Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file

Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 123d Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, September 24, 1952¹

top secret

September 24, 1952

[Extract]

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 123rd Meeting of the National Security Council, at which you presided. The Vice President was unable to attend the meeting because of his absence from the city.

. . . . . . .

2. Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security (NSC 135/2;² Annex to NSC 135/1;³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 23, 1952;⁴ NSC Action No. 668⁵)

At the conclusion of the briefing on the situation in the Far East, The President turned to NSC 135/2 and Mr. Lay explained that the present report constituted a redraft of the paper which had been considered by the Council at an earlier meeting. The President referred to the recommendations of the Senior Staff for a revision of the present paper and then called upon Secretary Acheson for his opinion.

Secretary Acheson stated that in its present form and with the additional sentence recommended by the Senior Staff he found the paper entirely satisfactory. He did, however, desire to comment on the reasons for the additional sentence. This was, he said, in the nature of a caveat in that the areas in point were Southeast Asia and the Middle East. These were areas in which it had proved very difficult to provide for any satisfactory collective security arrangements. It was therefore necessary that the policy in NSC 135/2 make it very clear that the United States did not intend to confine its role in defense against aggression to areas which already had satisfactory collective security arrangments. It was also necessary to point out, continued Secretary Acheson, that the influence of the United States is far more important in these areas than it had even been before owing to the decline of British and French prestige and power.

The President stated that he understood Secretary Acheson’s concern and added that it was extremely difficult to get the American people to realize the increased size of our responsibility in such areas. The President then asked Secretary Foster for his views.

Secretary Foster replied that he found the draft of the present report satisfactory and concurred in the suggestion of Secretary Acheson that the word “over-all” be deleted from the proposed additional paragraph.

After The President had inquired whether any other members of the Council desired to comment on the report. Mr. Fowler stated that he would like to speak briefly on two points in the report, largely in terms of information and emphasis of statements made in the report. These related to the statements in paragraphs 9–a and 16–a with respect to the level of resources allocated to the national security programs in general and to the capacity of the economy to accelerate the production of certain selected military end items. He added that he had at hand a somewhat lengthy memorandum on these points which he would transmit to the Executive Secretary for circulation to the Council members. Meanwhile, however, he desired to emphasize that analyses of the materials situation and allied problems recently completed in the Office of Defense Mobilization afforded clear evidence that certain of the national security programs could be rapidly accelerated in the latter half of Calendar 1953 and Calendar 1954 if it was deemed desirable to do so. Mr. Fowler stated that it was no longer necessary to make the difficult choice between production of end items and the expansion of the mobilization base in many categories of key weapons. In fact, so much progress had been made in the last year in solving this problem that we are now confronted by a new choice of alternatives. We can, if we desire, continue to adhere to the stretched out schedule which, until recently, we have felt obliged to follow or we can now take advantage of the solution of many earlier problems and accelerate production very sharply. In other words, we no longer need to adhere to the stretched out schedules for many selected items. This is certainly feasible, but it was largely up to the Defense Department to determine whether it was actually desirable to attain our original objectives at a much earlier date. Mr. Fowler also pointed out that the analyses from which he was quoting also meant good news for the stockpile program, as also for non-military, as well as military aid to our Allies, Furthermore, Mr. Fowler said, it was the conviction of the Stabilization people that the hypothetical acceleration which he was describing could be handled in such a way as not unduly to disturb the stabilization program or to induce severe inflationary pressures beyond those already in existence. In conclusion, however, Mr. Fowler warned of the importance of timing and indicated that we must be informed well in advance if the desired acceleration was to be undertaken.

At the conclusion of Mr. Fowler’s remarks, The President stated that if he heard no objection the paper stood approved by the Council.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 135/2 subject to the addition of the following sentence after the second sentence of subparagraph 9–b on page 8:

“This is not intended to preclude the possibility of the use of our military forces unilaterally when under the particular circumstances it is in our best interests to do so.”

b. Noted the remarks of the Director of Defense Mobilization with respect to the favorable outlook for the acceleration of production of certain selected items in the national security programs.

Note: NSC 135/2, as amended, subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The statement by the Director of Defense Mobilization referred to in b above subsequently circulated to the Council for information.

3. Possibility of an Improved Continental Early Warning System

The President then turned to Mr. Gorrie and said that he understood he had a paper which he desired to present to the Council.⁷

Mr. Gorrie replied in the affirmative and said that he had brought up his problem at the previous Council meeting but felt that it was so urgent that he must state his case once again. After referring to the chronic inability of his own agency and others, such as Civil Defense, to get adequate guidance for the formulation of workable passive defense programs, Mr. Gorrie informed the Council that he had recently talked at some length with individuals who were engaged in projects such as the East River Project.⁸ Many of these scientists and technicians had changed their minds and abandoned their previous pessimistic estimates about the possibility of developing a more adequate early warning system for the defense of the Continental United States. He therefore desired to reopen the problem which he had discussed at the previous meeting of the Council and to pass out copies of a memorandum setting forth these new possibilities.

Mr. Gorrie noted that the original costs of providing a more adequate early warning system were now thought to be much less than had originally been estimated and cited figures to indicate the reduction. Mr. Gorrie then noted the urgency of the problem and the importance of time. If we continue with conventional methods it will take many years to develop a reasonable early warning program, but if given preferred treatment and taking advantage of new technological discoveries this task might be accomplished in two or three years.

The President stated that he thought the subject of Mr. Gorrie’s remarks, and of his memorandum, was of the greatest importance. He said he had not intended that it should be a specific subject for consideration at this meeting but that he was anxious for all around the table to give it careful attention before the Budget for the next Fiscal Year had been firmed up.

Secretary Foster stated that he feared that Mr. Gorrie’s figures for the cost of building a reasonable early warning system were a little optimistic. It looked to him, said Secretary Foster, like a major job, in terms of cost, to provide a system which would assure three to six hours of warning in advance of an attack.

After further comment The President stated his desire that a survey be undertaken to see what could and should be done in this field.

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Noted a statement by the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, regarding recent technological developments indicating the possibility of an improved early warning system for military and passive defense of the Continental United States, and the urgency of taking immediate steps in this field.

b. Noted the President’s desire that an urgent survey be made by the Department of Defense of the feasibility and cost of such an improved continental early warning system.

Note: The President’s action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared on Sept. 25, presumably by the Secretariat of the NSC. According to the minutes of the meeting, which consist of a list of participants and a brief list of decisions taken, the following members of the Council attended: President Truman, presiding, Acheson, Foster, Harriman, and Gorrie. Others present at the meeting included Foley, Fowler, Sawyer, Murray, Lawton, Keyserling, Wadsworth, General Bradley, Walter B. Smith, Major Turk, Commander Clausner, Lay, and Gleason. (Minutes of the 123d meeting of the NSC, Sept. 24, 1952, Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file)
2. See footnote 1, supra.
3. Dated Aug. 22, p. 89.
4. See footnote 4, p. 143.
5. See footnote 7, p. 123.
6. Paragraphs a and b below constitute NSC Action No. 672. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action, 1952”)
7. Printed as the attachment to the memorandum by the Secretary of State, infra.
8. Regarding the East River Project, see footnote 2, p. 20.
9. Paragraphs a and b below constitute NSC Action No. 673. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action, 1952”)