310.2/6–453
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State
- Subject:
- Your Meeting With Ambassador Lodge This Afternoon.
Ambassador Lodge is coming in to see you and will discuss, inter alia, three problems which he refers to in his telegram No. 757, June 3, (Tab A)—Chinese Representation, Korea and Disarmament.
The following comments on each of the foregoing subjects might be useful in your conversation with him.
1. Chinese Representation
This question will pose great difficulties if a Korean armistice is concluded. As Ambassador Lodge points out, it is essential to take every feasible step at the earliest practicable time to secure such support from other governments as will be necessary to maintain our position in the post-armistice period. As Ambassador Lodge says, the first [Page 659] step in such an effort is to seek United Kingdom and French agreement to continue to support postponement of consideration of the Chinese representation question in all United Nations bodies. It would, in our view, be desirable for the President to seek such an agreement in principle at the Bermuda Conference.
It would probably be desirable to postpone pressing this issue with other delegations until this effort to secure an agreed tripartite formula is completed. The United Kingdom and French attitude will, of course, have great influence on the Commonwealth states and the countries of Western Europe. We do not, in any case, anticipate an important shift in the attitudes of the Latin Americans, in the near future.
India, Burma and Indonesia are a separate and much more difficult problem. It is highly doubtful that anything can be done to get them to recede from the position which they have consistently maintained even in the face of the Korean aggression.
The Arab states present a still different problem. They may well determine their position on this issue in the light of our attitude on issues of special concern to them like Palestine and North Africa. It will therefore be necessary to consider most carefully what the most profitable approach to them might be and the timing of such an approach.
Although Dr. Tsiang should be consulted at the appropriate time, it would prejudice our efforts with a number of delegations if he were to play a prominent role. At some point, he can be helpful in speaking to some delegations, particularly those from Latin America.
[Here follow Hickerson’s views and recommendations regarding the other two items, his comments on Korea being limited simply to the observation: “You may wish to brief Ambassador Lodge on the developments at Panmunjom last night. This would appear to make it unnecessary to comment on Ambassador Lodge’s points at least for the time being.” (310.2/6–453)]