A/MS files, lot 54 D 291 (V), “UNA/P master file”
Paper Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs
I–1
The General Assembly and the Security Council
character of issue
The most noteworthy structural development of the UN to date has been the growth of the General Assembly into the predominant organ [Page 91] in the political and security field, following the paralysis of the Security Council by great power disunity. The GA, which is designed to reflect and crystallize world public opinion, works through recommendations on which small nations vote their views on a par with great powers. The US, as the leading nation of the “free world”, is experiencing certain stresses and strains in endeavoring to reconcile the dynamics of sometimes reckless UN majority operations with the vital requirements of free world unity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
background
As the UN was considered originally, the Security Council was supposed to have primary responsibility for action on behalf of international security. Its effectiveness in this respect was clearly seen to depend on continued unity and cooperation among the great powers. By contrast, the Assembly was designed as a forum of discussion serving primarily for the reflection and formation of world opinion, although the Charter conferred upon it certain functions with respect to international peace that were susceptible of development in case of SC impotence. Voting arrangements represented these two different roles. In the SC, the crucial part of the great powers was reflected in their permanent membership as well as in the requirement of their unanimous concurrence for substantive decisions. In the Assembly, all nations, great or small, could be treated alike, and the majority of votes could prevail, as the GA was to pronounce views and make recommendations rather than decide upon substantive action.
The steadily deepening rift between the great powers since 1946 and the obstruction of the Soviet Union have rendered the SC incapable of assuming the active responsibility based on great power unanimity for which it was designed.
Accordingly, there has been a steady shift of the most important political and security work of the UN to the GA; since 1948 only four new cases have been considered by the SC, while during the same period at least a dozen have been brought into the GA. A number of forces have combined in bringing this about: First, there is the desire of the leading Western powers to overcome the UN stalemate caused by the paralysis of the SC; apart from this, smaller nations have always sought to strengthen the plenary organ as the instrument best suited to the pursuit of their particular interests, a factor which might have caused the GA to expand its functions even if there had been no cold war; thirdly, in view of the Cold War, there arose the need for the UN to rally non-Communist nations for determined resistance to Communist aggression, propaganda, maneuvers, and pressures. Whether or not these forces should be considered the sole causes, the fact remains that the functions and prestige of the GA have increased; [Page 92] while the SC remains available for use in limited circumstances.* Some of the principal milestones of this development are listed in Annex A.
united states policy
In general, the US has considered the GA a potentially very strong organ, on Senator Vandenberg’s famous analogy of the town meeting of the world. This reflects the traditional US concept of the role of public opinion, and confidence in the unifying, mediating, and restraining influence of world opinion expressed in discussions and recommendations that develop Charter principles and purposes. However, in this field of strong idealistic aspirations, it is important to distinguish between the pronouncements of principles and the decisions and practices of day-to-day policies. Keeping in mind that actions do not always live up to stated ideals, one can characterize US attitudes toward the GA in terms of the following positions:
- 1.
- As a matter of general policy, we have on the whole tended
to look upon the UN as a
“democratic” organization where world opinion is reflected
in, and shaped by, the votes of the majority, and we have
inclined to demand respect for, and deference to, the
majority will.
(This has been our position above all with respect to the veto. We have decried the use of great power veto as an instrument to thwart the will of the majority, although we have never been prepared to relinquish entirely the veto as an instrument of legitimate self-protection against decisions requiring the use of force in which we could not concur.)
- 2.
- As a corollary of the above, we have as a matter of
general policy postulated that UN Members must not lightly disregard or flout
recommendations by the GA,
that the GA could discuss
anything within the scope of the Charter, that there would
be an expanding area of operations for the GA, and that GA recommendations could greatly
extend and develop the rule of law among nations.
(We have definitely taken pride in our record of compliance with GA resolutions, and we have intimated, particularly in our criticism of Soviet behavior, that recommendations passed by an overwhelming majority of UN Members are endowed with moral authority which to disregard is decidedly wrong. In the cases of Korea and Palestine, we have even attributed something like a constitutive force to GA recommendations.)
- 3.
- In accordance with our traditional respect for public
opinion, we have been interested in being, on the whole,
with the majority in the UN
(although we have not hesitated to maintain an “unpopular”
position when our interests and principles so demanded); and
we have particularly desired to be surrounded by sizeable
majorities in cold war matters.
[Page 93]
(This objective has been an important consideration, even in matters on which we might at the outset disagree with the prospective majority position. We have mostly attempted to meet this problem tactically, either by so diluting extremist resolutions that we could finally vote with the majority, or by methods of rallying the support of as many delegates as possible for our position—sometimes unkindly referred to as “arm-twisting”—or by a combination of both of these methods. As a result, we have often been accused of throwing our weight around too much in the UN.)
- 4.
- We have regarded UN
majority votes as an important means of pressure as well as
public justification of our case, and we have therefore
brought important business (particularly cold war business)
before the vetoless GA where
large majorities can materialize.
(We transferred the Greek question and aggression in Korea from the SC to the GA, we brought the question of Chinese aggression before the GA rather than the SC, and we introduced into the GA such items as the conditions of free elections in Germany, and the Austrian Peace Treaty.)
- 5.
- On the other hand, we have made it clear that we do not want to abandon the SC altogether and are willing to use it fully, when it is capable of operating. Nor have we entirely discounted the function of the SC as a symbol of common interest to the great powers and as a possible background for future negotiations. On occasion, we have also looked upon the SC as a forum of propaganda, sometimes even in preference to the GA (when unfriendly voting blocs in the latter might embarrass us or our friends, as we anticipated, e.g., in the case of Laos). Finally, we have considered the SC valuable for the mediatory function it has discharged in non-Cold-War issues (e.g., Kashmir and Palestine).
attitudes of other states
The Soviet Union regards the SC as the vital center of the UN both because of the Kremlin’s emphasis on the directing role of the great powers and because of its apparent conviction that the one really significant function of international organization lies in the realm of great power relations. In the bi-polar world, the Soviet Union has made the best of the existence of the Assembly (in which it acquiesced at Dumbarton Oaks) and vigorously used the GA as a forum in which it could launch bitter attacks on the US, at the same time testing periodically the cohesion of the free world.
The UK is inclined to take a narrow view of the role of the GA and its recommendations and to look upon the SC as a matter of vital interests to great powers. Particularly in certain colonial questions, the UK, together with France, Belgium, and some Commonwealth nations, have tended to reject the concept of any even moral authority residing in GA majority decisions.† These countries have not objected to being outvoted, and they have at times even rejected majority decisions as not obligating them to any kind of cooperation.
[Page 94]The Arab-Asian and many Latin American states, as well as many other small nations, consider the GA as an instrument of change, an institution which lends them strong voice and voting power without demanding from them a commensurate responsibility for action. The GA is, for weak countries, a source of prestige and a device through which, organized in regional blocs, they can bring pressure to bear on the great powers. It enables them to press for quid pro quos in the pursuit of the extended reform programs in which they are interested. Accordingly they favor an increasingly wide scope of GA activity and authority.
implications for the united nations
It is difficult to estimate the power of precedents in the UN to shape the course of subsequent events. One cannot predict that because the GA has on certain occasions assumed certain functions or powers its members will agree that it continue to do so in the future. Yet, one cannot deny that a pattern of action observed in the past will exercise a certain channeling and motivating influence on delegations and their governments, although it is impossible to say just how much. With this in mind, one can characterize the past developments in the UN structure in the following way:
1. The GA, meant to be primarily an organ of discussion with a view to the formation of world opinion, has in a number of important cases been cast in the role of an organ of action (even though only through recommendations) and has been given a predominant responsibility in the political disputes and security field which, apart from the power to make binding decisions, resembles that originally assigned to the SC.
Items have been submitted to the GA which in the absence of the Cold War might have gone to the SC. There has been increasing use of the GA on a continuing basis between regular sessions. The GA has shown a tendency to perform as a quasi-legislative body. It has also used various devices to take on responsibilities (short of binding decisions) akin to those of the SC under Chapter VII. In particular, the Uniting for Peace Resolution establishes a voluntary basis for possible collective action with specially earmarked military contingents. Resolutions of the GA have been clothed with a moral authority that in some degree approaches and simulates in political—though not in legal—effect the force of SC decisions under Article 25.
2. The GA has been used as an instrument to shape, if not direct, important political change, particularly in the setting up of independent nations where there were none before, in recommending boundaries and forms of government.
The leading Western powers have in fact so employed the GA in the case of Palestine, Korea, and under special circumstances the Italian colonies. Now the Arab-Asian countries are endeavoring to make similar use of the Assembly for forcing the pace of liquidation of colonial rule and bringing about the independence of countries like Tunisia and Morocco.
[Page 95]3. The GA has been treated as a suitable (although not the only) body for the over-all political and military organization of the non-Soviet world against the Soviet threat.
The preparation of a broad framework for collective measures and collective military strength on a world-wide basis have,“for the time being”, been placed under GA auspices. Furthermore, the determination of the non-Soviet world to stand together against the Soviet threat has become associated to a large extent with GA votes on Cold War items, so that a certain relationship has presumably emerged between such votes and the expectation of future solidarity in the face of actual Soviet aggression. Finally, Soviet opposition to the GA majority has often been branded as an indication of the aggressive nature of Soviet intentions.
major difficulties facing the united states
The UN in general, and the GA in particular, are only a part of the general setting in which the US exercises the responsibilities of a great power and leader in the “free world”. Provided that the pattern of GA developments analyzed above has some influence on the future course of events, the US would have to face and meet there the following difficulties:
1. In the GA the US occupies the position, not of a legally privileged great power, but of one among many all of whom have one vote, regardless of their relative power and responsibility in the world.
If the US, in the parliamentary setting of the GA, wants to exercise influence commensurate with its position and responsibilities, it must continuously rally other nations’ votes by appropriate methods. In general, our great power influence and role as the free world leader enables us to do this. Our voting strength in the GA therefore depends considerably on US policies outside of the UN, as well as on the moral appeal of our positions to the greatest possible number of delegations. Beyond this, however, our leadership in the GA requires highly effective liaison methods of persuading and occasionally pressuring delegations, frequently on vote after vote. Hence the US often finds it necessary to pose the “question of confidence”, as it were, on matters of relatively minor importance and to put its power more in evidence than might be desirable.
2. The GA being a body that has been used both for organizing the non-Soviet world and to work political change, there is some danger of seeing the anti-Soviet majority in the GA weakened or reduced by the dissatisfaction of those pressing for rapid change in the colonial system, or alternatively by the fears of those who find their national interests vitally threatened by the “revolutionizing” tendencies in the GA.
3. Since the GA has been used as a body for quasi-legislative action (e.g., on control of colonial powers) by majority vote (as well as a forum for the reflection and formation of world opinion), we find ourselves in an ambiguous position between groups of friends who hold often mutually exclusive ideas about what the GA should or could do. and we may have to make choices on issues which we would rather not see crystallized.
[Page 96]- A similar trend has been noticed in the relations between the GA and ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council, respectively. The development of expanding GA functions and prestige vis-à-vis these organs may in turn have been helped by the growth of GA authority at the expense of the SC. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- See note on page I–2. [Footnote in the source text.]↩