CA files, lot 58 D 395, “Chinese
Representation at UN, 1953”
Memorandum by the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs (Bacon)1
secret
[Washington,] June 12, 1953.
- Subject:
- Draft Paper on Chinese Representation for the Bermuda
Conference
Attached is a revised edition of the draft paper on Chinese representation
for the Bermuda conference. You saw the first version of this paper and
approved its general substance.
UNP informs me that the Secretary personally
added the following two sentences:
In numbered paragraph 4, relating to the need for retaining the
present policy on Chinese representation pending a future
reassessment in the light of the behavior of the Chinese Communists,
the Secretary added “In Churchill’s own words in connection with the
admission of Germany into the League of Nations after World War I,
‘they must work their passage back’”.
In numbered paragraph 6, relating to the U.S. suggestion that the
U.S., U.K. and France agree to
continue a policy of postponement, the Secretary added “It may be
desirable to continue to postpone the question, at least until the
Charter Review Conference in 1955.”
[Page 673]
Note: The Secretary’s reference to the Charter Review
Conference is of special interest. It may be that the Secretary suggested it
merely as a possible cut-off date sufficiently far in the future for present
purposes. Beyond that the full implications of a possible connection between
Charter revision and the Chinese representation question are not entirely
clear. The U.K. and France might assume that
a revision of the Charter was contemplated under which the provision for
China as a permanent member on the Security Council would be deleted. On the
other hand, it may be that the Secretary has in mind that a provision might
be added to the Charter laying down rules for handling cases of rival
claimants for seats in the UN.
[Attachment]
Draft Position Paper Prepared by the United Nations
Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Bacon)
secret
[Washington,] June 10, 1953.
Chinese Representation in the United
Nations
the problem
To obtain UK–French agreement to continue
in all United Nations bodies to support procedural action designed to
ensure the continued seating of the representatives of the Chinese
National Government and the exclusion of Chinese Communists.
positions of uk and
france
Under a “moratorium arrangement” agreed upon by the UK and US in May 1951, US and UK representatives in all UN bodies have jointly supported action
designed to dispose of the Chinese representation issue on a procedural
basis and to avoid a vote on the substance. This action usually takes
the form of motions to postpone consideration of the Chinese
representation issue. The UK bases its
support of these motions on the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea.
The UK contemplates early abandonment of
postponement and active support for the seating of Chinese Communists
soon after the armistice is signed.
France, which has not recognized the Chinese Communists, has generally
voted with the United States against the seating of Chinese Communists.
However, the French attitude on this does not appear to be firm and
France might be strongly tempted to recognize the Chinese Communist
regime and to support the seating of its representatives in the UN if there were a prospect of successful
negotiations on Indochina.
[Page 674]
united states position to be presented to other
governments
- 1.
- We consider it imperative that the Chinese Communists should not
be seated in any UN body and that
representatives of the Chinese National Government continue to be
seated, so long as the Chinese Communist regime is constituted on
its present basis, under its present leaders, and so obviously
serving the ends of the Soviet Union.
- 2.
- Agreement by the Chinese Communists to a military armistice in
Korea does not constitute adequate evidence that Communist China has
abandoned the use of armed force to seek its objectives and those of
the USSR. There is nothing to
indicate that it represents more than a tactical shift designed to
create an atmosphere in which resistance to communist and Soviet
imperialism will be weakened; it signifies merely that the
Communists have found it unprofitable to continue the war in Korea,
and the danger of renewed agression by them particularly in
Southeast Asia, remains.
- 3.
- In the absence of further evidence that the Peiping regime has
changed its standards of international conduct, international
political acceptance of the Chinese Communist regime, including the
seating of its representatives in the UN, would have serious consequences. It would greatly
enhance Chinese Communist prestige and weaken the resistance to
communism of Asian peoples who are still free. It would appear as a
reward for halting the criminal act of aggression; by minimizing the
penalty it would encourage the Chinese Communists to embark upon or
to lend greater aid to further aggressive ventures.
- 4.
- It is imperative therefore that the current policy on Chinese
representation must be fully retained pending a future reassessment
by the three governments in the light of the behavior of the Chinese
Communists. In Churchill’s own words in connection with the
admission of Germany into the League of Nations after World War I,
“They must work their passage back”.
- 5.
- A new public divergence of policy between the US, the UK and France would have most
unfortunate consequences for our combined efforts to build our
defenses against communism throughout the world. Our Congress would
be severely shaken if the US, with British and French concurrence,
were to seat the Chinese Communists.
- 6.
- Because of the basic difference of view between the UK and the US on the Chinese
representation issue, agreement should be reached, in principle,
that the three governments will continue, in all UN bodies, jointly to support some
procedural action by which votes on the substance can be avoided.
The United States suggests that the three governments agree to
continue a policy of postponement, leaving the delegates of the
three governments to work out the necessary steps to achieve this
result. It may be desirable to continue to postpone question, at
least until Charter Review Conference in 1955.
[Page 675]
discussion
An understanding with the UK and France on
the Chinese representation issue is essential if we are to continue to
keep Chinese Nationalists seated in and Chinese Communists out of the
many UN bodies, particularly those
smaller bodies which are so composed that a large number of their
members recognize the Chinese Communist regime. The other UN countries of Western Europe (all of which
recognize the Chinese Communists, except Luxembourg, Belgium and
Iceland) and the Commonwealth countries will be strongly influenced by
the attitude of the UK and France.
