Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

A/MS files, lot 54 D 291 (V), “UNA/P master file”

Paper Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs

confidential
II–1

[Washington, undated.]

The Colonial Question in the United Nations

character of the colonial question

The colonial question has existed in one form or another ever since the Renaissance of Western Europe, and thus antedates by centuries the creation of the United Nations. Furthermore, it continues as a problem with ramifications far more extensive than those raised in the United Nations. In a period when the spirit of nationalism is spreading, the Charter of the United Nations has, however, provided a forum for giving expression to deeply held views on the colonial question. Thus, in the United Nations, broad aspects of the colonial question have become major issues, second only perhaps to the major security questions dividing the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds.

The simple fact that 200 million people^* still remain in varying conditions of colonial dependence does not in itself explain the colonial question. Its roots are historical and psychological as well as political, economic, and strategic in character, to wit:

a. For most of the non-European countries the experience of direct or indirect domination by Europeans is part of their national heritage. (For instance: Nehru, who spent thirteen years in a British prison, cannot forget that India was a British colony, and therefore inclines to concentrate, in his speeches and policies, on the “evils” of colonialism, about which he has expressed himself more strongly than about communism.) These countries are disposed to act in accordance with a general “anti-colonial” ideology that rejects the premises of even a “liberal” colonial system and, in many instances, to use the colonial question as a lever in their effort to achieve power and influence in international relations.

b. The growth of an intense nationalism in countries of non-European civilization gives heightened significance to the colonial problem today. Since World War II national movements have led to independence for a dozen new nations containing some 600 million people, including such new states as India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. For most of these newer states, psychological considerations have frequently overshadowed economic or strategic factors in international consideration of colonial problems.

c. It has become increasingly evident that the colonial question is tightly bound up with attitudes relating to race. The right of one people to keep another (particularly one of different color) in an inferior status, is sharply challenged. Thus, non-European nations seize on colonial issues to voice their resentment against the dominant position in world political, economic and cultural activities of the states and peoples of European background.

The Charter sets forth certain responsibilities for Members which administer non-self-governing territories. The states which have voluntarily recognized and accepted such responsibilities are all European or of mainly European origin.^† They number only eight out of the total membership of sixty. The six other members of Western European origin^‡ give varying degrees of support to the administering states. However, the vast majority of Member states tend to assume the role of assessing or judging how the minority of colonial powers discharge these responsibilities, while they themselves do not acknowledge any similar accountability. Thus attitudes on colonial questions in the United Nations tend to polarize around the divergent attitudes and interests of two groups—those of the “administering” or colonial powers and those of a number of “non-administering” states that may generally be characterized as having an anti-colonial viewpoint.

The administering and the anti-colonial states, while differing on basic assumptions, diverge most sharply on questions of timing and method: they disagree as to (a) the rate at which advancement toward self-government or independence in colonial areas should be sought, and (b) the role which the United Nations should play in the process.

While there is considerable diversity of view within each group, the basic assumptions of each group, and particularly of its more extreme members, may be summarized as follows:

Administering Members	Anti-Colonial Members
(1) The administering members start from the premise that the continuation of the dependency relationship is useful and necessary for varying periods of time.	(1) The anti-colonial Members believe that colonialism in any form is bad and should be eliminated, if not immediately, at least in a very short time.
(2) The more conservative administering Members regard the present activities of the UN as at best an unnecessary interference and at worst a positive danger to internal order and stability in their territories.	(2) The anti-colonial Members believe that the role of the UN in relation to dependent areas should be extended.
(3) The administering Members, while not excluding independence where conditions are suitable, see various alternatives to independence as a goal for their territories. They look with more favor on their territories achieving self-governing status within a larger association, union, or commonwealth.	(3) The anti-colonial Members generally favor independence as the goal for colonial territories.
(4) The administering Members maintain that the fixing of a date for the attainment of full self-government or independence cannot generally be determined far in advance.	(4) The anti-colonial Members contend that for most, if not all, dependent territories, a fixed term of years for the achievement of independence or self-government should be set by the administering authority.
(5) The administering Members hold that they alone are responsible for determining the constitutional position and status of territories under their sovereignty, including changes which would remove them from the scope of Chapter XI of the Charter.	(5) The anti-colonial Members believe that in fact, the colonial territories do not really belong to the colonial powers, and therefore that any decision by an administering Member to remove a territory from the scope of Chapter XI as a result of a change in its constitutional position and status is subject to review by, and possibly even the approval of, the General Assembly.
6) With respect to the eleven trust territories as distinct from the other non-self-governing territories, the administering members, while not claiming sovereignty for themselves, reject the view that such sovereignty resides in the UN, and the consequential view that the UN therefore can exercise a directive authority over the administering state.	(6) The anti-colonial Members tend, on the other hand, to assert the sovereign or quasi-sovereign authority of the UN over the trust territories and the exercise of far-reaching supervisory powers.

The special objectives and policies of the Soviet Union, on colonial questions in the UN introduces a further complicating element. Soviet strategy assigns decisive importance to the colonial field as an area of Communist expansion. The Soviet inveighing against the so-called “imperialist powers” for “economic exploitation” and “anti-democratic practices” in colonial areas, is obviously designed to divide the noncommunist world and to stimulate the neutralist tendencies of the Arab-Asian world. The Soviets also seek to weaken the strategic position of the West by creating division among the NATO powers, among whom are coincidentally the leading colonial powers, and also by bringing confusion and unrest to the colonial areas controlled by the West.

background of the colonial question in the united nations

As early as San Francisco, the clash of interests on colonial questions was revealed. Sharply divergent views were expressed on issues such as (1) whether “independence” or “self-government” should be the political objective, (2) the composition, status, and powers of the Trusteeship Council, and (3) the obligations, if any, to be assumed by administering powers with regard to non-self-governing territories, particularly in the political field.

In its first year of operation the UN established the “Chapter XI system” in relation to some 60 colonial territories and also inaugurated the trusteeship system, now embracing 11 territories with nearly 20 million inhabitants. The Trusteeship Council held its first session early in 1947 and has carried out on a continuing basis its supervisory work in relation to trust territories—the consideration of the reports of the administering authorities, the examination of petitions, and the sending of visiting missions periodically to the territories. At the instigation of the non-administering states and against the opposition of the administering group, the General Assembly went beyond the provisions of Chapter XI and established a special committee, first on a yearly basis and then for three-year periods, to examine the information transmitted under Article 73(e) on non-self-governing territories. The work of the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories has received an annual review in the Fourth Committee of the GA, and the emphasis in the work of these UN bodies has shifted gradually from procedural questions to substantive matters.^§ The cumulative effect of the resolutions adopted on these matters has seriously disturbed the principal colonial powers—The United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. They have now reached the point where they may refuse, in certain circumstances, to continue their cooperation in given United Nations activities in the colonial field.

In addition to the work of the Fourth Committee of the GA, in which the colonial question has been dealt with continuously in its broadest terms, the UN has also considered a number of other significant colonial questions during its first seven years: The problem of the Netherlands East Indies, the disposition of the former Italian colonies, the question of the mandated territory of South West Africa, and the questions of Tunisia and Morocco. In addition, the question of the right of peoples to self-determination, while it emerged in the Commission on Human Rights, has been largely treated as a colonial question.

united states attitudes and interests vis–à–vis colonial problems

United States interests in colonial problems may be summarized as follows:

By history and disposition, the American people have maintained an attitude of sympathetic understanding and encouragement toward dependent peoples striving for political freedom. Accordingly, in most colonial issues, there is a strong psychological alignment of the American people with the peoples of the colonial area and against their European rulers. A related element is the traditional humanitarian interest of the American people, developed through the activities of missionaries and private institutions and foundations in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, in the development and welfare of the inhabitants of dependent areas.

On the other hand, the US has certain specific interests because of its role as an administering power of certain dependent territories, like Puerto Rico, Guam, and Samoa, and, including the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered under the International Trusteeship System. While the US is not uniformly regarded as a “colonial power”, our territorial responsibilities clearly oblige us to defend our interests in this regard.

With regard to the colonial areas themselves, the US has in many cases clear economic and strategic interests. The uranium resources of a territory such as the Belgian Congo and the air bases available to us in North Africa are illustrative of these interests. Beyond this the US must also take into account the value of the friendship, on general grounds, of the peoples of colonial areas as they achieve self-government or independence. Our interest requires that they be oriented toward the West rather than toward the Soviet world.

A centrally important element is the fact that the European colonial powers are our principal NATO allies, and our common security interests may be jeopardized by actions which would result in political crises in the metropoles and turmoil in their colonial areas.

We must also take into account the strongly expressed concern of the anti-colonial nations, embracing the great population masses of India and South East Asia, in colonial questions.

Finally, there is the necessity of combatting Soviet efforts to lay successful claim to the title of “champion of dependent peoples”.

united states policies and objectives re colonial questions in the united nations

In the light of these varying interests, the US has pursued the following general objectives in relation to colonial questions arising in the UN:

1. To favor the progressive development of all dependent peoples toward the goal of self-government, and, where conditions are suitable, toward independence.

2. To favor the growth of responsible democratic movements and institutions among indigenous people in colonial areas (to encourage metropolitan powers to foster such movements, or, in some cases, to give direct US encouragement and support to such movements after consultation with the metropolitan power concerned).

3. To assist in the development of changing relationships between colonial peoples and metropolitan countries toward a suitable form of association in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.

4. To encourage a pace of metropolitan response to popular pressures rapid enough to prevent extremists from seizing control of national movements (yet recognizing the greatly varying conditions that govern the pace of a well-rounded orderly evolution of dependent peoples).

5. To have UN activities in colonial matters develop progressively in such a manner that the cooperation of administering powers is retained.

6. To seek the mutual understanding and cooperation between the US and the colonial as well as the anti-colonial powers and their acceptances of basic US objectives.

7. To seek the alignment of dependent peoples with the democratic world and to prevent the Soviet Union from being regarded as the champion of dependent peoples.

No general statement of US interests and objectives in the colonial field can serve as a formula for the establishment of the policy to be pursued by the US in a specific area. The policy which should be pursued will depend upon the weight which is given to the various, and perhaps, conflicting interests of the US; and this can be determined only with regard to the circumstances of the issues as it is presented.

However, in relation to specific colonial issues arising in the UN, the US, taking account of its varied interests and objectives, has usually found itself in a moderate, middle-ground position. The middle position which the United States has taken has also reflected the balance of views within the Government itself, where differing attitudes on colonial questions have been held by the various bureaus and agencies concerned. Thus, while the desire to maintain the greatest possible degree of cooperation between the colonial and anti-colonial groups has often led the US to support compromise positions, the search for compromise has been carried on within the framework of our policies and objectives. In other words, we have not sought compromise for its own sake; nor has our “middle-ground” position necessarily been in the geometric middle between two extremes. Insofar, however, as our position on the issues of principle would permit, the US has sought to serve as a moderator between the extremes and to bring about the greatest possible measure of agreement on such questions in the UN.

obstacles faced by the united states in pursuing its policies and objectives on colonial questions in the united nations

The underlying obstacle to the achievement of US policies and objectives in this field is the highly emotional and symbolic nature of colonial questions, rendering objective consideration of their substance and on their merits almost impossible, at least among the more extreme members of the anti-colonial and colonial groups. In such an atmosphere the US policy of moderation frequently has little appeal.

Our position has also been made increasingly difficult by the growth of bloc politics in the UN. It is safe to say that the dominant feeling of the leaders of the Arab-Asian and Latin American blocs is anti-colonial. The more moderate members of these blocs generally hesitate to support a less popular position, even when they prefer it. It thus requires very considerable diplomatic activity to swing the members of a bloc to a middle-ground position, as was done in the case of the Latin American bloc’s position on the Tunisian and Moroccan questions at the Seventh GA. Such a diplomatic campaign is too difficult to be used effectively except on major issues.

Both the emotionalism surrounding colonial issues and the existence of bloc politics in the UN render the achievement of US objectives on such issues in the UN difficult on account of the arrangement of voting power in the GA which in no way corresponds to the actual distribution of power and responsibility among the nations of the world. The majority of members may allow their emotions on colonial issues to lead them to use their majority voting position to exert pressures on the colonial powers which neither their strength nor their sense of responsibility to the world community justifies. In so doing the more extreme members of the anti-colonial group appear to overlook the extent to which this policy, regardless of its merits, may undermine the pillars of the very organization which is giving them such a conspicuous voice in world affairs.

In the UN, the US has sought to develop a sizeable group of states which would also take a middle position on colonial issues. This has become increasingly difficult. As was noted earlier in this paper, in recent sessions more and more decisions have been forced on important matters of principle and substance. In such cases, the middle-ground position which we would have wished to occupy has often been obliterated.^║

Another difficulty faced by the US arises from the fact that many colonial issues when they first emerge in the UN are not of dramatic or easily recognizable significance so that often insufficient attention is given them until they become hopelessly controversial. A corollary of this difficulty is that in the Fourth Committee of the Assembly, where colonial questions are dealt with on a continuing basis, many member nations are represented by relatively junior members of their delegations. Furthermore, such delegates are frequently without precise instructions so that they are inclined to follow the dictates of their own emotions rather than a carefully thought-out, fully integrated government policy.

implications for the united nations

Certain broad trends are readily discernible:

1. The forums of the UN are used by the anti-colonial Members to exert pressure on the colonial powers to accelerate the transfer of authority in dependent areas to the colonial peoples, to attract world attention to colonial problems and world sympathy to colonial peoples. To these ends there is a consistent effort to expand the competence, powers and machinery of the UN in relation to colonial questions, and to expand the role of the GA in which the administering powers are but a small minority. In this effort the anti-colonial Members seek US support and sometimes endeavor to put pressure on the colonial powers through the United States.

2. The colonial powers have reacted sharply to what they regard as unwarranted encroachments, in many cases exhibiting a hyper-sensitivity to suggestions and criticism which has only stimulated their critics. The process of reaction provoking further reaction has hardened positions on both sides and narrowed, and in some cases eliminated altogether, the middle ground.

3. In the last two years there has been increasing evidence that some of the colonial powers, particularly the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands will increasingly refuse to cooperate or participate in certain UN activities on colonial questions.^¶

4. The “colonial question” is steadily expanding its role in the United Nations, both in terms of the number and importance of the issues considered and the emotional atmosphere generated. These issues pervade more and more organs and agencies of the UN and now arise in many technical and specialized bodies as well as in political organs and committees. For example, colonial issues have arisen in meetings of such widely differing bodies as the Commission on the Status of Women, the Pan American Sanitary Organization, UNESCO, WHO, ILO, FAO, and the Commission on Human Eights.

implications for the united states

The intensification of European-non-European rivalries has coincided with the accentuation of the Soviet-non-Soviet conflict. This is not a mere coincidence; for, as the non-Soviet world is made up of both European and non-European peoples, the Soviet Union has a compelling interest in promoting discord between these two groups.

The non-European powers have increasingly employed the UN as a means of seeking a greater share of world influence, for, together with the Latin Americans, they form the preponderant majority in the UN and particularly the GA. While they undoubtedly recognize that their voting position does not reflect the current realities of world power ratios, they find the UN, with its world audience and considerable prestige, a useful device for promoting what they feel to be their rightful position in world affairs.

With a crucial stake in both of these conflicts, the US has been caught in an increasingly difficult dilemma. To counter successfully the threat of world communism we need the active support not only of our European allies but also of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We have therefore a vital interest in reducing the tensions between European and non-European peoples—tensions which have frequently been focused on colonial issues in the UN.

Our “middle-of-the-road” position is frequently uncomfortable for us and often unsatisfactory to a number of our friends on both sides of colonial issues, as well as to US public opinion. It has, however, left us in a position where we can still seek with some effectiveness to narrow the rift between our European and our non-European friends and to influence both sides to see more clearly the viewpoint of the other. The widening of this rift could be disastrous.

Annex A

Classification of UN Members in Terms of the Viewpoint Normally Taken by Them on Colonial Questions in UN Bodies

It is recognized that numerous exceptions could be found to the following classification and that many variations of viewpoint exist among the UN Members listed in each category; however, it is believed that on the basis of past performance the following classification is a useful indication of the way in which Members of the UN are likely to be grouped on colonial questions arising in UN bodies.

Conservative Colonial Viewpoint	Moderate Colonial Viewpoint	States Having Sympathy with Colonial Group	Moderate Anti-Colonial Viewpoint	Extreme Anti-Colonial Viewpoint
South Africa	Netherlands	Canada	Afghanistan	USSR
Belgium	New Zealand	Norway	Argentina	Czechoslovakia
France	United States	Sweden	Bolivia	Poland
United Kingdom	Denmark	Iceland	Brazil	Byelorussia
		Thailand	Chile	Ukraine
Luxembourg		Dominican Republic	China	Guatemala
Australia			Colombia	Indonesia
		Peru	Costa Rica	Yugoslavia
		Greece	Cuba	India
		Turkey	Ecuador	Burma
		Israel	El Salvador	Pakistan
			Ethiopia	Egypt
			Honduras	Haiti
			Iran	Mexico
			Iraq	Philippines
			Lebanon	Saudi Arabia
			Liberia	Syria
			Nicaragua
			Panama
			Paraguay
			Uruguay
			Yemen
			Venezuela

1. Including most of the inhabitants of the continent of Africa, and a total of some 70 territories. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Canada, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the Union of South Africa. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. For example, whereas the Fifth General Assembly (1950) recommended a study of land questions in trust territories, at the Seventh General Assembly (1952) a proposal to restore a particular parcel of land to members of the Wa-Meru tribe in the trust territory of Tanganyika was approved by the Fourth Committee and only narrowly rejected by the Assembly in plenary. Another example of this trend is the Ewe or Togoland unification question, with regard to which the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly have limited themselves in previous years to recommending various means of ascertaining the wishes of the people; whereas in 1952 the Fourth Committee approved a resolution which in effect recommended the unification of the two territories. While this proposal was also rejected in plenary by the Assembly, It, too, is indicative of the trend towards substantive proposals. Similarly, the question of the process whereby a given non-self-governing territory is eliminated from the category of territories on which information must be supplied to the United Nations under Article 73 (e) has in previous years been discussed as a theoretical matter; whereas the last General Assembly had on its agenda a specific case, namely the decision of the Netherlands to cease transmitting information on Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, and the next Assembly will also consider the same question with regard to Puerto Rico. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. For example, while at previous General Assemblies most of the anti-colonial Members had been willing to set up temporary committees to consider information on non-self-governing territories, at the last session a majority of them pushed a proposal for a permanent committee through the Fourth Committee; and it was only possible to obtain approval of another three-year committee when several colonial powers threatened not to participate in a permanent committee. When the three-year extension, originally a US compromise proposal, was rejected in the Fourth Committee, no further middle ground was left, and the United States voted with the colonial powers. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. See footnote on page 9. [Footnote in the source text; refer to previous footnote.]