Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 143d Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 6, 19531
[Extract]
eyes only
Present at the 143rd meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the [Page 1146] President; Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
. . . . . . .
1. The Large Ship Reactor and Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Programs (NSC Action No. 768–e; NSC 149/2)2
Mr. Cutler sketched the background of Council action on this item. He reminded the Council that it had eliminated the sodium graphite reactor which was to have been built in connection with the Atomic Energy Commission’s objective of realizing practical nuclear power for commercial purposes. Mr. Cutler also reminded the Council that it had eliminated, in so far as the interest of national security was concerned, the two programs calling for the construction of the large ship reactor and the aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor.
Since the Council had taken these actions, continued Mr. Cutler, the Department of Defense had revised its position on the aircraft nuclear propulsion program, while the AEC had come up with a new position with regard to the future of the large ship reactor program. Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Strauss to inform the Council of these new positions.
Admiral Strauss dealt first with the new views of the Department of Defense on the aircraft nuclear propulsion program. While the Department of Defense did not propose to revive a program which would result in the actual completion of an aircraft propelled by nuclear power, which would have cost approximately $1 billion, it had nevertheless come to the conclusion that certain research and development activity on this program should be continued. The cost would amount to some $29 million from AEC in FY 1954 and something over $14 million in FY 1955. As its share, the Department of Defense would contribute something over $9 billion [million]. Admiral Strauss stated that the revised objective no longer contemplated actually building the aircraft reactor, but the program would be continued to the point of proving the possibility of successfully building such a reactor. The revised views of the Department of Defense were that such expenditures for such an objective would pay off.
As for the large ship reactor program, which the Council had decided it was not necessary in the interests of national security to [Page 1147] proceed with, Admiral Strauss said the Atomic Energy Commission had come up with a new possibility. It proposed to continue work on this reactor, not in order to produce an aircraft carrier propelled by nuclear power, but to produce a reactor which might produce electric power as a substitute for the sodium graphite reactor which had been previously eliminated. In short, the AEC is asking authorization to proceed with the large ship reactor program divorced from its military aspects. The Commission felt that their proposal had had great value in filling the gap in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, which would exist until such time as private capital could be induced to finance such projects. The AEC, concluded Admiral Strauss, had in mind a pilot plant to test nuclear power possibilities.
The President stated that the issue before the Council was this: The Council had earlier determined to eliminate the large ship reactor and the aircraft reactor on grounds that neither was currently essential for reasons of national security. The Department of Defense had now modified its views and was stating that research and development on the aircraft reactor should be continued on a more modest scale. The AEC was suggesting continued development of the large ship reactor with a non-military objective in view. The AEC had informed him, said the President, that development of a power reactor should be continued by the Government until such time as private industry was ready to take over. The question is, do we agree with these two positions? The President said that he believed that we should. We have gone so far with both these programs, governmentally, that the Council should be willing to authorize the expenditure of additional funds for the programs until the atomic energy law could be changed and private capital appeared willing to invest in the enterprise.
Secretary Humphrey sought a specific answer to the question whether the proposals advanced by Admiral Strauss contemplated continued Government expenditure over a considerable period, or whether Admiral Strauss contemplated private interests taking over in the near future.
Admiral Strauss said that both courses were likely, depending on whether and when private industry could be induced to take over.
The President pointed out that it was quite possible that further work on the nuclear power reactor might lead to the conclusion that its construction was not feasible. We should then, of course, have to drop the program.
Admiral Strauss, however, stated his conviction that construction of the power reactor was feasible. The real problem was the high cost of this power per kilowatt hour.
[Page 1148]Secretary Wilson observed that unless the cost of electric power produced by this reactor could be lowered to compete with other sources of electric power, the reactor was certainly not feasible.
Mr. Dodge inquired whether the program contemplated a complete reactor or a mere pilot plant.
Admiral Strauss replied that the objective was to produce a full reactor. A pilot plant couldn’t determine costs of power per kilowatt hour. He pointed out, however, that the cost of building this full reactor would be much less than the cost estimated for the sodium graphite reactor which had been eliminated from the AEC budget. The reason for this was that the Navy had already carried its large ship reactor so far along, and the AEC could now take over where the Navy left off.
Commissioner Murray summed up the position of the Commission on this matter. He estimated that the total cost of completing the full reactor would be approximately $100 million. Large as was this sum, Commissioner Murray felt that unless it were expended, the prospects for developing peaceful uses of atomic energy would be very dim indeed, and we would have fooled the public on the great issue of peacetime uses.
Secretary Humphrey inquired if, as Commissioner Murray had stated, the Council was initiating a program which it would cost $100 million to complete, whether the Council was really changing its earlier decision not to compete with private industry and private capital in the field of practical nuclear power. He felt that the Council should have a clear answer to this issue.
Admiral Strauss said that as it seemed to him, the decision was rather one to try to salvage money already spent by the Government on the development of a power reactor. In effect, what the Council would be doing, if it agreed to the AEC’s proposal to take over the large ship reactor program, would be to put in some $25 million in FY 1954 and 1955 in the hope that before we reached the ultimate expenditure of $100 million, private industry would come in and take over.
The President remarked that this was precisely the point he wished the National Security Council to be aware of. Certainly, he said, he had no desire to go against the earlier decision of the Council to seek to persuade private industry to exploit the field of practical nuclear power. It was our intention, continued the President, to proceed with the attempt to modify the Atomic Energy Act in order to open the field to private industry. Meanwhile, however, we do not wish a gap to exist in this field or to throw away Government money already spent in research and development of the large ship reactor.
[Page 1149]After further discussion of expenditure figures and savings in the next two fiscal years, the President turned to Admiral Strauss and asked him directly whether he favored carrying on the large ship reactor program. Admiral Strauss replied that he did, and the President stated that he agreed.
The National Security Council:3
- a.
- Confirmed the action taken in NSC Action No. 768–e to eliminate, as not required from the viewpoint of national security, the existing programs for the large ship reactor and aircraft nuclear propulsion.
- b.
- Adopted the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Defense for a new program of nuclear propulsion for aircraft, which selects the air cycle drawn wire and the super-critical water-liquid fuel system as the most promising possibilities to date for further exploitation in the interests of national security. This new program is estimated to result in expenditures during FY 1954 of $9.6 million by the Air Force and $14.2 million by the Atomic Energy Commission plus $13.8 of AEC funds from previous years’ appropriations.
- c.
- Adopted the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission that the pressurized light water program and related research be continued, pending the availability of private financing, in the interests of nuclear power development. This program is estimated to result in expenditures by the Atomic Energy Commission of $11.9 million in FY 1954 and $12.8 million in FY 1955, and no expenditures by the Navy. Including these expenditures, carrying the full program to completion is estimated to cost the Government approximately $100 million, unless private financing should become available before completion.
Note: The above actions subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.
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