Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 146th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 27, 1953¹

[Extracts]

top secret
eyes only

May 27, 1953

Present at the 146th meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of Commerce; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); Dr. Vannevar Bush (for Item 3); Dr. Robert Oppenheimer (for Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 2); J. Ed Warren, Deputy Administrator for Petroleum Administration (for Item 2); W. Y. Elliott, ODM Planning Board Member (for Item 2); Earl W. Clark, Deputy Maritime Administrator (for Item 2); Robert B. Murray, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation (for Item 2); Charles J. Hedlund, Director, Program Division, Petroleum Administration (for Item 2); Robert L. Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Item 2); W. G. Donley, Petroleum Administration for Defense (for Item 2); Brig. General A. H. Johnson, Chairman, Joint Petroleum Committee, Munitions Board (for Item 2); the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

. . . . . . .

3. Armaments and American Policy (NSC 151; NSC Action No. 725; Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953)²

At the invitation of Mr. Cutler, Dr. Oppenheimer made a brief statement to the Council as to how the original panel of consultants, of which he, Dr. Bush and Mr. Allen Dulles had been members, had reached the conclusions which were now set forth in NSC 151. They had concluded in favor of the policy of candor to the American people regarding the atomic equation, in view of their feeling that the public must be made to understand the grim situation with which they were now faced. There was very little likelihood that the Soviets would change their spots, and not much hope that a really adequate defense against surprise atomic attack could be developed. It would be agreeable if we could discount these grim facts, continued Dr. Oppenheimer, but we simply could not. As in other areas, the Russians were behind us in the development of atomic weapons, but they will soon be pressing us hard. In 1945 the United States had made four atomic bombs. Today we could make a thousand. In 1945 these A-bombs were comparatively small, the equivalent of 20,000 tons of HE. Now they were enormously more powerful, and every year and a half or so the destructive power doubled. Dr. Oppenheimer professed to see no reason why the Soviets could not approach this achievement, although he admitted they would do so more slowly. Our only hope in facing this situation was an informed and steady public. Whatever steps we took to create a defense against this threat would still leave us vulnerable. The public does not realize the true facts of the situation, and it was crucially important to enlighten them. In addition, we ought to provide appropriate information to our allies, who are faced with an even more immediate danger. Finally, the policy of candor, which the report advocated, would have an important effect in securing support from the Congress and people for taking whatever practical steps we could to build a defense of the continent. Such a defense would never remove the atomic threat wholly, but it would at least palliate this threat. To explain to the people the nature of their dilemma it was necessary for the highest voice in the land to speak. Only a wise and informed people, concluded Dr. Oppenheimer, could be expected to act wisely.

The President replied to Dr. Oppenheimer’s statement by indicating his great concern over the fact that the Russians were in so much more favorable a position in using atomic weapons. The Soviets would not hesitate to use them on the territories of our Western European allies, where, of course, we ourselves could not use the bomb. We were hamstrung, and could only bomb Soviet territory.

Asked for his views of the report, Dr. Bush said he had little to add to the statement of Dr. Oppenheimer. We were facing very grim times. If the American people were to go along with their Government, they must know the worst and what the Government can do about it. Otherwise the day might soon approach when, instead of being obliged to attack us with atomic weapons, the Russians would merely confront us with the necessity of agreeing to a vast Munich appeasement. To counteract this it was vital to create the best possible defensive system.

The President observed that he certainly agreed in principle with Dr. Oppenheimer’s recommendation in favor of candor. He was concerned, however, about the security aspect of the release. What facts could safely be revealed to the public? Much too much classified information was already being dished up. How, inquired the President, can we distinguish the kind of information on this problem that it is safe and wise to release?

In response to this query Dr. Oppenheimer noted the suggestions in the report with respect to the type of information that could be released. It was obvious, he added, that we must avoid releasing any information as to know-how and technical construction of warheads, and the like. But a release on the general problem of the atomic race and the atomic equation, far from inciting the Russians, might even deter them by bringing home to them the fact of our enormous atomic power.

The President then said he had another thought on this subject which he wanted to try on Dr. Oppenheimer. If he was to go to talk to 160 million people on this tremendous subject, he thought it was unwise to make any distinction between fission and fusion weapons. Indeed, he thought we should suppress in all future official statements any reference to the term “thermonuclear”. It was quite possible that omission of this term would add to Russian confusion and ignorance of the status of our program. Dr. Oppenheimer expressed agreement with the President’s view.

Secretary Wilson stated that, as he had said previously, he feared that the proposal was more likely to frighten people than to reassure them, and Secretary Humphrey said that the same problem bothered him.

The President, however, stated his own conviction that instead of trying to raise vague hopes in the minds of the American people, it should be our job to attempt to inspire some really energetic action. In order to avoid the worst effects of bombing in great metropolitan areas, the first requisite was to assure firm discipline. Despite this truism, people merely laughed at all our efforts to emphasize discipline and control in our civilian defense exercises. As to the clamor for shelters, the President thought that they were far less significant than means to assure discipline. It was essential that more thought be given as to how to get this job done. It seemed apparent that civilian defense inspired no enthusiasm among most people.

At this point Mr. Cutler read to the Council Governor Peterson’s written statement approving the recommendations in NSC 151.³

The President expressed his agreement with the ideas of Governor Peterson, but insisted that the Administration must do more to make people realize their own individual responsibility in facing up to this problem. The Government cannot simply do everything for them. People had been so used during the past twenty years to expecting the Government to settle all their difficulties, that it was going to be extremely hard to inspire a new sense of individual responsibility.

Dr. Bush, referring to the discussion of possible defense measures, expressed the view that it was plainly hopeless to expect any complete defense against atomic attack. Nevertheless, he insisted that it was possible to construct a defense sufficient to postpone and deter the evil day. We should have commenced this task several years ago. We have delayed almost too long the construction of a defense system for the North American Continent. Along with the facts of their grim situation, the American people must be told what the Government proposes to do to defend the continent.

Secretary Wilson observed that a trying part of the problem was that we would never be the first to use the atomic bomb, whereas the Russians obviously would use it when they were ready.

The President said he was not absolutely sure that Secretary Wilson was right. It seemed to him at least possible that some action would occur which would force the Government’s hand and cause us to resort to atomic bombardment. He noted that popular pressure had forced the Government’s hand in the Spanish-American War. Accordingly, though Secretary Wilson was generally correct, he should not be so certain in view of the temper of the American people.

Secretary Smith said that he was concerned, as he had said to the Council before, about the increasing feeling among Western European peoples that anything was better than atomic warfare. He wondered, therefore, whether, if the President agreed to speak to the American people along the lines recommended in this report, he would not in fact intensify this sentiment of so many Europeans and thus jeopardize the objectives of our foreign policy.

Dr. Oppenheimer replied that he did not think this a necessary corollary of a policy of candor if we stressed the deterrent power of the bomb and also pointed out to our allies that we too were vulnerable.

The President added that of course no one, he supposed, was suggesting that he go before the people with some kind of horror story. There were enough raw nerves in various parts of the world so that he did not wish to add to them. The emphasis should be on vigilance and sobriety, not on panic. The President went on to say that perhaps in this case, as in others, he was too pragmatic in his approach, but he was convinced that he must see the text of what he was expected to say to the American people before deciding to support the recommendation in favor of candor.

Secretary Humphrey reverted to his own anxiety as to the wisdom of telling the American people these grim facts before we were in a position to state concretely what steps the Government would take in building a defense against atomic attack.

The President said that that might be the case, but if free government were going to work, it was necessary to have an informed people.

Secretary Humphrey said he obviously could not deny this statement, but he was merely concerned with the matter of timing. In short, we should be ready to talk with the American people about the defense system at the same time that we informed them of their extreme vulnerability.

Secretary Wilson added that he was far from certain that this was the right moment to acquaint the American people with the facts.

Dr. Oppenheimer replied that the precise question of timing was beyond his knowledge, but he was sure that in general the policy of candor was several years overdue.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the question of timing the release of the information was discussed very carefully in NSC 151.

The President reiterated his desire to see a draft of the speech before he agreed to the policy, at which point Mr. Jackson suggested that he or someone else be directed to outline the draft of an opening-gun speech. The President thought this a sensible proposal, and further indicated that the subject of the atomic threat ought to be fitted into a speech which had a larger umbrella than the A-bomb and atomic warfare.

General Bradley commented that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the policy of candor, they were uncertain of the wisdom of acting on this first of the four recommendations in the report of the panel of Consultants until we were ready to go ahead with the other three recommendations.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject in the light of oral remarks by Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Bush and a memorandum from the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

b. Noted the President’s desire that reference in official statements to “thermonuclear” weapons be discontinued for security reasons, and that such weapons be included within the term “atomic” weapons.

c. Noted that the President directed Mr. C. D. Jackson to prepare a draft of a Presidential address which might initiate the recommended policy of candor toward the American people.

d. Directed the Psychological Strategy Board to prepare for Council consideration an outline plan of the specific steps, including speeches by Government officials, which should be taken to carry out the recommendations contained in NSC 151.

Note: The action in c above subsequently transmitted to Mr. C. D. Jackson for implementation. The action in d above subsequently transmitted to the Psychological Strategy Board for implementation.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 30.
2. For text of NSC 151, May 8, see p. 1150. For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114. The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.
3. The text of the statement has not been found.
4. Paragraphs a–d constitute NSC Action No. 799, May 27, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)