate press coverage. Subjects for these speeches might be generally grouped as follows:

(a) Direct aggression in Korea—verdict of GA

(b) Indirect aggression in Indochina—participation on Red Side at Geneva

(c) Maltreatment of foreign nations—following communist practices

(d) Enslavement of Chinese people—following communist practice

(e) Expansionism—Tibet, Mongolia, North Korea

(f) Subservience to Moscow, alien rule, etc.

(g) Violation of international agreements—Korean Armistice, Geneva Conventions re POWs

(h) The greatness of Chinese culture and the excellence of U.S.-Chinese relations in the past

(i) Conclusion on essential nature of United Nations—an organization with a moral purpose or a mere continuing diplomatic conference?

D. In addition to the campaign of speeches and of close political liaison with our allies, in order to get out the largest possible anti-communist vote, I would also insist that the subject come under the heading of “Important Question” for the purpose of requiring a ⅔ vote in the Assembly in the event we should lose in committee.

6. The above plan is originally designed for Ninth GA use, if necessary. On the other hand, should we find ourselves in a major campaign on the subject in the Economic and Social Council this summer, or in any of the other Councils, Commissions or Committees of the UN that may meet between now and next September, a selection of this material can be used by me or the regular United States Representative on such body. Above all, we must keep and be kept current with our Western European allies, the Commonwealth and all others who have heretofore indicated support for denying Red Chinese membership.

7. We would probably win with this program, but we would certainly retain the confidence of U.S. public opinion in ourselves if we lost. We must square our jaw and make a last ditch fight.

8. Recommended action:

(a) An agreement with the British to postpone the question should be obtained.

(b) The question of admitting Red China to the United Nations should not even be discussed in Geneva. We should try to get the British and the French lined up ahead of time to fight off any attempt to bring it up in Geneva. It is not a matter concerning which we can even talk at all.

(c) The possibility of changing policy on trade between the East and the West should be very carefully studied to see whether the view of the previous administration did not fail to take into account certain advantages which we can derive from East-West trade.² If we determine that a new type of East-West trade could be advantageous to us, it would be good tactics for us to propose it ourselves so as to show the neutralists in this world that we are not rigid.

(d) If we make concessions to the British viewpoint on East-West trade, we should receive, as a minimum, assurances of support on the issue of Chinese representation.

(e) If the Chinese communists abandon their aggressive tactics in Korea and Indochina, there will be a demand here in the United Nations to alter the United Nations embargo. Consideration should be given to the United States sponsoring a resolution to revise the United Nations embargo so that we could control the procedure ourselves and, as a quid pro quo, obtain support of our position on Chinese representation. Our own embargo is, of course, a different matter.

1. For documentation on the Geneva Conference, see volume xiii .
2. For documentation on East-West trade, see volume i.