Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 135 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 135/3

Washington, September 25, 1952.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security

References:

A.

NSC Action Nos. 575, 668 and 672²

B.

NSC 135/2 and Annex to NSC 135/1³

C.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 23, 1952⁴

D.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, dated June 30, 1952⁵

E.

NSC 20, NSC 68 and NSC 114 Series

At the 123rd Council meeting, with the President presiding, the National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Murray for the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers and the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 135/2 subject to the addition of the following sentence after the second sentence of subparagraph 9–b on page 8 (NSC Action No. 672):

“(This is not intended to preclude the possibility of the use of our military forces unilaterally when under the particular circumstances it is in our best interests to do so.)”

In adopting NSC 135/2, as amended, the Council also noted the remarks of the Director of Defense Mobilization with respect to the favorable outlook for the acceleration of production of certain selected items in the national security programs. The statement by the Director of Defense Mobilization will be circulated separately for the information of the Council.⁶

The report, as amended and adopted, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 135/2, as amended and enclosed herewith, as a reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy for national security and directs its use as a guide by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. Also enclosed is an Appendix containing a “Summary and General Conclusions”, resulting from the NSC Staffs reappraisal of U.S. objectives and strategy for national security which served as the basis of the enclosed statement of policy.

Special security precautions are requested in the handling of the enclosure.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security

General

1. Reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy for national security reaffirms the basic purposes and policies of the NSC 20, 68 and 114 Series. The fundamental purpose of the United States remains as stated in NSC 68: to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual, while promoting peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Pursuit of this fundamental purpose should continue to be through that general policy which seeks:

a. To develop throughout the world positive appeals superior to those of communism.

b. To block further expansion of Soviet power even at grave risk of general war.

c. Without deliberately incurring grave risk of general war, to induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence, and so to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Soviet bloc is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

2. We continue to believe that the free world with its superior resources should be able to build and maintain, for whatever length of time proves to be necessary, such strength that the Soviet orbit will be unable to make significant advances in expanding its power, either geographically or politically. Moreover if the free world develops such strength, the internal conflicts of the Soviet totalitarian system should, with positive effort from us, subsequently cause a retraction of Soviet power and influence and eventually cause that system gradually to weaken and decay, although no time limit can be established by which these objectives will be achieved.

3. Although no fundamental departures from the conclusions of the NSC 20 and 68 Series are required, it is essential that we take into account certain factors that have developed or acquired new significance since the adoption of these reports:

a. The United States and its major allies have responded to the perilous situation of 1950; they have responded collectively to the attack upon South Korea; they are improving the security position in Western Europe and in the Pacific; they, and particularly the United States, have significantly improved their readiness for war. These efforts, though not yet complete, have already reenforced the deterrents to general war and reaffirmed the reasoning of NSC 68 by which both preventive war and isolation were rejected as courses of action.

b. There has also been a substantial further development of Soviet orbit strength since 1950. Modernization and expansion programs in the Soviet, satellite, and Chinese Communist armed forces are proceeding, supported by a rapidly growing economic and industrial capacity and by a high level of scientific and technical capability in selected fields of vital military importance. As a result of the developing atomic and possible thermonuclear capability of the USSR, the vulnerability of the United States to direct attack, which is now serious, will in a few years probably assume critical proportions. On the other hand, the USSR has been seriously vulnerable for some time and will also probably become critically vulnerable to our own developing atomic and possible thermonuclear capability.

c. Although there is continuing danger of general war, the most immediate danger facing the United States is that a progressive and cumulative loss of positions of importance to the United States (either as a result of deterioration within the free nations or of communist cold war actions or a process involving both) could eventually reduce the United States, short of general war, to an isolated and critically vulnerable position.

4. In the light of these concurrent developments, it must remain the immediate and, we believe, attainable objective of the free world to develop and sustain for as long as may be necessary such over-all strength as will (a) continuously confront the Kremlin with the prospect that a Soviet attack would result in serious risk to the Soviet regime, and thus maximize the chance that general war will be indefinitely deterred, (b) provide the basis for winning a general war should it occur, (c) reduce the opportunities for local Soviet or satellite aggression and political warfare, (d) provide an effective counter to local aggression, if it occurs, in key peripheral areas, and (e) permit the exploitation of rifts between the USSR and other communist states and between the satellite regimes and the peoples they are oppressing. The United States should accordingly pursue with determination and constancy, and in keeping with the threat, the courses of action set forth in the following paragraphs.

Deterrent to General War

5. The United States should develop and maintain, in cooperation with its allies, a position of strength, flexibility and depth adequate to deter the Soviets from deliberately initiating general war and to discourage them from pursuing courses of action involving grave risk of general war.

6. To achieve such a deterrent, the United States should take the necessary measures to:

a. Develop the political unity of and encourage the growth of strength and determination in the free world so as to minimize the likelihood that the Soviets would believe they could undertake local aggression without serious risk of war.

b. Develop and retain, under all foreseeable conditions, the capability to inflict massive damage on the Soviet war-making capacity.

c. Assure ready defensive strength, both military and non-military, adequate to provide in the event of general war a reasonable initial defense and to ensure reasonable protection to the nation during the period of mobilization for ultimate victory.

d. Round out and maintain the mobilization base, both military and industrial, in the United States at a level which in the event of need will enable us to expand rapidly to full mobilization; and, consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic society, provide the means for protecting the mobilization base against covert attack and sabotage.

7. In the light of the capacity of the USSR to deliver an atomic and possible thermonuclear attack, the United States should develop a substantially improved civil defense as an essential part of the total national security program in order to (a) provide reasonable protection for the American people and maintain their morale, thereby enhancing the freedom of action of the U.S. Government, and (b) minimize damage to war production plants and facilities and increase the capability of the country’s economy to recover. At the same time the American people should recognize their vital role in the total program of national security, and be prepared to accept and live with a substantial degree of vulnerability in fulfilling that role.

Areas Outside the Soviet Orbit

8. A preliminary study of problems in the areas outside the Soviet orbit brings out some major causes of concern which indicate the need for a restudy and possible change of emphasis and redirection of certain of our efforts with respect to those areas. These causes of concern are the following:

a. Our major European allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, may not have the political and economic capacity (a) to make a fully adequate contribution to the forces of NATO and (b) to support their existing responsibilities outside of Europe.

b. Present indigenous political and military strength in areas on the periphery of the Soviet orbit, even when reinforced by the readily deployable reserve strength of the United States and its allies, is insufficient to permit us to escape from the possibility of having to accept, in the face of local aggression, either the eventual further expansion of Soviet power, inconclusive local counteraction, or general war.

c. Serious internal instability in many areas, caused in varying degrees by the activities of indigenous communist parties, rabid nationalism, economic and political backwardness, and defeatist neutralism, and stimulated by aggressive Soviet and satellite propaganda directed chiefly against the United States, threatens to create conditions where communist influence and control may be extended without Soviet aggression unless effective counter measures are taken.

9. In the light of the above, the United States should:

a. Reexamine the amounts and allocations of resources to various areas in terms of kind, quantity, timing and priority, to determine (1) whether a general increase in the level of free world programs and military forces is required to deal with the several threats; (2) whether the present allocation of resources as between U.S. military forces and other free world forces is appropriate; (3) whether the present balance between military assistance and the various types of economic assistance is appropriate; and (4) whether these allocations are in proper relationship to the threats facing the United States in Europe, the Far East and the Middle East, to the importance of these areas for U.S. security, and to United States commitments.

b. Encourage and as appropriate assist in the development of indigenous forces and regional defense and collective security arrangements capable of sharing responsibility for resisting local communist aggression. At the same time the United States should be increasingly willing, in support of its security objectives in key geographical areas, to use its resources, as appropriate in cooperation with its allies, and to take collective military action against aggression. (This is not intended to preclude the possibility of the use of our military forces unilaterally when under the particular circumstances it is in our best interests to do so.) To this end, the reexamination called for under sub-paragraph a above should include the necessary study of requirements, capabilities and appropriate arrangements. Any decision to use United States forces would, of course, be made at the time in the light of the prevailing circumstances.

c. Increase its efforts to promote internal stability in critical areas outside the Soviet orbit. Here the United States should conduct, with greater vigor, political warfare operations as an integral part of its over-all strategy, in order to reduce communist and neutralist influence, combat anti-American propaganda, and create stronger support for the purposes of United States foreign policy. Particular emphasis should be placed on measures directed against the effectiveness of local communist parties.

Areas Within the Soviet Orbit

10. Where operations can be conducted on terms which may result in a relative decrease in Soviet power without involving unacceptable risks, the United States should pursue and as practicable intensify positive political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary operations against the Soviet orbit, particularly those operations designed to weaken Kremlin control over the satellites and the military potential of the Soviet system. However, we should not over-estimate the effectiveness of the activities we can pursue within the Soviet orbit, and should proceed with a careful weighing of the risks against the possible gains in pressing upon what the Kremlin probably regards as its vital interests.

Economic Measures

11. The United States should:

a. Utilize its economic power as feasible to facilitate the growth of strength, stability and unity in the free world. United States international economic policies, including trade policy, the promotion of raw material development and supplies, the stimulation of investment abroad, and financial relations among the nations of the free world should, where necessary, be adjusted to make sure that they contribute to the greatest possible extent to the achievement of our security objectives. In this connection, relevant studies already under way should be utilized. The provision of economic and technical assistance should be coordinated with these policies so that, in operation, the several elements of our strength will be mutually supporting. Such assistance should also be closely related to military and political policies and aid should be allocated in the light of the reexamination specified in paragraph 9–a above.

b. Be prepared to utilize its economic resources to forestall, or if necessary to resolve favorably, political crises which pose a threat to U.S. security interests.

Public Support

12. The United States should undertake systematically and consistently a program of clarifying to the American public and to other peoples of the free world the complex problems of the free world in meeting the Soviet threat, the nature of that threat, the strength and resources the free world possesses to meet that threat, and to the extent possible the reasoning behind the general lines of policy and action described herein, in order to secure that public understanding and support which is essential to the success of our policies and actions.

Negotiation

13. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, should develop a sound negotiating position in any question or dispute involving the USSR and should be prepared to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union if they offer promise of achieving acceptable modus vivendi, or if, for other reasons, they appear to be desirable. On the other hand we should recognize that only enforceable agreements are meaningful and that the major contributions of negotiation in the foreseeable future may be to convince the world of the validity and sincerity of our position and to serve as a political warfare weapon.

Mobilization Policy

14. The United States should continue to pursue a policy of limited mobilization designed to develop and maintain a favorable power position sufficient to support the security objectives and strategy of the United States without resort to an armament effort so large as to disrupt the economies of the free nations. In view of the fact that our mobilization effort must meet a situation in which general war might be forced on us at any time, or might be avoided indefinitely, it should be designed concurrently to:

a. Develop forces and matériel adequate to attain the objectives set forth in paragraph 4 and which can be maintained for so long as may be required.

b. Enable the military forces of the U.S. and our allies to achieve a high state of readiness as soon as feasible.

c. Support the expansion of our basic industrial potential concurrently with an expansion of essential armament capacity.

d. Achieve a high level of production of long lead-time military items as soon as feasible.

e. Maintain a broad base of production for military end products and keep these production lines active over as long a period as feasible.

f. Safeguard and increase the economic and fiscal strength of the nation as the essential foundation upon which an indefinitely sustained military program must rest.

13. The adequacy of currently projected mobilization goals is a question separate from that of the soundness of the concept of limited mobilization. Appraisal of the present goals must be accomplished on a continuing basis as the various programs are fulfilled and in light of changes in the world situation. The rapid growth of the Soviet atomic capability, the prospect for our continued heavy commitment in Korea, the serious threat to Southeast Asia, the danger of further deterioration of the situations in Iran and Egypt, the grave implications of further Soviet efforts to force the Western powers out of Berlin—all of these portents underline the risks involved in the projected rates of delivery and in adhering to presently programmed force levels.

16. Recognizing the above risks and objectives in the light of the situation facing us, and recognizing that acceleration and upward adjustment of our national security programs as a whole, if necessary, are well within our capacity and can be accomplished without serious adverse effects on the U.S. economy, the United States should:

a. Assure the acceleration of the production of selected military end items under present programs.

b. Place continued high emphasis upon selected scientific and technical programs in fields of military application.

c. Make such adjustments in our national security programs as may be found necessary and feasible in the light of the reexamination called for in paragraph 9 above.

Appendix

Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security

Summary and General Conclusions

1. If the Soviet rulers should attain, in their judgment, the capability of defeating the United States or of so reducing its power potential as to render it permanently incapable of effectively challenging Soviet power and if they should come to believe that such action would not involve serious risk to the maintenance of their regime, they would probably deliberately initiate general war.

2. The Soviets might attack the West if they were convinced as a matter of fact, rather than theory, than an attack by the West was actually imminent.

3. Nor can it be excluded that if in the eyes of the Soviet leaders developments in the power balance appeared directly and imminently to threaten the security of the Soviet Union or areas under its control, they might feel compelled to force certain outstanding issues in such a way that the result might well be the outbreak of war without any deliberate intention on the part of the Soviet Union to bring about such an event.

4. War could come from communist action based on initial Soviet miscalculation of the free world’s interest in and reaction to the situation in some particular area.

5. War could come from a deadlocked situation in which basic interests of both parties are involved with an act of one side setting off an unwinding chain of action and reaction which neither side would be able fully to control.

6. In the absence of general war, the Soviet leadership will probably continue a pushing and probing exploitation of all weaknesses in the free world. This means that the Soviets can be expected to continue their efforts to consolidate and expand their influence in Asia; undermine U.S. leadership of the free world; break the unity of the West; prevent the integration of West Germany and Japan into the Western system; disrupt the economies and governmental effectiveness of our major continental European allies; and exploit the intemperate nationalism and political instability of the Middle and Far East. Thus, there continues to be danger of such a progressive and cumulative loss of positions of importance to the United States (either as a result of deterioration within the free nations or of communist cold war actions or a process involving both) that the United States would eventually be reduced short of general war to an isolated and critically vulnerable position.

7. The Soviet orbit now has formidable military capabilities. It has succeeded in maintaining large and increasingly well-equipped Soviet armed forces, in expanding and improving the satellite armed and para-military forces, and in developing significant atomic, electronic and possibly BW and CW capabilities. The Soviet long-range air force is capable of atomic attack on the United States and might achieve surprise in the initial strike. The Soviets would be able to support extensive military operations of an offensive nature during the early phases of a general war with reserve stocks and military forces in being.

8. The Soviet orbit is expanding its current production; it is also expanding its industrial, economic, and scientific potential. Many of these latter developments are long range in nature. The USSR has demonstrated a high level of scientific and technical capability in several vital military fields, notably nuclear energy, aircraft design and production, electronics and chemical warfare.

9. The United States and its major allies have responded to the perilous situation of 1950; they have responded collectively to the attack upon South Korea; they are improving the security position in Western Europe and in the Pacific; they, and particularly the United States have significantly improved their readiness for war.

10. The United States is increasing its atomic strength and may soon develop a thermonuclear weapon. There is, in fact, every indication that its present advantage in atomic weapons stockpile and in the production of fissionable materials will be further increased; and means for their delivery exist. The U.S. is also developing an increasing variety and quantity of mass destruction weapons and means for their delivery; well dispersed overseas bases are being established within range of the sources of Soviet political and industrial power.

11. The United States and other countries in the free world are engaged in a mobilization program which is designed both to facilitate any future shift to a war economy and to maintain a substantial level of strength over an extended period. Moreover, the United States has the economic capacity to sustain a generally higher level of armament production than is contemplated by currently projected programs and is capable of accelerating the production of selected items within the framework of present programs. Such an increase in the level of armament production would, however, require a willingness in the United States and allied countries to accept an increased diversion of scarce materials and other resources to such production through more severe direct physical controls. In addition more vigorous price and credit controls and a heavier tax burden would be required in order to protect the economies of these nations.

12. The free world enjoys a very substantial superiority in basic productive potential over the Soviet orbit, but this superiority is not the sole measure of the relative ability to undertake large armament programs over an extended period in the absence of general war. The Soviet orbit, through its total control over the Soviet economy and population, can utilize a high proportion of the Soviet orbit resources and potential to achieve and maintain the present level of military preparedness. In the absence of general war, it is far more difficult for the free world to achieve an adequate utilization of its resources and potential to counter the Soviet threat.

13. Moreover, the increasingly destructive power that will be available to both sides could make it more difficult to ensure the effective conversion of the economies to full war production. In planning the utilization of its resources in the absence of general war, therefore, the free world cannot give the same weight as in previous wars to its heavy preponderance of productive capacity and economic potential as the determining factor in preventing or winning a general war.

14. Because of improved methods of delivery, in combination with increased atomic and possibly thermonuclear weapon stockpiles, the Soviet orbit will probably acquire during the next several years a capability to damage critically the United States and its allies. Defensive counter-measures now in prospect probably cannot prevent the Soviet orbit from achieving such a capability, although such measures can certainly postpone the time of its achievement. The same reasoning would apply in general to the defensive position of the Soviet orbit. The free world for its own protection must take measures to improve active and passive defense, including the exploration of new technological possibilities, but nevertheless must probably accept a substantial degree of vulnerability and avoid disproportionate concentration of resources on defense at the expense of measures necessary to project its strength outward to the enemy.

15. Taking account of all these factors, the strongest deterrent to general war will be the achievement and maintenance of such an overall position of strength by the free world as will force the Soviets to recognize the undesirability of challenging it. The United States and its allies hold it within their power to achieve and maintain such a position of strength.

16. In Europe a continued improvement in the NATO military posture is essential (a) further to reinforce the deterrent to general war, (b) to provide a sounder military position in the event of general war, (c) to strengthen the confidence of our European allies and their determination to stand firm in the face of further Soviet provocation. Greece and Turkey, with their significant forces, are being successfully integrated in NATO; Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military cooperation is beginning to develop; the juridical basis for Western German rearmament is being established; and Spain’s participation in Western defense plans is a developing prospect. However, our major European allies, particularly the UK and France, are encountering major obstacles in making a fully adequate contribution to the forces of NATO and in supporting their existing responsibilities outside Europe. The volume and rate of delivery of U.S. assistance, which in turn depends upon production and availability of material, is a major factor in determining the size and timing of the genuinely effective forces which can be created. On balance, the NATO commitments, and such additional declarations as those of the United States and its allies concerning Berlin, together with European efforts and U.S. assistance, have made it clear that military action by the USSR or its satellites would almost certainly lead to general war. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet orbit will take military action there unless it is prepared to engage in general war.

17. Apart from the above problem of military capabilities, the Western European powers continue to be confronted with serious political, economic and social problems despite substantial advances, with U.S. assistance, towards greater stability and cohesion. These problems have derived from economic conditions, political instability, neutralist tendencies, social tensions, and, in France and Italy, the continued existence of large and powerful Communist parties. Although genuine progress has been made, further efforts by the Western European countries and U.S. assistance to them will be required to overcome these adverse elements and to continue the progress towards political, economic and social stability, and collective defense in Western Europe.

18. Present and threatened communist aggression and subversion in the Far East and Middle East (excepting Turkey) currently pose immediate dangers to the free world position.

a. In the Middle East, efforts to maintain or enhance political stability have not succeeded. Recent developments in Iran, and to a lesser extent Egypt, have emphasized the danger that trends in this area may lead to the denial of its resources to the free world’s security efforts and eventually to the loss of important countries in Communist control. The U.S. may soon have to consider assuming additional responsibilities in the area.

b. In South Asia and the Far East, the inexperience of the present leadership and lack of a firm popular base hampers the ability of various countries to strengthen themselves internally and to cope with communist and extremist pressures. The continued rise of nationalism in these areas has created divisive conflicts. This nationalism represents a reaction against former or remaining colonial controls and creates weaknesses in the free world as a whole.

c. In Indochina, where the situation is most acute, an increase of strength has enabled the French Union forces to stand off the communists but has not brought them within sight of success.

In the Middle and Far East there is evident need for aid programs of such flexibility and so related to political factors as to contribute to the solution of critical problems in unstable areas. Moreover in the Middle and Far East, the USSR, by instigating direct or indirect aggression, can force the Western powers to choose among (a) suffering the loss of these areas by default, (b) fighting defensive local action for limited objectives, or (c) treating local aggression as a cause for general war.

19. Despite the vital interest of the free world, measures to deal with a sudden worsening of situations in the Far and Middle East are not now adequately provided for under present programs, priorities and force levels. In the circumstances, the questions arise (a) whether these serious threats can be met by a redistribution of the free world’s effort presently programmed, or (b) whether consideration must be given to increasing the total effort, or (c) both.

20. Over the next several years, with the accumulation on both sides of atomic and other mass destruction weapons, the developing situation may present a continuing and possibly improved opportunity for Soviet expansion by the techniques of political warfare and local aggression if the free world permits the fear and threat of general war to paralyze its reaction to such threats.

21. In the light of the present threats and foreseeable developments, as outlined above, it appears that the ability of the free world to maintain its position and progress toward its objectives will come increasingly to depend upon: (a) its capacity to stand firm against Soviet political warfare, which may be intensified by the increasing Soviet atomic capabilities, (b) a greater capability and greater willingness than have been demonstrated to commit appropriate forces and material for limited objectives, and (c) its ability to develop greater stability in peripheral and other unstable areas.

22. Outside the Soviet orbit there exists a need for increased and more selective political warfare operations by the United States and its allies to combat:

a. The threat of local communist parties, which remains serious although the United States and its allies have demonstrated the ability to weaken communist organizations and reduce the communist potential for revolution and sabotage.

b. USSR propaganda directed with particular force against the United States.

c. In many parts of the world, distrust of the United States which weakens affirmative support for the purposes of the United States.

23. Against the Soviet orbit itself, by skillful execution, the United States and its allies may sap the morale of satellite leaders and encourage rifts between the USSR and the satellite countries, and over a period of years may gradually force the Kremlin to an increasing preoccupation with internal security. By appropriate economic measures, the U.S. and its allies can help to deprive the Soviet orbit of needed resources and retard the development of Soviet orbit military potential. It should be recognized, however, that measures of these types alone, however vigorously pursued against the Soviet orbit, cannot be counted on drastically to reduce the threat which the Soviet system poses to the free world.

24. During the next few years, it is unlikely that broad settlements can be negotiated with the USSR for the Kremlin will probably not feel that the power relationship obliges it to make significant concessions to the free world. This situation could change in the course of time, particularly if Germany and Japan were to be restored to strength and firmly aligned with the free world; but during the next several years the prospect for negotiations of general agreements is negligible, although specific agreements on a quid-pro-quo basis, such as an armistice in Korea, are not precluded. Nevertheless, development of a sound U.S. negotiating position in any question or dispute involving the USSR would help to convince the world of the validity and sincerity of our position and would serve as a political warfare weapon.

25. While recognizing the admitted elements of strength of the Soviet world and the as yet un-marshalled over-all strength and obvious points of weakness of the free world, we continue to believe that the free world with its superior resources should be able to build and maintain, for whatever length of time proves to be necessary, such strength that the Soviet orbit will be unable to make significant advances in expanding its power, either geographically or politically. Moreover, if the free world develops such strength, the internal conflicts of the Soviet totalitarian system should, with positive effort from us, subsequently cause a retraction of Soviet power and influence and eventually cause that system gradually to weaken and decay, although no time limit can be established by which these objectives will be achieved.

26. During the past two years, the free world has made considerable progress toward building such strength. However, in view of the dangers and difficulties facing us in the next few years, a reexamination of the adequacy of current U.S. national security programs from the standpoint of size, relative priority, and allocation is required.

1. Copies to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Attorney General, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. Information on NSC Action No. 575 is in footnote 1, p. 5. Regarding NSC Action No. 668, see footnote 7, p. 123. Regarding NSC Action No. 672, see footnote 6, p. 138.
3. Regarding NSC 135/2, see footnote 1, p. 134. The Annex to NSC 135/1 of Aug. 22 is printed on p. 89.
4. Not printed; it transmitted to the National Security Council several recommended revisions to NSC 135/2 proposed by the Senior Staff. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Review of NSC 68 & 114”)
5. Ante, p. 54.
6. The undated statement is printed on p. 156.