Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

S/S—NSC files, lot 66 D 95, NSC 112

Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, May 26, 1953.

• Subject:
• Policy Guidance Governing United States Activities in the United Nations Disarmament Commission from May through September 1953

1. Under its terms of reference (Attachment A²), the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC) is responsible for formulating plans and policies respecting regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and the development and approval of detailed plans within established policies in the field of its competence.

2. Pursuant to the unanimous decision of RAC taken at a meeting on May 11, 1953, it is requested that the attached memorandum (Attachment B) be circulated to the members of the NSC for their information. This sets forth the policy guidance adopted by RAC governing United States activities in the United Nations Disarmament Commission from May through September 1953, the period between the anticipated resumption of the Disarmament Commission’s activities and the convening of the next regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. RAC considers that this specific policy is consonant with general United States policies concerning the recent Soviet “peace offensive”, and the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission will be given guidance in conformity with this policy.

3. The NSC has directed a review of United States policy towards regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments established by NSC 112;³ has specifically requested exploration of the possibility of a new United States proposal on disarmament between now and the next Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1953 (NSC Action No. 717 of February 20 [18], 1953⁴); and has requested in conjunction with the two previous tasks an evaluation of the fourth recommendation of the Report of the Panel of Consultants entitled “Armaments and American Policy”,^* covering disarmament discussions in the United Nations. The attached RAC policy guidance is adopted pending completion of these studies.

Walter B. Smith

Acting Secretary of State

Charles E. Wilson

Secretary of Defense

Gordon Dean

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Attachment B

Policy Guidance Governing United States Activities in the United Nations Disarmament Commission for the Period May Through September 1953

problem

To determine the course of action to be followed by the United States in the meetings of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations until the General Assembly reconvenes in September 1953.

conclusions

1. The complexities of disarmament are such as to afford the Soviet Union an opportunity for prolonged negotiation under the guise of sincerity without any important modification of basic position. If the United States now presses for extensive negotiations on disarmament and, as seems likely, there are no basic Soviet concessions, there is danger that this might seriously complicate the possibility of settling other outstanding issues where because they are less complex a greater opportunity may exist for progress. Conversely, successful negotiation of some of these other major differences might serve to strengthen world trust and enable the concurrent resumption of substantive disarmament negotiations.

2. United States activity in the Disarmament Commission limited primarily to an exploration of the Soviet disarmament position and its intentions in this field would be in conformity with the President’s speech of April 16, 1953⁵ which states that as progress toward settlement of certain major political issues “strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world”.

3. However, it will be necessary in the Commission to do considerably more than rely on the past Soviet record of intransigence as an indication of the impossibility of progress, in view of the ostensible shift in Soviet attitudes toward disarmament following the death of Stalin; the April 16, 1953 statement of President Eisenhower on this subject; and the probable activities of other members of the Commission in the light of these two developments.

recommendations

1. In the Disarmament Commission, the United States should as far as possible avoid using the discussions as a primary vehicle for exploring apparent changes in overall Soviet policy.

2. Pursuant to this policy, the United States should not now initiate major substantive action in the Disarmament Commission, but should limit its participation primarily to an exploration of the Soviet disarmament position and its intentions in this field.

3. Within the general framework of the preceding recommendations, the United States should:

a. Endeavor to induce other members of the Disarmament Commission to join the United States in pressing the Soviet Union to explain and elaborate its position;

b. Reiterate before the Disarmament Commission the basic principles and concepts which must underlie any program for safeguarded disarmament and ascertain the extent to which the Soviet Union is willing to accept, as a basis for negotiation, proposals in the Disarmament Commission along these lines, previously introduced or supported by the United States.

c. Attempt to induce the Commission to avoid immersion in details beyond existing papers until agreement has been obtained on these general principles.

4. In order to meet the exigencies of the tactical situation in the Disarmament Commission and in order to take advantage of any progressive steps taken by the Soviet Delegate, the United States Government should have ready for use, when deemed appropriate, working papers on the following subjects:

a. The nature and functions of an international control organ which would supervise the putting into effect and operation of a comprehensive disarmament program, in the event that such action might clarify the Soviet position or might be made necessary by positions taken by other Members of the Commission.

b. U.S. views in broad outline only on the problem of obtaining an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes, as suggested in the President’s speech of April 16.

c. Correlation of the principal aspects of a comprehensive disarmament program. (A paper on this subject should be introduced only if absolutely necessary to preserve the United States tactical position.)

5. In the event a new situation is created as a result of progress in negotiation of other outstanding major political issues which demonstrates the possibility of agreement in other areas or through concrete concessions made by the USSR in the disarmament field, the United States should be prepared to go forward in elaboration of the disarmament program. The exact procedure for going forward should be determined by subsequent policy directives, but could be either:

a. Elaboration in the Disarmament Commission of a safeguarded disarmament plan providing for balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the international control of atomic energy based on the United Nations or a no less effective plan, in accordance with existing policy directives as they may be modified as a result of pending long-range studies.^†

b. Discussion of the problem of disarmament in private Great Power talks, together with a decision of the Disarmament Commission whether or not to adjourn its operations pending the outcome of such discussions.

discussion

1. Prior to the recent change in the Soviet Government and the ostensible shift in policies which accompanied the succession, the persistent attempts on the part of the United States to reach an agreement on disarmament in the United Nations, dating from 1946, had been blocked effectively and completely by Soviet intransigence. The record clearly demonstrates there was never any real sign that agreement was likely nor was there ever even any genuine negotiation, certainly at least since 1947. It is apparent that the USSR was interested in the discussions only from the point of view of their propaganda value. Consequently, the disarmament proceedings became quite unrelated to any genuine negotiation.

2. The problems of disarmament are so complex as to offer the Soviet Union ample opportunities for prolonged negotiation without major changes in its basic position. Without definite Soviet concessions likely to lead to substantive progress in the field of disarmament, extended discussions on this matter in the Disarmament Commission and consequent overemphasis by the United States of its disarmament position might complicate the possibility of settling other major political issues with the USSR. In addition, such extended discussions could prejudice subsequent achievement of agreements in the disarmament field. Accordingly, in the absence of such encouraging concessions from the USSR, the United States should engage in these discussions in the Commission only to the extent necessary to expose the Soviet disarmament position and to counteract Soviet use of the Disarmament Commission as a forum for their propaganda.

3. The recent change in Soviet tactics manifested in the so-called “peace offensive” embraced the field of disarmament, among others. In the debates of the 7th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during recent weeks, the Soviet Union has attempted to create the impression that it has shifted its position in an effort to narrow the differences with the West, thus to permit genuine negotiation on disarmament problems in the forthcoming meetings of the Disarmament Commission. These changes may be summarized in substance as suggesting a willingness on the part of the USSR to drop its former insistence on a flat 1/3 reduction of armed forces and armaments by the 5 Great Powers, to abandon insistence on a “paper” declaration by the General Assembly banning atomic weapons without safeguards, to indicate a readiness to consider detailed proposals for an international control organ which would put into effect and supervise a comprehensive disarmament program, and to admit the program should be carried out in such a way that no state would have cause to fear its security was endangered (possibly by stages). The true significance of these Soviet moves in the field of disarmament is not clear. They are at present so vague and contradictory in nature that they cannot be accepted as demonstrating Soviet desire to negotiate logically and honestly on the substance of disarmament. They are certain, however, to lead to extended discussion in the Disarmament Commission with attendant international publicity, and this may be the chief purpose of the USSR in this field. In fact, it appears logical to accept the estimate of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on this subject contained in SE–42: Current Communist Tactics.⁶ Paragraph 7 of this estimate, dated April 16 [24], 1953, states that “The Kremlin will probably continue to make proposals for general disarmament, but we believe that these will be made for propaganda effect and not in the expectation that they would be accepted by the West”.

4. The meaning of all the various conciliatory gestures and statements of the Soviet Union and Satellites which have been issued in recent weeks is equally vague. The Soviets may have decided to make real concessions and to introduce an era of “peaceful co-existence”, or they may intend no real concessions, but are merely launching new tactics in pursuit of their longstanding policy of dividing and confusing the West. In any event, it is believed that the following thesis should serve as principal guide for United States activities concerning disarmament activities in the United Nations:

a. If the United States now presses for extensive negotiations on disarmament in the United Nations and, as seems likely, there are no basic Soviet concessions, there is danger that this would offer the USSR propaganda benefits and might seriously complicate settling major political issues where a greater opportunity exists for immediate progress since armaments are essentially symptoms of these political controversies although exacerbating them;

b. Conversely, successfully settling or negotiating towards settling some of these other major political issues might improve the international climate and enable concurrent progress to be made in disarmament negotiations on substance;

c. Consequently, in the Disarmament Commission, the United States should, as far as possible, avoid utilizing disarmament discussions as a primary vehicle for exploring apparent changes in overall Soviet policy;

d. This would mean concentrating on exploring the Soviet positions in such manner to force the USSR to disclose whether it is willing to negotiate genuinely on the subject of disarmament or whether the apparent change in the Soviet attitude is intended solely for propaganda and tactical purposes.

5. On the other hand, it must be recognized that United States tactics in the Disarmament Commission cannot rely primarily on the past record of Soviet intransigence as an indication of the impossibility of making progress toward an agreed disarmament program—which was essentially the policy suggested in the Annex to the Second Progress Report on NSC 112, Section 2, February 17, 1953.^‡ Three factors render this approach unworkable:

a. The ostensible shift in the Soviet attitudes toward disarmament made during the 7th Regular Session of the General Assembly, and heralded by USSR Representatives as intended to narrow disagreements with the Western powers in order to permit progress in the Disarmament Commission. The Soviets have thus placed themselves in a far better tactical and propaganda position which cannot be adequately countered or exposed by the United States by merely harkening back to the USSR’s past record.

b. President Eisenhower’s April 16, 1953 speech called on the Soviet leaders to demonstrate by deeds their desire for peace, declaring the first step must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea, followed by an end to attacks in Indo-China and Malaya and the working out of just political settlements for other serious issues between the free world and the Soviet Union. Thereupon, “As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of arms now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements.” These agreements could include limitation of the size of the military and security forces of all nations, agreed limits on that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes, atomic energy control, limitation or prohibition of other weapons of great destructiveness, and a system of adequate safeguards including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations. The position taken by the President in his speech reaffirms the general validity of the holding operation concept in the Disarmament Commission advocated in the Recommendations above, in that it calls for simultaneous progress on many fronts in our attempts to diminish world tensions. The very fact that the President has again raised the question of disarmament and made proposals, however, indicates the necessity for doing something more in the Commission than merely to rely on the past Soviet record of intransigence as an indication of the impossibility of progress.

c. The membership of the Disarmament Commission, consisting of the Members of the Security Council plus Canada, makes it almost inevitable that moves will be made by some nations on the Commission to bridge the gap between Soviet and United States positions under the stimulus of the recent apparent Soviet concessions to the Western position on disarmament. It may be recalled that the Representative of Pakistan confidentially submitted a draft proposal to the United States Representative on May 9, 1952, suggesting means of tying together general principles for a disarmament program, disclosure and verification, control of atomic energy, and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Representative of France twice confidentially submitted a draft disarmament treaty, seeking to accomplish these ends, and even after the United States twice informally detailed its objections to the treaty the Representative of France outlined these concepts in a public statement to the Disarmament Commission. As recently as April 8, 1953, the French Government again evinced interest in these proposals. In the recent General Assembly discussions, the French Representative suggested that the Commission work out a system for “dovetailing” the primary elements of a disarmament program. Lebanon, Colombia and Chile are other countries which might be tempted to introduce proposals seeking to bridge the gap between the East and the West.

6. Consequently, while following the policy that the United States should not initiate major substantive action in the Commission until such time as settlement of some of the major political issues between the USSR and the West is achieved, the United States should employ the following tactics:

a. Endeavor to induce other Commission Members to join the United States in pressing the USSR to explain and elaborate the apparent change in Soviet views.

b. Reiterate before the Commission the basic principles and concepts which must underlie any program for safeguarded disarmament and ascertain the degree to which the USSR is willing to accept as a basis for discussion proposals which have already been introduced in the Commission by the United States, individually or joined by the United Kingdom and France. In concrete proposals tabled before the Disarmament Commission, the United States has submitted or reaffirmed the broad outlines of a plan for the international control of atomic energy; a system of continuing safeguarded disclosure and verification; proposals for fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of all states, and proposals for practical procedures to limit armaments and work out the details of a disarmament program. In making these proposals, the United States had emphasized that they were not definitive in terms or exhaustive in details, but were made only to provide a basis for discussion and to open avenues to agreement and understanding. Nevertheless, all of these proposals have been thus far rejected by the Soviet Union. The frustrating history of these negotiations characterized by Soviet intransigence emphasizes the wisdom of concentrating continuing attention on broad principles, and avoiding immersion in details until agreement has been reached on the basic premises outlined in these proposals.

c. Recognize that certain affirmative action to avoid the appearance of intransigence and rigidity may be forced on the United States by the Soviet overtures in the disarmament field, by the probability these overtures will motivate other members of the Disarmament Commission to make proposals designed to bridge the gap between Soviet and U.S. positions, and by the possibility the Soviets may actually make concessions. Consequently, the United States Government should have ready for use, when deemed appropriate, working papers on the international control organ, limitation of strategic materials, and co-relationship issues. These papers should confine themselves insofar as possible to a brief and general discussion of these subjects and a detailed provision of the plans should be avoided. The purpose of such action would be to develop fully the U.S. position, thus retaining the tactical initiative, while at the same time presenting as small a target as possible for Soviet counter-action. With the submission of these papers, it should be made abundantly clear that the United States has no intention of submitting new proposals or additional details unless there is a marked change in the situation in the Commission. Such an approach would be in general consonance with the statement of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament in their report on “Armaments and American Policy”, to the effect that “in the context of the existing world situation, the drafting of detailed blueprints for general arms regulation has seemed to us a dangerous and misleading exercise.”

7. In the event that negotiations of other outstanding major political issues is progressing successfully and demonstrates the possibility of agreement, or if the Soviet Union indicates a willingness to make concrete concessions in the debates of the Disarmament Commission, so that a new situation is created, the United States Delegation should be prepared in the Disarmament Commission to elaborate the disarmament program. The procedures for so doing should be determined by subsequent policy directives, but conceivably could include elaboration, in either the Disarmament Commission or in private Great Power conferences with possible adjournment of Commission deliberations, of a comprehensive, coordinated and safeguarded program for balanced reduction of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments and the international control of atomic energy, based on the United Nations plan or a no less effective plan. This program would be developed in accordance with existing policy directives or those directives may be modified as a result of certain pending long-range studies by the NSC. These studies include: a review of United States policy towards regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments established by NSC 112; exploration of the possibility of a new United States proposal on disarmament between now and the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1953 (NSC Action No. 717 of February 20 [18], 1953); and in conjunction with the two previous tasks an evaluation of the fourth recommendation of the Report of the Panel of Consultants concerning “Armaments and American Policy” which recommends a gradual disengagement from disarmament discussions in the United Nations.

1. This memorandum and its attachments were originally circulated as document RAC (NS) D–5a Final, May 11, 1953. (330.13/6–453) The source text is accompanied by a covering memorandum of June 3 by NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitting this memorandum and its attachments to the members of the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. Not printed here. For the terms of reference of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments (RAC), Mar. 8, 1952, see p. 876.
3. For text of NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 477.
4. For NSC Action No. 717, see footnote 6, p. 1108.
5. See Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, “Armaments and American Policy”, dated February 4, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the report, see p. 1056.]
5. See the editorial note, p. 1144.
6. Note: The NSC has directed a review of United States policy towards regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments established by NSC 112; has specifically requested exploration of the possibility of a new United States proposal on disarmament between now and the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1953 (NSC Action No. 717 of February 20 [18], 1953); and has requested in conjunction with the two previous tasks an evaluation of the fourth recommendation of the report of the Panel of Consultants concerning “Armaments and American Policy” which recommends a gradual disengagement from disarmament discussions in the United Nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Scheduled for publication in volume viii.
7. See Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments”, dated February 17, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. The Feb. 17 memorandum of transmittal is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “NSC Papers, 1953–1955”). For text of the Annex to the Second Progress Report on NSC 112, see p. 1103.]