Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 151 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board¹

secret
NSC 151

Washington, May 8, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Armaments and American Policy

References:

A.

NSC Action No. 725²

B.

Memo for NSC Planning Board from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953.³

The enclosed interim report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy of the NSC Planning Board, which the Planning Board has considered and concurred in, is submitted herewith pursuant to Reference A, for early consideration by the Council of the Recommendations contained in pp. 3–4⁴ thereof. Also enclosed for Council information is an Annex to the report containing an outline of the type of information to be released under the proposed policy. The Ad Hoc Committee and the Planning Board had the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush in their preparation and consideration of the enclosed report.

The enclosure relates to the possible means of carrying out Recommendation One by the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament in the report circulated by Reference B. The Ad Hoc Committee is preparing another report on other recommendations made by the Panel of Consultants.

It is recommended that if the Council adopts the Recommendations contained herein that they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them and direct their implementation in accordance with paragraph 3–d thereof by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Psychological Strategy Board.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Here follows a table of contents]

[Enclosure]

Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the NSC Planning Board on Armaments and American Policy

introduction

1. Panel Recommendation on Candor Toward the American People. The first recommendation of the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament was that the United States Government “adopt a policy of candor toward the American people—and at least equally toward its own elected representatives and responsible officials—in presenting the meaning of the arms race.”

a. Objective. The objective would be to secure support of the American people for necessary governmental actions which would rest on an adequate understanding of the realities of the situation. To achieve such an understanding, the Panel urged that the facts of atomic developments in this country and the Soviet Union be explained, and that the implications of these facts for the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union be set forth. The Panel was of the opinion that a policy of candor with respect to the atomic arms race could be executed without causing the American people to lose heart in the present struggle or to seek a solution through preventive war. It also concluded that our proper concern about the danger of the arms race should not, and could not, be kept a secret from the Soviet Union.

b. Change in Existing Policy. This policy would constitute an important change in existing policies, a change which arises from the altered circumstances in a developing world situation. The U.S. Government would be taking a new initiative in deciding to inform the public of the facts as to the armaments race and its official analysis of those facts. It would involve a decision to reveal certain facts about the arms race not only on one occasion but also over a period of time. If it were to be successful, it would be necessary to secure an understanding by the Congress of the reasons for such a policy. It would almost certainly require some mechanism by which information now available and subsequently developed and the implication thereof could be considered and decided at a high level of the Government in terms of the advisability of its public release.

2. Nature of Information to be Released. The recommended policy does not require the public exposure of atomic energy “Restricted Data” of a technical nature and it need not embrace material which would compromise intelligence sources. With these areas of information excluded, the judgment involved in deciding whether or not to release material will consist of balancing the advantages and disadvantages from the point of our national security interests and from the standpoint of achieving the objective of an informed public understanding of the problems involved. There is set forth in the Annex to this paper the type of information which might be made available to the American people if a policy of candor is accepted. None of the information included in the Annex includes “Restricted Data” or information which would compromise intelligence sources.

recommendations

3. With respect to the first recommendation of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, we recommend:

a. that an affirmative policy of candor toward the American people be adopted;

b. that a policy of continuing candor on the atomic arms race be accompanied as it develops by public indications of such decisions as may be taken with respect to national security programs. It should be recognized that the degree to which the objective of such a policy will be achieved in the initial stages will be affected by the Government’s ability to inform the public of its views on the programs required to deal with the dangers involved in the atomic equation;

c. that the agencies of the U.S. Government should not restrict the distribution within the Government of material involving information about atomic energy and the atomic equation (other than “Restricted Data” of a technical nature) more rigidly than other information of comparable security classification. Officials of the U.S. Government whose responsibilities would be carried out more effectively with such information should have access to it;

d. that a government agency such as the Psychological Strategy Board (which would be augmented for this purpose by the addition of interested agencies not now represented thereon) be made responsible for considering information now available and subsequently developed on the atomic arms race and for making recommendations on the advisability and timing of public release. This agency could also be given responsibility for recommending the release of information in other matters (such as chemical and biological warfare) related to the security of the United States.

discussion

I. Essential Elements of a Policy of Public Candor

4. It would be possible to adopt a policy of telling the American people certain facts about the atomic weapons race, but to do so in such a way that information would appear only sporadically and as forced by events. On this basis information would be released as it was necessary to deal with “leaks” through unofficial sources or when it was thought to be necessary in connection with specific programs or proposals which the Government wished to advance.

5. This would not amount to a very great alteration of present practice and it has the disadvantage that the information made public might be increasingly discounted on the ground that it was aimed at frightening the people or the Congress into support of particular actions. Moreover, the impact of the facts would tend to be dispersed, as it has been in the past, and the picture in the public mind would tend to be blurred.

6. Instead of a negative policy of disclosing information when forced by events, the Panel proposed an affirmative policy of candor on its own merits.

7. Such a continuing program of publishing information and the implications thereof would be an important new policy for the administration in a matter bearing directly on our national interests and the individual lives of our citizens. It would mean that the President and his principal officers would regularly take the people into their confidence in the conviction that in a democracy an informed public is the best safeguard against extreme public reactions, such as fright and despair on the one hand or an impulsive sentiment for preventive war on the other. The objective is to secure an informed and careful public consideration of the problems arising from the facts disclosed so that the American people will remain steady and determined and will give their support to the necessary actions of their Government.

8. This policy should also stress the following related aspects of atomic energy:

a. No physical phenomenon is inherently good or bad in itself. Atomic weapons must be considered a part of our total weapons system, so that the question of morality will relate only to the way in which this or any other weapon is used. This will give us greater freedom of action with respect to all elements of our military strength.

b. Atomic energy is not something unique and apart from other new developments in technology. Atomic energy is an integral part of the new and tremendously constructive technology of western civilization. Developments in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can in the foreseeable future have immense practical and economic benefits. Our national atomic energy activities are and should be increasingly related to other areas of governmental and industrial activity. These constructive aspects of our atomic energy program will help the public to understand the importance of continued progress in the atomic field.

II. Relevant Considerations in Carrying out a Policy of Continuing Public Candor

A. Relation to National Security Programs

9. With the facts about the atomic equation officially before them, the public is certain to become increasingly concerned about our national security and our national defense programs.

10. Our present large atomic capability and the development and importance of our strategic air power are widely known and should continue to be emphasized, along with other elements of our military strength, as vital to our national security. A failure to continue to emphasize the deterrent effects of our ability to project our power abroad might result in excessive preoccupation with defense at home.

11. Public knowledge of the dangers to the United States from a Soviet atomic attack and from such other lesser means of destruction as biological and chemical warfare is likely to focus particular attention on problems of continental defense, both civil and military. This aspect of the policy of continuing candor will raise special problems which could be dealt with in several ways:

a. It is possible to decide to withhold the disclosure of the facts about the atomic arms race for a year or so in order to give more time for study of the problems of continental defense (civil and military) and for decisions with respect to the programs to be undertaken. The difficulty is that unofficial disclosure is likely to continue and, as the facts become known more fully by this means, the public will grow increasingly critical of its Government for trying to keep it in the dark. Here public reaction is unpredictable, and might result in fright or demands for precipitous action as easily as public support for sensible programs.

b. If a continuing policy of candor beginning soon is decided upon, before definitive decisions have been made with respect to all aspects of programs of increased civil and military continental defense, disclosure could be accompanied by general assurances that the Government is moving forward in the development of continental defense programs. Such general assurances may not be wholly effective in view of the recent unofficial publication of much of the material in the East River Report⁵ and the Summer Study Group, Project Lincoln, since it is already widely thought that there are specific programs which can be undertaken provided enough funds are appropriated for the purpose.

c. A policy of continuing candor beginning soon can be accompanied by an announcement of at least the initial decisions with respect to additional programs of civil and military continental defense. Such a program of disclosure would be an evolving one and should also be tied in with later decisions on defense programs, as they are taken.

B. Relation to the Situation Abroad

12. With respect to the U.S.S.R., the information which would be released to the American people both about developments here and in the Soviet Union need add but little to what the Kremlin already knows. Where the information might not be known to them, disclosure would be undertaken only if it were determined to be to the net advantage of the United States. In fact, a policy of candor, coupled with adequate defense programs, might assist in bringing home to the Soviet leaders the dangers to their own regime in the atomic equation and minimize the likelihood that they will overestimate the chances of a quick and easy victory over the United States.

13. In Western Europe, protection of the great deterrent power of U.S. atomic strength is regarded as crucial. Although the Europeans already recognize that they do not have the same opportunities as we do for improving their defense against atomic weapons, they can accept their vulnerability as long as they can place reliance on the deterrent power of our atomic strength and on the ability and willingness of the United States to use atomic weapons in the event of war.⁶ Unless the U.S. power base is regarded as secure, a public exposure of the dangers in the atomic arms race would have serious adverse effects in Europe. Such adverse effects would be compounded if there were created a fear on the part of the Europeans that the vulnerability of our population centers might even make us unwilling to use our atomic strength in the event of war.

C. Congressional Support

14. The adoption of a policy of public candor about the atomic arms race will be a sufficiently sharp reversal of policy to require an understanding on the part of the Congress of the objective of the program and the way in which it would be conducted. Advance consultation with the Congress would also provide an opportunity to discuss the meaning of the atomic arms race directly with the members of the Congress as a special aspect of the policy of candor.

D. Timing

15. If the policy of continuing candor is decided upon, the program might begin late in May or in June. By this time the Administration will have reached decisions about next year’s programs and will have received and considered various studies now in preparation on continental defense. The policy should probably be launched by a Presidential statement of some kind in order to secure maximum attention from the public and to indicate that the Government is embarking on a new approach to the problems faced by the United States. An example of a setting for such a statement that would appear natural to the public would be the conclusion of the present series of atomic tests toward the end of May.

III. Candor Within the United States Government

16. In its first recommendation the Panel of Consultants also suggested that there be much wider familiarity with atomic matters within the Government. Obviously, the information made public will itself reach Government officials, but considerably greater information could be opened to responsible officers in the Government than it is desirable to expose publicly. Atomic matters are so central to many of the problems with which the Government must deal, that a wider understanding of the implications of atomic energy is needed.

17. Material that falls within the classification of “Restricted Data” which involves technical information should continue to be handled in accordance with its sensitivity. Other matters involving atomic energy and the atomic equation, classified as “Top Secret—Security Information” or less, should be available to officials in the Government whose responsibilities would be carried out more effectively with knowledge of such information. In addition to availability of documents, as such, it would be desirable to have broader participation by officials dealing primarily with atomic energy matters in the consideration of problems of national security.

18. In short, no distinction should be made between atomic energy matters and other matters in this respect. For example the special precautions applied to NSC 68 for over two years, even though it contained no “Restricted Data”, greatly limited its distribution within the U.S. Government and prevented an adequate understanding on the part of many officials who might have made a contribution to the manner of dealing with the problems involved.

19. Greater candor within the U.S. Government should logically include state and local government officials. The leadership for many parts of the continental defense program rests with these officials, and the information to be released should include material they need to carry out their responsibilities properly. Obviously, there will be a marked difference between the security requirements applicable to state and local officials and those applicable to the availability of information within the Federal Government.

IV. Candor with Allied Governments

20. The second recommendation in the Report of the Panel of Consultants was that the U.S. should give its major allies a sense of shared responsibility through an increase in their understanding of the political and military implications of atomic weapons. The Panel specifically excluded from its second recommendation the special problem of technical collaboration on the making of atomic weapons.

21. A policy of public candor in the United States with respect to the atomic arms race will, of course, also reach the general public in allied countries. But, just as greater information can be made available to responsible officers of the U.S. Government than can be publicly disclosed, there is certain additional information in the atomic field which, if exchanged with allied government officials, would increase their capacity to deal wisely not only with such problems as those that arise in connection with NATO but also with non-military matters of common concern or mutual benefit.

22. The Atomic Energy Act has been interpreted to prevent any substantial disclosure of information relevant to an understanding of the use of atomic weapons to allied government officials. This inhibition, however desirable it may have been in the past, now prevents our allies from acquiring an adequate understanding of some of our policies and actions and will tend progressively to become a more serious divisive factor in our relations. A balance will have to be struck between security considerations and the advantages of disclosure, but within appropriate limits the present inhibition could be removed in the national interest.

Ad Hoc Committee:

• State—Gordon Arneson (Chairman); John Ferguson
• Defense—Charles P. Noyes
• AEC—Roy B. Snapp
• CIA—William P. Bundy
• PSB—Horace S. Craig
• Executive Secretary—Philip H. Watts

[Subenclosure]

Annex to Interim Report on Armaments and American Policy

Outline of Type of Information to be Released

(It is understood that the information listed in this Annex will not necessarily be covered by a single statement, or in any specified period of time. An initial statement, covering most of the facts identified in this Annex and pointing out their meaning for the arms race, will probably be desirable in launching the policy.)

Section I—Statement of Policy

1. The administration has determined upon a policy of candor.

2. Reasons for new policy and its significance for the American people and government.

Section II—Outline of Information to be Made Available as to the Significance of the Atomic Armaments Race

3. The basic international situation is unlikely to change and a long-term view is necessary.

4. The fundamental points:

a. Although the U.S. now has and expects to maintain a substantial lead over the USSR in atomic weapons available, the time is coming within a very few years when the USSR will have a supply of atomic weapons sufficient, if delivered on target, to injure the U.S. critically. It will not be possible to provide an ironclad defense against delivery of at least part of this supply of weapons.

b. In these circumstances, continued U.S. atomic superiority and well protected strategic striking power will still constitute vital elements in the strength of the U.S. and the free world and a substantial deterrent to deliberate Soviet initiation of general war or to Soviet action involving the grave risk of general war.

Note: The Committee anticipates that the information released will include a more exact statement or statements on the degree of defense possible against presently known and definitely foreseeable means of delivery. No statement along these lines is included in this Annex since the subject is now under study by responsible groups within the government, and since the Committee recommends that whatever is said in the present connection be related to continental defense programs. (See page 3 and the discussion on pages 5 through 7.)⁷

5. Nature of atomic weapon development. U.S. experience demonstrates that atomic weapon development, like the development of other members of the family of weapons, proceeds very rapidly after an initial stage is passed. This rapidity applies to increase in weapon stockpiles, increase in rates of production, increase in destructive power of individual weapons, and increased variety of uses. In the case of atomic weapons, such rapid development can be achieved without disproportionate use of national resources. The subsidiary facts behind this conclusion may be publicly stated as follows:

a. In the closing days of World War II, our entire stockpile of atomic weapons consisted of the two that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Since that time our production of weapons has proceeded on a constantly and rapidly increasing scale.

b. The destructive power of individual weapons has been greatly increased by improved design. Within the range of fission weapons available today are weapons having a destructive power———⁸ times that of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima type bombs. One such weapon, if dropped on a major U.S. city, would totally destroy an area of———square miles and cause major damage in an area of———square miles. Total casualties might be———.

Note: The Committee believes that the above comparisons and estimates of damage might be stated in general terms (such as “many, several” etc.) or expressed in specific figures, as determined by the Council.

c. The feasibility of thermonuclear energy release has been demonstrated by tests. We know that thermonuclear explosions can produce even greater destructive power than fission weapons. The destructive power already demonstrated in the fission field is so great that it is doubtful whether the added power demonstrated as feasible for thermonuclear explosions will essentially alter the nature of the atomic equation.

d. Economy. Through technical improvements it has been found possible to employ substantially smaller quantities of fissionable material to produce equivalent destructive power.

e. Greatly increased supplies of fissionable material can be achieved through the use of new facilities and through improved production techniques. The U.S. rate of production of fissionable material is now many times what it was in 1945. To a certain extent such increased rates of production are inevitable in the production process, even without added facilities.

f. The U.S. has developed weapons for a wide variety of uses, including tactical employment in warfare in support of troops in the field. Such development is a natural outcome of an atomic weapons program.

g. There is no obsolescence of fissionable materials.

h. Compared to conventional weapons, atomic and thermonuclear weapons are cheap in terms of destructive effect, both as regards money and as regards use of scarce national resources.

6. Soviet capabilities. The USSR has passed the initial stages of atomic development and will be able to do in all important respects everything that the U.S. has done and can do in the future, both in the fission and in the fusion field. The subsidiary facts behind this conclusion can be publicly stated as follows:

a. The temporary U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons ended in the fall of 1949 with the first atomic test in the USSR.

b. In the three and a half years since that time, the USSR has been producing atomic weapons for its own stockpile.

c. The requisite raw materials, power resources, industrial facilities, and scientific skill are available without undue strain on Communist resources.

d. There are no scientific or technical processes available to the U.S. which could not in time be discovered by Soviet scientists and technicians. This includes knowledge of thermonuclear reactions and techniques.

e. On the basis of these factors, it may be reliably estimated that within two years the Soviets will probably have a stockpile numbered in the hundreds, and not many years thereafter in excess of a thousand.

7. Means of delivery. Under the weapon availability conditions stated above, not the number of weapons, but the effectiveness of the means of delivery will become the limitation of the scale of damage that can be accomplished by the U.S. or by the USSR. In this field the publicly presented picture can be as follows:

a. The U.S. has developed several means of delivery. Our strategic airforces, together with their system of bases, are being expanded to effect rapid delivery of nuclear weapons.

b. The USSR now has adequate means of intercontinental delivery. These methods will almost certainly improve substantially over the next few years. (See note below.)

c. Over a period of 10–15 years, we must expect radically improved methods of delivery to be developed. Defense against these methods will present new and very serious problems.

Note: As stated in the Note to paragraph 4 above, the Committee expects that the information released will include a statement or statements on the degree of defense possible against presently known and definitely foreseeable means of delivery.

8. Peaceful uses of atomic energy. As atomic development progresses further, substantial peaceful uses are possible. Within a few years, if sufficient effort is made, these uses may make a real contribution to the resources and living standards of the free world nations.

9. Morality of atomic weapons. The atomic weapon differs only in degree from other weapons. This difference has decreased with the development of varied atomic weapons and with improvements in other types of weapons. Moral objections to the use of atomic weapons should be on the same basis as for other weapons capable of destroying life and inflicting damage.

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114.
3. The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.
4. Reference is to pagination in the source text; for the recommendations, see p. 1152.
5. Regarding Project East River, see footnote 2, p. 20.
6. For documentation on the developing interest of U.S. officials in the relationship of nuclear weapons to the defense of Western Europe and the need to inform NATO allies of the determination to place a nuclear shield around Western Europe, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 482 ff.
7. Reference is to pagination in the source text.
8. The omissions in this section are in the source text.