310.2/6–353: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State
priority
757. Personal for the Secretary. Among other topics there are three questions I would like to discuss with you when we meet on Thursday [June 4].
[Page 658]1. Chinese representation. As follow-up to statesmanlike action by President with Congressional leaders yesterday, is there anything I can do to assist in execution of our policy? Policy was made clear by President’s action but I feel there is no time to lose in consolidating our position and making sure that if and when this question arises again in UN we will get substantial majority of votes supporting our position.
First step would be to get assurances from British and French that they will support us in our desire not to seat the Chinese Reds or at the very least would maintain a completely passive attitude, and I suggest this be kept in mind in connection with other subjects currently being negotiated with Britain and France. We must also be as sure as we can that we have lined up Indians, Canadians, other Commonwealth members, LA’s and Arab-Asians. Would it be good idea for me to discuss matter with Tsiang, Chinese representative here, who is very astute and whose government has vital stake in matter?
[Here follows Lodge’s exposition of items 2 and 3. In item 2 Lodge dealt with “UN” action if armistice talks fail.” In the event of failure of the talks, Lodge anticipated that the United Nations would be subjected to strong foreign pressures “involving further concessions to Communists” and equally strong domestic American counterpressures “to adopt extreme measures against Communists.” Lodge thought that it was “very important” for the U.S. Government to be prepared “to deal very promptly and effectively with this situation if and when it occurs because if we are unsuccessful the result could involve the destruction of the UN.…” (310.2/6–353)]