Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

511.00/7–2553: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

confidential

Washington, July 25, 1953—1:26 a.m.

57. Following is InfoGuide Bulletin 411:

Armistice: Note: This guidance becomes operative only upon official announcement armistice is signed.² (FYI begins: Difficulties raised by Rhee³ and other ROK officials should not be allowed divert attention from fact and significance of armistice as viewed from our standpoint.

In establishing and projecting our own view of significance armistice we avoid becoming involved in differences with Rhee in our information output; similarly we undercut Communist attempts misinterpret armistice, viz., claiming victory for Communists or for Asians over whites, claiming credit for bringing peace, etc.

Whatever compulsions have brought Communists to armistice in Korea, we welcome termination hostilities but remember that their concessions must always be seen as part their larger global strategy to achieve unchanging Communist objectives. World is gratified that UN has elicited compliance with first part of first great step specified by Eisenhower April 16⁴ as requirement for relaxation tensions; nevertheless Communist agreement to armistice must be viewed in context of larger purposes Moscow’s “peace offensive” (Review Department’s circular airgram Control 2995, InfoGuide Bulletin 342, April 22, 1953). Communists’ shift from use armed hostilities Korea as principal instrument their expansionist aims, at least for present, may be calculated bring neutral and some Allied pressure on US to relax opposition to (a) trade with China and other Soviet orbit countries, (b) admission Communist China to UN, and (c) other Communist political and economic goals. We guard against world opinion being taken in by face which Communists will place upon their action. We seek forestall Communists anticipated attempt make virtue of UN’s frustration of their Korean aggression, their attempt present their agreement to armistice as major concession which would make it free world’s turn to make major concessions in Asia and Europe. Ends FYI)

Information Policy and Treatment:

Our strategy upon signature of armistice is to explain its terms, to establish our view of its significance, and to use occasion to review history of Korean conflict and drive home its lessons: (a) Soviet orbit will resort to unprovoked armed aggression in pursuit of its objectives at any time or place cheap victory appears possible, (b) collective security measures under UN met and stopped aggression, (c) aggression does not pay.

I. Terms

A. We explain terms by circulating full text widely as possible, plus appropriate summaries of varying length in all useful forms and media. In summaries to North Korea and Soviet orbit emphasize factually arrangements giving reasonable assurances against ROK renewal of hostilities; also recall tri-partite Foreign Ministers’ Washington statement July 14 on renewal of aggression.⁵

II. Significance of Armistice

A. Destruction and bloodshed have ceased, we hope for good. We identify ourselves with human feelings of relief and joy that fighting has been halted on honorable terms—an end we have long and patiently sought. (1) Emphasize appropriate passages in President’s and other official statements; (2) Pick up US press and radio comment making point; (3) Report in proper perspective religious observances, sermons, articles in religious press, avoiding obvious extremes. Caution: Avoid exaggerated emphasis, any suggestion full peace achieved, or any implication that “now it’s all over, we can bring the boys home”.

B. The armistice registers UN success. It is military agreement registering fact that unprovoked aggression has been stopped and repelled by collective action under UN, thus fulfilling purposes which motivated UN military action.

1. Use selected and original material which recalls: (a) Creeping, piecemeal aggression such as led to World War II was met and stopped by resolute, prompt collective security action by free nations under UN; (b) First North Korean aggression was routed. When Soviet orbit threw power of Communist China into second act of wanton aggression this too was stopped.

2. Without gloating or boastful talk of “victory”, make plain that free world has said unprovoked armed aggression against a free country, even though small and weak, shall not succeed and has made good. Caution: Keep treatment simple and broad, avoid arguments about fine points of precisely what various UN resolutions meant as to UN military objectives, also arguments about crossing 38th parallel, etc.

C. Armistice makes further progress possible. With fighting stopped on honorable terms, now becomes possible pursue by peaceful means common political objective of UN, US and ROK—a free, united and independent Korea. It is further possible turn more attention to efforts toward solution other problems creating tension and dangers to peace. (1) Use official statements, US and foreign, demonstrating common objective and making point we can now pursue it by peaceful means; (2) Document division of Korea, a Soviet act, enforced by Red Army, contrary to our purposes and understandings. Recall our efforts (1945–50) to achieve united, free Korea, frustrated by arbitrary Soviet actions; (3) Refer to political conference as provided for in armistice terms and as treated in official US statements (e.g. Eisenhower, Dulles) keeping a positive, constructive—but not unduly hopeful—attitude toward possibility of a successful outcome. Cautions: Avoid speculations. Treat political conference relatively lightly in keeping with our intention to use conclusion of armistice to focus attention on lessons learned in Korea. Limit to official UN, UNC and US statements any treatment re date, place, membership or agenda of conference.

D. This is honorable armistice. Besides registering success in stopping aggression, armistice embodies fundamental principle, overwhelmingly approved by free men and nations of world, that men shall not be forced return to slavery against their will. (1) Recall UN resolutions and overwhelming free world support for UNC stand against forcible repatriation despite tremendous Communist pressure; (2) Foreign statements and comment making this point particularly useful; telegraph Washington for cross-reporting.

To Soviet orbit countries, that principle of no forcible repatriation was sustained should constitute main theme.

Caution: Do not commit US–UN prestige to high number of eventual non-repatriate Communist POWs, nor comment on numbers of captured UN personnel whom Communists may claim refuse repatriation. Do not refer to release of POWs by Rhee.

E. Armistice is not political settlement, a peace, or conclusive evidence Communist intentions are peaceful. It is agreement between military commanders to cease fighting. It also recommends a conference to seek a peaceful and final solution of remaining Korean problems. (1) Since armistice is only an armistice, there can be no relaxation of vigilance, strength, and unity of purpose among free nations in Korea or elsewhere; (2) Use statements and selected and original comment making clear that although Communists have been forced to halt, they have still to demonstrate future intentions; (a) Agreement to armistice does not indicate Soviet orbit has changed basic objectives or abandoned use of armed aggression; (b) Agreement to suspend illegal armed aggression is not an act deserving rewards or concessions on our part, e.g. admission of Communist China to UN; (3) Foreign statements and comment this point particularly useful; Telegraph Washington for cross-reporting.

Caution: Avoid discussing whether armistice is deed in terms of Eisenhower’s April 16 speech. If necessary we may point out his formulation of whole “first step”: “The first step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea. This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea”.

III. Lessons of Korean Conflict

A. Communist attempt to conquer South Korea by violence and outright armed aggression after withdrawal US forces illustrates necessity of strength, vigilance and unity of purpose on part of free nations. Mere suspension of aggression does not justify any relaxation. (1) Review and recall reactions to 1950 attack among free nations, with spirit of determination to cooperate in arming and guarding against threat of Soviet attack; (2) Recall communiqué of three Foreign Ministers in Washington, July 14, 1953.

B. Collective security is workable and has worked. (1) Give credit to UN which took action, to overwhelming majority of UN members who approved and supported action, and especially to ROK and other nations with contingents in UN forces in Korea whose heroic sacrifices made this effort of collective security under UN work; (2) Review difficulties and skill with which UNC surmounted them in welding these units into an effective fighting force; (3) Emphasize UNC responsibility and restraint in conducting successful military action without allowing conflict to grow into world conflagration.

C. UN has upheld values of human freedom and dignity above all else; stress: (1) UNC good treatment of prisoners; (2) Patience, skill and determination of UNC in conducting negotiations for armistice, our repeated initiatives and Communist obstruction, our refusal compromise on Communist demand for forcible repatriation, entailing many months of sacrifice, finally acknowledged by Communist agreement to present terms.

Overall Cautions:

1. Avoid interpretations precise legal purport of specific armistice terms beyond official US–UNC statements.

2. Avoid tone and material which would lay official US information output open to charge of prejudicing successful implementation of armistice terms or prejudicing success of political conference.

3. Avoid any suggestion that when armistice is signed US troops will be returned home; play down predictions of or developments in reductions of US draft calls.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Frederick M. Fisher of the Office of Policy and Plans, IIA; cleared in draft by Huyler, Pratt, Mosman, Montgomery, and Allen Haden, Chief of the Area Policy Planning Staff in the Office of Policy and Plans, IIA, as well as by Louis Henkin of UNA, Robert McClurkin of FE, and Major Kelleher of Defense; approved by Wechsler; telegraphed, priority, to 38 posts and the Department of Defense, and pouched to 49 other posts.
2. The armistice terminating hostilities in Korea came into effect on July 27, 1953. For documentation on Korea and the Korean war, see volume XV.
3. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea from 1948 to 1960.
4. Reference is to President Eisenhower’s address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors entitled “The Chance For Peace”. See InfoGuide Bulletin 342, Apr. 22, p. 1699.
5. For documentation on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, held July 10–14, 1953 at Washington, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.