830/4–254
Memorandum by the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon), to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
- Subject:
- Chinese Representation Question in the Security Council under Soviet Chairmanship.
The USSR (Vishinsky) has the chairmanship of the Security Council for the month of April and it is accordingly possible that the USSR may raise the Chinese representation issue at the Security Council meeting next Monday. There should be a safe voting margin to overcome any such Soviet tactics provided there is advance agreement on our side on the counter-measures to be used. UNP has discussed the various possibilities with USUN and has emphasized that consultations should be held today with key delegations, particularly with the British, to ensure an agreed position and to make possible representations here or in London in case of any divergency.
Background information on possible Soviet tactics follows:
In August 1950, during the Korean crisis, the USSR returned to the Security Council to assume the chairmanship. At that time the USSR circulated in advance of the Security Council meeting a provisional agenda which included Chinese representation as a separate item. When the Security Council meeting convened under Malik’s chairmanship, he ruled that the Chinese representative was not entitled to sit. His ruling was successfully challenged.
Subsequently, the Security Council decided against including the Soviet proposed item on Chinese representation on the agenda. On the latter vote the United Kingdom abstained. This vote preceded agreement on the moratorium arrangement.
Possible Soviet tactics include the following:
- (1)
- Ruling by the Chair that Tsiang is not entitled to his seat: This should be voted down and we should be able to count on wide support because of the clearly arbitrary nature of such a ruling.
- (2)
- Proposal of an agenda item: This proposal also should be voted down. The United Kingdom might suggest that in accordance with the moratorium agreement an effort should be made to postpone discussion of the item rather than vote it down. Inasmuch as, however, the Security Council has no formal session but meets throughout the year upon call the moratorium formula would not be applicable and we would hope that the United Kingdom would agree with us in a straight negative vote.
- (3)
- A formal statement for the record of the Soviet position with regard to Tsiang’s status: This would be met by a formal statement by Ambassador Lodge and, we would hope, by others.
- (4)
- Refusal by the Chair to recognize Tsiang in his official capacity (Vishinsky will probably call on Tsiang by name and not as the representative of the Republic of China.): Tactics on this may be left to [Page 725] Ambassador Lodge. Our experience in challenging a similar form of address by a Committee Chairman at the last GA led to an involved and bitter wrangle which did not enhance the status of the Chinese representative. If Vishinsky overplays this tactic, however, it may become desirable to meet it in some way.
- (5)
- A statement by the Chair after a vote has been taken that the Chinese vote cannot be counted because it is illegal: There have been some indications that the Soviet Union may be returning to its position, often expressed before, that proceedings of the Security Council are illegal if participated in by the Chinese representative. Tactics in meeting this situation will have to be left to Ambassador Lodge because it is difficult to predict beforehand the precise turn which Vishinsky may adopt.
A further tactical point involves the desirability of our relying on other members of the Council to take the initiative in some of these tactics.