Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

511.00/7–2453: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

secret

Washington, July 24, 1953.

Unrest in Satellite Countries²

CA–345. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 409: (FYI begins: Following, which supplements earlier guidance this subject, constitutes, together with InfoGuide Bulletin 405,³ first installment of comprehensive regionalized guidance on Unrest in Satellite Countries. Remainder will be moved in segments as it is completed and cleared. We have been asked to indicate that the White House attaches significance to appropriate exploitation, in all areas, of the current unrest in Eastern Europe. Ends FYI)

background

For the first time since the extension of Soviet power to that area, massive anti-regime demonstrations and large scale rioting has taken place in Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. These events, confined largely to East Germany, were of a scope and intensity which a short time ago no one would have believed possible. As the Economist pointed out nothing more damaging to Communist prestige has happened since the war.

The satellite countries have been experiencing severe strains for some time. These strains emerged, inevitably perhaps, from the program of forced industrialization and collectivization pursued in this area. Shortages in food stuffs and consumers goods, systematic increases in worker’s norms and forced deliveries of agricultural goods as well as pauperization through currency revaluation, all accompanied this ruthless policy. Popular reaction to these measures included labor slow-downs, absenteeism, peasant resistance. Repression and material hardship combined to crystallize popular hatred of the Communist regimes although there is reason to believe that rioting itself in East Germany took on significant proportions only after the populace sensed the indecision and/or impotence of their puppet regime.

In general press reports concerning the scope of unrest in the satellite countries have exaggerated the gravity of the situation as assessed by reliable on-the-spot observers. In view of the unexpected character of the East German events and the general desire to believe that the Soviet empire is crumbling, these exaggerations are natural and human. Despite outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany however, there is little evidence of organized overt defiance of state authority in the other satellite countries. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and East Germany no unusual security measures have been reported by reliable observers. It is the view of qualified experts that the control exercised by satellite regimes appears as firm if not as confident as in past.

The pattern of current developments in Eastern Europe indicates an absence at this moment of a uniform Soviet policy re their European satellites. In East Germany and Hungary Soviet policy appears to be characterized by moderation of earlier political and economic programs, accompanied, however, by warnings that activities directed against the regime will not be tolerated. In Poland and Bulgaria, on other hand, there are as yet no clearly discernible signs that similar changes are imminent there. Limited adjustments on specific problems made in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Albania can scarcely compare with the rather impressive concessions and “reforms”’ promised in East Germany and Hungary.

It is, of course, impossible at this point reliably to predict the influence of Beria’s⁴ fall on future satellite developments. At the present juncture, however, it would appear that the recent policy changes in Soviet dominated Europe may not be countermanded as a result of Beria’s elimination.

So far as the non-Communist world is concerned the events of East Germany have

a. exposed the exploitation and suppression by the East German government of the very working classes which it professes to represent, conversely it has demolished the myth concerning the workers “paradise.”

b. demonstrated that the Soviet satellite regimes do not enjoy any real popular support.

c. exposed the satellite governments not only as unpopular tyrants but as impotent puppets maintained in power only by Soviet troops and by local security forces of uncertain reliability.

d. demonstrated that the puppet satellite regimes can be challenged by a population aroused.

e. indicated that although the workers demonstrated against objectionable conditions of work, they rioted for freedom and against Soviet domination, the root cause of their hardship and degradation.

It is not clear how the satellite people view the East German developments. We may legitimately assume, however, that in addition to being impressed and heartened by the daring of the East German populace they may be considering

a. what were the true origins of the demonstration-rioting and how they relate to the Soviet “peace offensive,” particularly the manifest Soviet objective to prevent the buildup of Western power and unity. Many may assume that the rioting made it psychologically impossible for West Germans to subordinate German reunion to West European integration.

b. whether the rioting can list accomplishments of lasting significance.

c. whether the accomplishments justify their cost as measured in terms of lives lost, injuries sustained and arrests of an indeterminate number of actual or potential leaders.

d. what significance to attach to the absence of overt Western support despite the fact that the drama unfolded in full view of Western observers with American, British and French troops close at hand.

e. what important differences exist between their own position and that of the East German population. For example, the East Germans were in a position indirectly to contribute to their own eventual liberation from Soviet domination by limited actions imparting new urgency to the moral obligation of the Fedrep and the Western powers to explore the practical possibilities of German unification.

In the light of the background considerations set forth above we should set ourselves the following basic objectives:

a. To persuade the peoples of the Soviet satellite countries, through facts, reports and interpretations which are both credible and convincing that Soviet power in the satellite world is not impregnable, and that the resistance manifested by the East Germans has achieved concrete successes.

b. To strengthen the confidence of the satellite people in the potentials of their own strength and in this way to fortify the spirit of resistance in the satellite countries.

c. To make the problem of Soviet control over the satellite people in the critical period which lies ahead as difficult as possible, without, however, inciting to revolt which might well lead to bloody reprisals and without jeopardizing the reputation for credibility and reliability which we have taken great pains to establish and maintain.

d. To reflect United States opposition to the enslavement of the satellite peoples and United States determination that true liberty be restored to the countries of Eastern Europe. (See communiqué of Three Foreign Ministers, July 14, 1953)⁵

e. To maintain in the satellite lands a climate of resistance calculated to encourage exploitation of whatever opportunities unfolding developments in the Soviet orbit may present for effective action against the edifice of Soviet power.

It is essential in this connection to keep in mind that while the United States, as noted above, has stated its desire to see true liberty restored to the countries of Eastern Europe, the President has indicated (his news conference of July 1, 1953) that he did not believe there was any thought of taking, for such purpose, any physical action of any kind that could be classed as intervention.⁶

treatment

To the European Satellites of the USSR

a. We continue to cross-report reliable news concerning unrest in the satellite lands and popular resistance to the puppet satellite regimes.

b. We seek serious comment emphasizing that the current indications of Soviet weakness and uncertainty vis-à-vis the satellite countries foreshadow the eventual failure of Soviet policy in that area.

(1) The carefully nurtured pretense of monolithic strength has been shaken by the dramatic, open manifestations of inner weakness in the Soviet system.

(2) The puppet “quisling” regimes installed by Moscow have failed to win any real popular support. Far from winning the voluntary compliance of the people, they have succeeded only in intensifying the will of the people to resist. The behavior of the East German police should destroy any illusions, if there were any, concerning the reliability even of the satellite security forces.

(3) Failure of the Soviets to achieve their objectives in the satellite countries must be attributed primarily to the resistance developed by the East European people themselves. The myriad forms of resistance which devoted and staunch patriots throughout the satellite world have devised and employed with ingenuity has begun to reap dividends. A factor in this resistance is, of course, the determination of the Free World, as epitomized in NATO, for example, to stand up to the challenge of Soviet power.

(4) The USSR must now recognize the dangers of the policy which they have pursued since 1945.

c. When appropriate we employ the theme that the people of Eastern Europe have steadfastly adhered to the European tradition despite the temporary barriers imposed arbitrarily by the USSR to isolate them from their European brethren.

d. We report in detail and comment as opportunity permits, to the other satellite countries on the “concessions” promised the people by the puppet regimes of Eastern Germany and Hungary. Comment should emphasize the theme that nothing is so dangerous as necessary concessions delayed too long.

e. In output to Hungary we question both the sincerity and the capability of the reorganized government to implement its promises concerning “reform.” Particular attention should be devoted to the matter of peasant withdrawal from agricultural collectives.

f. Commentaries interpreting the significance of the events of Eastern Germany should utilize available German or other statements indicating

(1) that Soviet control of the situation in their zone of occupation has been permanently undermined by the failure of the SPD, their chosen political instrument in Eastern Germany.

(2) the emergence among the people in East Germany of a new spirit of self-confidence.

(3) satisfaction of the East German population that they have contributed indirectly to their own eventual liberation. Handled with appropriate care the point may be made that through their dramatic action the East German people have focussed world attention upon their own plight, in particular their urgent desire to be united in freedom with their brethren in free West Germany.

g. We continue to publicize useful statements of escapees and report arrival in the West particularly of defecting Vopo’s.

h. We give full publicity to free world expressions of solidarity with both the suppressed East German people and the enslaved peoples of the satellite countries.

i. Useful statements by reliable emigre groups such as the recent memorandum of the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe and the statement by the Conference of the Socialist Union of Central and Eastern Europe should be given appropriate play.

j. We continue to emphasize the United States desire to see free and unfettered elections held in the European countries under Soviet domination expressed by the President in his April 16 speech and reiterated more recently by himself and by the Secretary.

k. We continue, as appropriate to make points relating to Beria’s downfall and the intensified struggle for power being waged at the core of the Soviet empire, set forth in earlier guidance.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Revey; cleared by Thurston, Straus, Montgomery, and Harold Vedeler of EE; sent to 31 missions and 3 consulates.
2. For documentation concerning the disorders in the German Democratic Republic, see volume VII. For documentation concerning the disorders in Czechoslovakia, see volume VIII.
3. Not printed; it provided an outline of publicity policies to be pursued or inaugurated concerning the disturbances in East Germany. (511.00/7–1753)
4. Lavrentiy Pavolovich Beriya was from March to June 1953 Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR and Member of the Presidium of the CPSU. He was removed from office and later executed for alleged high crimes against the state.
5. For documentation on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at Washington, July 10–14, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.
6. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 468–469.