Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 135 Series

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington , September 24, 1952.

At the NSC meeting this afternoon¹ NSC 135/2 was approved with the amendment to paragraph 9b recommended by the Senior Staff. I made the statement regarding 9b which was suggested at this afternoon’s briefing and this was received with apparent approval by all.

In connection with the meeting, two matters were brought up of some importance.

1. Joe Fowler made a statement bearing on paragraph 9a and paragraph 16a. He says that he has a report available bearing on this matter which would be accessible to those making the reexamination called for by 135/2. The report, as I understand it, is to the effect that the work on the expansion of our mobilization base has now proceeded so far that it is possible to have a very considerable increase in the production of various end items without adding to our inflationary troubles or interfering with civilian demand. This production might take the form of military end items of certain sorts which did not require redesigning of plant or tools. It might also take the form of exports of producers goods should these be needed in connection with foreign aid or foreign investment. He thinks that acceleration could show results, if it were approved immediately, by the middle of 1953. This is a matter which I think Mr. Nitze will wish to look into.

2. Jack Gorrie distributed the attached paper. After having the paper read, the President said that he was not suggesting any action on it at the present time. He thought that members of the Council might wish separately or together to discuss the matter with Gorrie and to have all documents in his possession which substantiated his position. Here again is a matter which I think will require investigation. The President contemplates the possibility of a later discussion and possible action in regard to allocating funds. The Acting Secretary of Defense put in a caveat that this was a much disputed field; that he thought the costs would be vastly in excess of those suggested in the paper, and that the scientific developments were disputed by other scientists of equal repute.

DA

[Attachment]

Paper Distributed by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Gorrie) at the Meeting of the National Security Council, September 24, 1952

top secret

[ Washington , undated.]

In connection with the Council’s consideration of NSC 135/1, I submitted a written statement of my views regarding the need for more adequate policy guidance as a basis on which to plan the Nation’s passive defense programs.²

Unless an effective military defense of the continental United States can be developed, it is impossible to provide meaningful policy guidance to civil defense regarding shelter or evacuation programs for civilians, and for the protection and continuity of war industry.

In raising the question of the adequacy of military defense programs, it is again made clear that this does not suggest improving military defense at the expense of programs that project our strength outward toward the enemy. The question is that of adequacy and relationship of our combined defense programs.

An effective early warning system is important to both the protective military and passive defense of the continental United States. NSC 135/1 points out that in their growing atomic strength, the Soviets are creating a capability for critical attack on the United States.

Data provided by scientists and engineers associated with projects Lincoln, Charles, Hartwell, and East River and with the Rand Corporation, indicate that recent technological developments now make it possible to control the advantage of surprise by providing effective early warning. Furthermore, we are advised that the cost of such a warning system would be a nominal fraction of current military outlays; its manpower requirements would be small. It can be operational within two to three years if undertaken now, according to experts who have been studying this problem.

The scientists who supply this information emphasize that, as recently as two years ago, they held the view that effective early warning was infeasible. Technological break throughs, which promise a solution to the problem, have occurred only in recent months.

They recommend that $100 million be provided immediately for expediting the further development and initial installation of a new continental early warning system which incorporates these technological improvements. They estimate that in order to complete the full warning system in depth, an additional $250 million per annum may be required for each of the following three to four years.

Early warning of three to six hours is now possible, according to scientists who say this would make defense in depth feasible. It is only with the assurance of early warning and defense in depth that an adequate program of civil defense, the evacuation or shelter of civilians and the protection of war industry can be planned.

It is understood that the Department of Defense now has these problems under study. However, the purpose of this memorandum is to urge the immediate allocation of funds sufficient to initiate this program as a matter of utmost urgency and with the highest priority.³

1. See the memorandum for the President of discussion at the 123d meeting of the NSC, supra.
2. Ante, p. 114.
3. On Sept. 29, Nitze and Carlton Savage of the Policy Planning Staff met with officials of the National Security Resources Board at the Old State Building where the Gorrie memorandum was further reviewed and “Mr. Nitze expressed tentative concurrence in the position taken in the NSRB paper.” It was the sense of the meeting that the Department of Defense would prepare “a presentation of the case for approval by the President, direct or through the NSC” and that, because of the importance of the subject to the Department of State, “it was understood that State should see the presentation before it goes to the President” upon his return to Washington on Oct. 13. A handwritten notation on the memorandum of this meeting notes the extreme displeasure of the Department of Defense “to Gorrie having taken this directly to Pres without having consulted them. Serious—critical—decisive Technical problem”. (Memorandum by Carlton Savage, Sept. 29, PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Natl Sec (Civil Defense)”)